Rita -
>Date: Fri, 24 Nov 1995 17:18:48 -0600 (CST)
>From: dralfonso@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: RE: null conscience and uncanny anxiousnesses
You wrote:
"Micheal,
"thank you for your elaborations and clarifications of my post.
"For the most part I do not think that we are in any serious
disagreement...
"Here are just a few points of clarification.
"On Thu, 23 Nov 1995 us005330@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >Being-towards-death would be Dasein's way of
> >being-towards the possibility of the impending impossibility of
death;
>
> Perhaps an accidental mistake here - death is not an impossibility. It
> is the one certainty of human existence which we must all come to
> terms with. This coming to terms with leads us to anxiety (but only as
> one possibility) and other emotional states.
You respondez:
"I was thinking of H262: "The closest closeness which one may have in
Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from
anything actual. The more unveildly this possibility gets understood,
the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it *as the
possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.*"
"Death is not simply an impossibility, but the possibility of the
impossibility. And this is why it is Dasein's most primordial
possibility, it is the limit of and ground for Da-sein's factical
existence." [MvP: if we are talking here only of the factical death
and not the death present in/perceived thru Attunement.]
MvP: On Second Reading: We strive not to recognize or acknowledge
our death, not only out of fear of not-being-at-all, but also because
we cannot KNOW what it is not-to-be. Trying to imagine one's own death
is an impossibility; for in that imagining, we are actually looking at
it through the experience of some other.
> >The nullity, or not, belonging to Dasein is always already a
> >possibility in its constant becoming: "...Dasein is dying factically
> >and indeed constantly, as long as it has not come to its demise."
> (H section 52.)
>
> We are always equally close to dying.
Rita sez:
"Oh, is that all this means?"
I respond lamely:
That's all only if we bracket out, and write under erasure, and admit
all sorts of differing interpretations and emotional states that go
along with each and every word of that stmt. We are always already
dead just as we are always already equally alive. My death is as assured
as my living; but my death nor my living can be yours, nor can your
death or living cannot be mine.
Lovely Rita, in meter:
"Why not "Dasein is always close to dying" but
"Dasein is dying (active) *factically* and indeed *constantly* as long
as death has *not* come to pass." I am intrigued by this statement, and
others similar throughout these passages on Being-towards-death,
*because* he seems to be claiming not simply that Dasein could at any
moment die, but that in its very existence Dasein is dying factically.
Do you see the peculiarity of this statement, the paradox here?"
MvP:
For me, there is no paradox here. Death is our constant, but only so
long as we are living.
Perhaps I was not clear enough. We are always as close to life as to
death. 'Though we are factically always dying, we are factically
always living. In choosing to remain living, we are 'in a sense' making
of our death an impossibility. The Angst involved is the recognition
of death as the constant pressure against futurity becoming truly
meaningful, except as some authentic transcendent.
Jeez! After looking at that - did it make any sense at all?
Clip from old exchange:
> (or even better, the crisis of choosing life, not death; the choice we
> may every moment, 'though for the most part without thinking)
> Good ol' W.Shakespeare puts this call into the mouth
> of Hamlet, methinks.
To which Rita responded:
"Dasein cannot *choose* life, because Dasein is alway already the
'there' (Da) equiprimordially." Micheal inserts: [and here we will
disagree, for in remaining alive we are choosing life, whether that
choosing is active (eigentlich) or passive (uneigentlich); it is
either active involvement/engagement with or a mere dwelling-along-
side; but it is still a choosing. Choosing is the most primordial
action. But you are correct in that Da- Sein as Being right here is
always that which is living. My feeling is that you focus on that Da-
too closely. Then again, I've been wrong before.]
Continuation of above from Rita:
"Neither can Dasein *refuse* life by a negation in
suicide, because the 'choice' is not possible for Dasein qua Dasein."
Micheal inserts: [Death is not always a negation. And it seems that
we will disagree about choice. 'Though we are thrown existent and
thus cannot refuse the present condition, in choosing no longer to be,
we do choose to refuse the future and any possibility of projection.]
Rita:
"About the 'bro Shakespeare, methinks it the very impossibility of this
possibility to which Hamlet gives voice. Both Derrida, in _Specters_
and Levinas, in _Time and the Other_ explicate this fine point much
better than I ever could.
Mikey:
Ah, and here we will disagree -
Rita:
"Is not the question not one simply of 'choice' but of *authentic
choice*?"
