Mark, I take it you are addressing me when you say....
>the formal necessity for death as a concept...thats an interesting
>determination I would think that according to the canons of logic
>in which I am not so schooled death would not be a formally necessary
>concept if by that one means what is formally necessary for their
>to be any concepts, such as perhaps identity, relation, possibility
>but i am to some extent dreaming that may not be what a formally
>necessary concept even is, but if it is doesnt death have a
>more empirical less purely lofi sorry logical status?
>mark hewson
... so I will respond.
I meant Death as a formal necessity *in* Being and Time. That is, Heidegger,
while suggesting that his pathway from Dasein towards Being was not the
*only* route to take (ie, he could have done the same thing using structures
other than those he used) his use of "death" (and it is a concept when we
are talking about the concepts he used to describe, or attempt to describe,
Dasein and Being) was formally necessary to his enterprise. As a concept it
was necessary for him to invoke his somewhat unique (or possibly totally
unique) concept of Death (That is, how Death *is* to him - or at least in
his book) in order to get at Dasein as a whole. The fact that Heidegger's
concept (what he conceived it as) of Death was a necessary part of the
logical structure that is the book Being and Time in no way gives Death
itself (if we accept his view of it) an Empirical status any more than the
concept of gravity (as worked out by either Aristotle, Newton, or Einstein)
changes the fact that things fall. I believe that would be to mistake "the
theory" for the "way things are".
Take that last statement with a grain of salt as it could lead all over the
place. I hope you know what I mean and do not wish to spark the embers of a
"theory"/"way things are" discussion even though I know I would have brought
it upon myself. (I do enough of that for school - this is relaxation - smile).
-Nik
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>the formal necessity for death as a concept...thats an interesting
>determination I would think that according to the canons of logic
>in which I am not so schooled death would not be a formally necessary
>concept if by that one means what is formally necessary for their
>to be any concepts, such as perhaps identity, relation, possibility
>but i am to some extent dreaming that may not be what a formally
>necessary concept even is, but if it is doesnt death have a
>more empirical less purely lofi sorry logical status?
>mark hewson
... so I will respond.
I meant Death as a formal necessity *in* Being and Time. That is, Heidegger,
while suggesting that his pathway from Dasein towards Being was not the
*only* route to take (ie, he could have done the same thing using structures
other than those he used) his use of "death" (and it is a concept when we
are talking about the concepts he used to describe, or attempt to describe,
Dasein and Being) was formally necessary to his enterprise. As a concept it
was necessary for him to invoke his somewhat unique (or possibly totally
unique) concept of Death (That is, how Death *is* to him - or at least in
his book) in order to get at Dasein as a whole. The fact that Heidegger's
concept (what he conceived it as) of Death was a necessary part of the
logical structure that is the book Being and Time in no way gives Death
itself (if we accept his view of it) an Empirical status any more than the
concept of gravity (as worked out by either Aristotle, Newton, or Einstein)
changes the fact that things fall. I believe that would be to mistake "the
theory" for the "way things are".
Take that last statement with a grain of salt as it could lead all over the
place. I hope you know what I mean and do not wish to spark the embers of a
"theory"/"way things are" discussion even though I know I would have brought
it upon myself. (I do enough of that for school - this is relaxation - smile).
-Nik
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---