From: Laurence Paul Hemming[SMTP:llh21@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: 28 April 1996 23:45
<<You ask me "I wonder if you have actually read carefully the work of
Kisiel and van
Buren." My whole point to you in my last and other posts is concerned with
what it is to *read* - in this case Heidegger. I am in no sense denying
the complexity if Kisiel's or van Buren's work - that is not what is at
issue - it is what it is to read. Which is why I find on the one hand your
dismissal of my failure to read two writers with whom you have a particular
concern odd when juxtaposed with your own unwillingness to "read" what I
might be aiming at in the rest of my post which you graced with the comment
"text deleted - the rest of your post is an expansion of this point - which
I question." My point has been consistently that there is more going on
here than you are reading.>>
I'm prepared to go along with that if we talk at the level of concrete
thinking - rather than generalized - mud slinging (viz. 'an unwillingness
to 'read''). I did 'read' the rest of your post - and in a second post
responded to it - however, as my first post was long enough and I had no
more time then to write my reply to the rest, I posted it off. If this
caused you offence I am genuinely sorry, I thought you might want a
speedier response to answer at least some of your points - rather than
hanging on until I had enough time to answer them all.
I have questioned your self declared parody of Kisiel's work - and wondered
why you might have, as far as I can see, so over interpreted it - in
claiming that it concerns at heart the search for the 'real' Heidegger. I
wondered then if you had actually read it - this was an attempt on my
behalf to understand your interpretation, as I saw it, it was actually a
generous interpretation of your parody. If you have read it carefully (and
presumably then you have) then perhaps you might be willing to actually
discuss it substantively .ie what are the grounds for your claim.
<<Let me illustrate this with one of your own posts. On the 18th April you
posted to the list something containing the phrase "H. affirms on multiple
occasions that philosophy is methodologically atheistic." I can only (so
far) find one reference to "methodological atheism" - on page 109 f. of
Gesamtausgabe 20 - Prologomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, translated
as "History of the Concept of Time" by Kisiel. (I am grateful to Paul
Fletcher of Durham University and his post for locating the exact
reference).>>
Eg in the KNS 1919 course - H. writes of a 'religious reduction'. You will
know what reduction means in a Husserlian context.
In the SS course 1921 - Augustine and Neoplatonism - the analysis of the
confessional grounding of faith, and the analysis of the absence of God in
the context of 'becoming a question to myself'.
October 1922 - The Einleitung to a book on Aristotle - facticity of
philosophy - (p15) philosophy must be 'fundamentally atheistic' (translated
I believe in Man and World 25 (1992)
This is a straight recollection - (my copy of the text is lent to someone)
- 1924 lecture on The Concept of Time.
Then, of course, the text you have found(1925 - History of the Concept of
Time)
ie repeatedly throughout the period leading up to B & T. In addition there
are numerous other side references which presume this formal structuring of
the question of Being.
<<Let us ask ourselves the question of how your assertion stands in
relation to the text itself.
Commentators seize upon this passage because it says "Philosophische
Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus" (Philosophical research is and remains
atheism) as if it is self-evident both what the research being referred to
here is, and just what atheism means here also.>>
Not self evident - as I have already written - but explicable - and
repeated and presumed in different ways.
<< But if we read on, we discover that what is at issue is an "inner
necessity" (innere Notwendigkeit) and and "eigentliche Kraft" (proper
strength or power) at issue in the "Anmassung" - the "presumption" (Kisiel
has "arrogance") of thought itself. Moreover, that there is an intimate
connection between "diesem Atheismus" (this atheism) and what "ein Grosser
einmal sagte" (a great individual once said). Who is this great
individual? Heidegger does not name him, but we are told he said what he
said in the "Froehlichen Wissenschaft", so we know it is Nietzsche.
Why is the work "die Froehlichen Wissenschaft" significant? Because it is
the place where we find elaborated in the story of the madman what
Heidegger will later come to call the "word" of Nietzsche - "God is dead"
(Gott ist Todt).>>
When does H. call this - the 'word' of Nietzsche - I don't know myself -
but is it before the mid 1930's (ie 10 extraordinary years after History of
the Concept of Time). You seem to want to read back the thought of the
1930's into the thought of the early 20's.