Mikey, waxing Japanese:
Ah so desu. This is the point on which we can agree; praps the
misunderstanding is involved in my usual choosing the Eigentlich
(my major prof accused me of this quite regularly). However, I must
still maintain that Dasein is an always choosing of life and refusing
of death, even in the face of death as the always most possible.
Aesthetically speaking, this puts us on the knife's edge of the
sublime, living fully at any moment while staring into the abyss.
The problem is that Dasein as inauthentic refuses to stare into
the abyss and thus strives to put nullity as an impossible. H suggests
that Dasein seeks an authentic responce to the struggle inherent
in choosing life authentically while acknowledging death authentically.
Rita:
"And is not to chose to live authentically also to choose to die
authentically?"
Micheal:
Yes, I would think so. But re-read this stmt of yrs here, and then
try to square it with yr comment above about choice. Are we both
running into paradoxes here?
R:
"Can the privation of one's life by oneself ever be authentically
'chosen'?"
M:
[As I read H, this would seem to be so, as he suggests that there are
several ways that social interaction can be ways in which we can live
authentically while not falling into the They. However, the problem
here would be that this privation might be an attempt to deny the
presence of Other as a prime force in shaping Self. Again, H puts us
on a razor's edge ('though not Ockham's); balancing between the Call
to Conscience (and Self) and the Fallenness of They (Uneigentlichkeit).]
Ah - the richness of Heidegger.
Good comments, Rita. Thank you.
Micheal.
-------------------------------------
Micheal vanPelt,PhD
Chair, Humanities Division
Philander Smith College
Little Rock AR 72202 USA
Off: 501-370-5339; Res: 501-666-7199
E-mail: us005330@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Author of PIRK -The Philosopher's Internet Resource Kit.
Note just a list of lists, but a complete (pretty much) guide to
philosophy resources on the Internet, including instructions on the
WorldWideWeb, WWW sites, FTP, Gopher, the software to use, and how-to's
on all of it.
Now available ftp from raz.mc.duke.edu/pub/PIRK.
11/25/95
Time: 10:09:29
This message was sent by Chameleon
-------------------------------------
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Date: Fri, 24 Nov 1995 17:18:48 -0600 (CST)
>From: dralfonso@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: RE: null conscience and uncanny anxiousnesses
You wrote:
"Micheal,
"thank you for your elaborations and clarifications of my post.
"For the most part I do not think that we are in any serious
disagreement...
"Here are just a few points of clarification.
"On Thu, 23 Nov 1995 us005330@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >Being-towards-death would be Dasein's way of
> >being-towards the possibility of the impending impossibility of
death;
>
> Perhaps an accidental mistake here - death is not an impossibility. It
> is the one certainty of human existence which we must all come to
> terms with. This coming to terms with leads us to anxiety (but only as
> one possibility) and other emotional states.
You respondez:
"I was thinking of H262: "The closest closeness which one may have in
Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from
anything actual. The more unveildly this possibility gets understood,
the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it *as the
possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.*"
"Death is not simply an impossibility, but the possibility of the
impossibility. And this is why it is Dasein's most primordial
possibility, it is the limit of and ground for Da-sein's factical
existence." [MvP: if we are talking here only of the factical death
and not the death present in/perceived thru Attunement.]
MvP: On Second Reading: We strive not to recognize or acknowledge
our death, not only out of fear of not-being-at-all, but also because
we cannot KNOW what it is not-to-be. Trying to imagine one's own death
is an impossibility; for in that imagining, we are actually looking at
it through the experience of some other.
> >The nullity, or not, belonging to Dasein is always already a
> >possibility in its constant becoming: "...Dasein is dying factically
> >and indeed constantly, as long as it has not come to its demise."
> (H section 52.)
>
> We are always equally close to dying.
Rita sez:
"Oh, is that all this means?"
I respond lamely:
That's all only if we bracket out, and write under erasure, and admit
all sorts of differing interpretations and emotional states that go
along with each and every word of that stmt. We are always already
dead just as we are always already equally alive. My death is as assured
as my living; but my death nor my living can be yours, nor can your
death or living cannot be mine.
