Chris,
If madness is a more or less completely dysfunctional collapse into the
exhaustion of everyday psychosis then the organised militia aren't mad. But
since their violence still has real effects why confuse ontology with
ethics? And whose alternative truths do you speak for?
But then again H's decisionism from *B&T* on blurs the distinction between
ontology and ethics, out of the authentic self affirmation of Dasein
towards the willful affirmation of the Deutsche Volk and its historical
mission. From phenomenological science to poesis. And on towards the
passivity of Gelassenheit. Totalitarian will and the ontological
difference: In H's case it seems to be one of both complicity and radical
critique.
>You are correct in noting that authenticity is in opposition to falling;
>authentic Dasein is drawn back out of the enervation that belongs to
>falling.
No, the question I want to ask is precisely in what sense do you think that
the authentic projection is in opposition to falling? Does authenticity
require a recognition that there is only the 'they-self', that temporality
consists in the constant fall back to one's self in the world? Is that the
sense of the 'existentiell modification'? Then falling would be an a priori
existentiale, a temporal condition for the possibility of 'being'. Or is
falling arrested in the authentic anticipation of death, projecting 'out
of' the they in order to disclose it as falling, and following the detours
of a Nietzschean will to power? (Where, as Tom Blancato says, "The
alienated structure of fallen Dasein's Being ostensibly requires death to
pull it out of the they, perhaps with a certain shock"). And here:
"In anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself,
or behind the potentiality-for-Being which it has understood. It guards
itself against 'becoming too old for its victories' (Nietzsche)" (Being and
Time, p. 308).
I prefer the first but I agree that the second reading is possible, that
H's self-affirming reactionary authenticity (and his early thirties
optimism for the will to power):
>seems to be modelled on the path
>Zarathustra reaches in affirming the eternal return of the same as the
>solution to the problem of revenge
although I have never read in Nietzsche or Heidegger's Nietzsche that
>there is only joyful acceptance of one's place.
I had thought the opposite.
************************************************
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.
311.
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
If madness is a more or less completely dysfunctional collapse into the
exhaustion of everyday psychosis then the organised militia aren't mad. But
since their violence still has real effects why confuse ontology with
ethics? And whose alternative truths do you speak for?
But then again H's decisionism from *B&T* on blurs the distinction between
ontology and ethics, out of the authentic self affirmation of Dasein
towards the willful affirmation of the Deutsche Volk and its historical
mission. From phenomenological science to poesis. And on towards the
passivity of Gelassenheit. Totalitarian will and the ontological
difference: In H's case it seems to be one of both complicity and radical
critique.
>You are correct in noting that authenticity is in opposition to falling;
>authentic Dasein is drawn back out of the enervation that belongs to
>falling.
No, the question I want to ask is precisely in what sense do you think that
the authentic projection is in opposition to falling? Does authenticity
require a recognition that there is only the 'they-self', that temporality
consists in the constant fall back to one's self in the world? Is that the
sense of the 'existentiell modification'? Then falling would be an a priori
existentiale, a temporal condition for the possibility of 'being'. Or is
falling arrested in the authentic anticipation of death, projecting 'out
of' the they in order to disclose it as falling, and following the detours
of a Nietzschean will to power? (Where, as Tom Blancato says, "The
alienated structure of fallen Dasein's Being ostensibly requires death to
pull it out of the they, perhaps with a certain shock"). And here:
"In anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself,
or behind the potentiality-for-Being which it has understood. It guards
itself against 'becoming too old for its victories' (Nietzsche)" (Being and
Time, p. 308).
I prefer the first but I agree that the second reading is possible, that
H's self-affirming reactionary authenticity (and his early thirties
optimism for the will to power):
>seems to be modelled on the path
>Zarathustra reaches in affirming the eternal return of the same as the
>solution to the problem of revenge
although I have never read in Nietzsche or Heidegger's Nietzsche that
>there is only joyful acceptance of one's place.
I had thought the opposite.
************************************************
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.
311.
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---