In addition you over interpret a pssing reference to what Kisiel translates
'joyful science' ('The Gay Science' is the english translation I remember
seeing) - Nietzsche is in no way a central reference in this text (as you
know). This reference is simply a gesture on H.'s part - it doesn't presume
that in depth encounter with Nietzsche's thinking which so marked
Heidegger's thought of the _1930's_.
Your point is interesting and well argued but again, in my view, over
interprets. It is simply too ahistorical to be a plausible interpretation
of this reference.
<<This transforms the whole perspective - for it immediately historicises
what "methodological atheism" is - it is not some abstraction of scientific
methodology that one "takes up" as an instrument when undertaking
"philosophical research" but rather it occurs somewhere and at a time - in
Nietzsche's work, with all that implies (for "it is only the moral God who
is dead") for the death and return of the gods. And it is not just any old
"atheism" but has a specificity, Nietzsche's tale of the madman's
proclamation of the death of God, in the very character of its telling. >>
H. is unclear as to the scientific status of phenomenology until after B &
T. His later polemic against science (as world historical essence) cannot
be read back into his earlier work . In addition H's later reluctance to
write of philosophy is not to be read back earlier. H. clearly and often
refers to his own thinking as a philosophy - of course, of the most radical
and originary sort.
So, of course, he takes neither of these terms for granted - they are
radicalised - but they are clearly used. So, I feel there is some
justification in using them - at least when writing of his early thinking.
Finally, and substantively, you seem to interpret it too strongly the light
of the 1936-8 text - Contributions to Philosophy which clearly interprets
Neitzsche, Holderlin & Kierkegaard as reflecting on the abyssal nature of
the history of Being and whose prime task is to abandon the shade of the
Christian 'moral' God - for the sake of the 'last god.'
I see absolutely no indication in the 1925 text that it is to be
interpreted in this light.
<<Heidegger is not, in other words, making an abstract point, which our
intoxication with the phrase "methodological atheism" leads us to think he
is, but rather a much more nuanced, subtle and crucial point about
philosophy and thinking in its actual unfolding. >>
Intoxication - is perhpas a bit over the top! You may have got carried away
with your own rhetoric. Still I get your drift - I just think you are not
reading the text in its ow terms but interpreting it retospectively (so to
say) - in terms of world historical essences and epochs.
H. in his early thought is almost obsessed with laying down those formal
structures which can allow philosophy to access the restless, moving,
historical facticity of life, the primal, pretheoretical something. it is
lectured on several times from 1919 onwads. One of these formal structures
is to abstract from the particular regional ontologies in order to plunge
into their source. Thus if you want to use the term abstract (and you seem
to see it as a criticism) - it is not astracted from life (or Being) but
precisely in order to allow philosophy to do justice to the lived
experience.
<<Can we confirm this? You bet. The phrase methodological athesim occurs
in section 8, in division (b), "Das Selsbtverstaendnis ...", following on
>from section (a) Die Bedeutung der Maxime 'zu den Sachen selbst'. Not only
is it clear that we have to nuance considerably what is meant by
"methodological atheism", we are also being treated to a careful unfolding
of just what the "philosophical research" is (and so the point in thinking
at which it occurs) to which this "atheism" belongs in the history of
philosophy itself.>>
I do agree that H's concern (obsession as I called it above) is to allow
philosophy to speak of this primal something - in all its temporality and
facticity. Lived reality, if you want - rather than abstract theories. The
formal structures of philosophical research (and I note here you use the
term, as Heidegger does in this text, which above you seemed to criticise
or even be sarcastic concerning) are to enable this to occur.
But to at this time (the mid 20's) this concern in formally structuring the
subject and approach of philosophy is not yet with epochs of world history,
or the new beginning, or nihilism etc And to interpret the texts in this
light - is to do violence to _their_ temporal paticularity.
I hope you feel I have responded to your points fairly - it's obviously
clear we disagree. However, I'm trying at least to keep what I say polite,
to explain where you think I may have been cavalier, and to apologise if
offence is caused. These seem fair enough ground rules for any debate.
Cheers,
Jacob Knee
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