Lovely Rita, in meter:
"Why not "Dasein is always close to dying" but
"Dasein is dying (active) *factically* and indeed *constantly* as long
as death has *not* come to pass." I am intrigued by this statement, and
others similar throughout these passages on Being-towards-death,
*because* he seems to be claiming not simply that Dasein could at any
moment die, but that in its very existence Dasein is dying factically.
Do you see the peculiarity of this statement, the paradox here?"
MvP:
For me, there is no paradox here. Death is our constant, but only so
long as we are living.
Perhaps I was not clear enough. We are always as close to life as to
death. 'Though we are factically always dying, we are factically
always living. In choosing to remain living, we are 'in a sense' making
of our death an impossibility. The Angst involved is the recognition
of death as the constant pressure against futurity becoming truly
meaningful, except as some authentic transcendent.
Jeez! After looking at that - did it make any sense at all?
Clip from old exchange:
> (or even better, the crisis of choosing life, not death; the choice we
> may every moment, 'though for the most part without thinking)
> Good ol' W.Shakespeare puts this call into the mouth
> of Hamlet, methinks.
To which Rita responded:
"Dasein cannot *choose* life, because Dasein is alway already the
'there' (Da) equiprimordially." Micheal inserts: [and here we will
disagree, for in remaining alive we are choosing life, whether that
choosing is active (eigentlich) or passive (uneigentlich); it is
either active involvement/engagement with or a mere dwelling-along-
side; but it is still a choosing. Choosing is the most primordial
action. But you are correct in that Da- Sein as Being right here is
always that which is living. My feeling is that you focus on that Da-
too closely. Then again, I've been wrong before.]
Continuation of above from Rita:
"Neither can Dasein *refuse* life by a negation in
suicide, because the 'choice' is not possible for Dasein qua Dasein."
Micheal inserts: [Death is not always a negation. And it seems that
we will disagree about choice. 'Though we are thrown existent and
thus cannot refuse the present condition, in choosing no longer to be,
we do choose to refuse the future and any possibility of projection.]
Rita:
"About the 'bro Shakespeare, methinks it the very impossibility of this
possibility to which Hamlet gives voice. Both Derrida, in _Specters_
and Levinas, in _Time and the Other_ explicate this fine point much
better than I ever could.
Mikey:
Ah, and here we will disagree -
Rita:
"Is not the question not one simply of 'choice' but of *authentic
choice*?"
Mikey, waxing Japanese:
Ah so desu. This is the point on which we can agree; praps the
misunderstanding is involved in my usual choosing the Eigentlich
(my major prof accused me of this quite regularly). However, I must
still maintain that Dasein is an always choosing of life and refusing
of death, even in the face of death as the always most possible.
Aesthetically speaking, this puts us on the knife's edge of the
sublime, living fully at any moment while staring into the abyss.
The problem is that Dasein as inauthentic refuses to stare into
the abyss and thus strives to put nullity as an impossible. H suggests
that Dasein seeks an authentic responce to the struggle inherent
in choosing life authentically while acknowledging death authentically.
Rita:
"And is not to chose to live authentically also to choose to die
authentically?"
Micheal:
Yes, I would think so. But re-read this stmt of yrs here, and then
try to square it with yr comment above about choice. Are we both
running into paradoxes here?
R:
"Can the privation of one's life by oneself ever be authentically
'chosen'?"
M:
[As I read H, this would seem to be so, as he suggests that there are
several ways that social interaction can be ways in which we can live
authentically while not falling into the They. However, the problem
here would be that this privation might be an attempt to deny the
presence of Other as a prime force in shaping Self. Again, H puts us
on a razor's edge ('though not Ockham's); balancing between the Call
to Conscience (and Self) and the Fallenness of They (Uneigentlichkeit).]
Ah - the richness of Heidegger.
Good comments, Rita. Thank you.
Micheal.
-------------------------------------
Micheal vanPelt,PhD
Chair, Humanities Division
Philander Smith College
Little Rock AR 72202 USA
Off: 501-370-5339; Res: 501-666-7199
E-mail: us005330@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Author of PIRK -The Philosopher's Internet Resource Kit.
Note just a list of lists, but a complete (pretty much) guide to
philosophy resources on the Internet, including instructions on the
WorldWideWeb, WWW sites, FTP, Gopher, the software to use, and how-to's
on all of it.
Now available ftp from raz.mc.duke.edu/pub/PIRK.
11/25/95
Time: 10:09:29
This message was sent by Chameleon
-------------------------------------
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---