This message got truncated in the system, so I am sending it again.
Laurence
Dear Jacob,
You ask me "I wonder if you have actually read carefully the work of =
Kisiel and van=20
Buren." My whole point to you in my last and other posts is concerned =
with what it is to *read* - in this case Heidegger. I am in no sense =
denying the complexity if Kisiel's or van Buren's work - that is not =
what is at issue - it is what it is to read. Which is why I find on the =
one hand your dismissal of my failure to read two writers with whom you =
have a particular concern odd when juxtaposed with your own =
unwillingness to "read" what I might be aiming at in the rest of my post =
which you graced with the comment "text deleted - the rest of your post =
is an expansion of this point - which I question." My point has been =
consistently that there is more going on here than you are reading.
Let me illustrate this with one of your own posts. On the 18th April =
you posted to the list something containing the phrase "H. affirms on =
multiple occasions that philosophy is methodologically atheistic." I =
can only (so far) find one reference to "methodological atheism" - on =
page 109 f. of Gesamtausgabe 20 - Prologomena zur Geschichte des =
Zeitbegriffs, translated as "History of the Concept of Time" by Kisiel. =
(I am grateful to Paul Fletcher of Durham University and his post for =
locating the exact reference).
Let us ask ourselves the question of how your assertion stands in =
relation to the text itself.
Commentators seize upon this passage because it says "Philosophische =
Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus" (Philosophical research is and =
remains atheism) as if it is self-evident both what the research being =
referred to here is, and just what atheism means here also. But if we =
read on, we discover that what is at issue is an "inner necessity" =
(innere Notwendigkeit) and and "eigentliche Kraft" (proper strength or =
power) at issue in the "Anmassung" - the "presumption" (Kisiel has =
"arrogance") of thought itself. Moreover, that there is an intimate =
connection between "diesem Atheismus" (this atheism) and what "ein =
Grosser einmal sagte" (a great individual once said). Who is this great =
individual? Heidegger does not name him, but we are told he said what =
he said in the "Froehlichen Wissenschaft", so we know it is Nietzsche. =20
Why is the work "die Froehlichen Wissenschaft" significant? Because it =
is the place where we find elaborated in the story of the madman what =
Heidegger will later come to call the "word" of Nietzsche - "God is =
dead" (Gott ist Todt).
This transforms the whole perspective - for it immediately historicises =
what "methodological atheism" is - it is not some abstraction of =
scientific methodology that one "takes up" as an instrument when =
undertaking "philosophical research" but rather it occurs somewhere and =
at a time - in Nietzsche's work, with all that implies (for "it is only =
the moral God who is dead") for the death and return of the gods. And =
it is not just any old "atheism" but has a specificity, Nietzsche's tale =
of the madman's proclamation of the death of God, in the very character =
of its telling. =20
Heidegger is not, in other words, making an abstract point, which our =
intoxication with the phrase "methodological atheism" leads us to think =
he is, but rather a much more nuanced, subtle and crucial point about =
philosophy and thinking in its actual unfolding. =20
Can we confirm this? You bet. The phrase methodological athesim occurs =
in section 8, in division (b), "Das Selsbtverstaendnis ...", following =
on from section (a) Die Bedeutung der Maxime 'zu den Sachen selbst'. =
Not only is it clear that we have to nuance considerably what is meant =
by "methodological atheism", we are also being treated to a careful =
unfolding of just what the "philosophical research" is (and so the point =
in thinking at which it occurs) to which this "atheism" belongs in the =
history of philosophy itself.
So the whole notion of "methodological atheism" which we leap to ascribe =
to Heidegger as a "generalised" "methodological" "tool" of thinking =
begins to look rather transformed when one tries to hear what he is =
actually saying. It is still further transformed when understood in the =
light of his later work, and his understanding of the onto-theo-logical =
constitution of metaphysics (which again you identified on the 20th =
April as a "broad sweep" - a dangerously broad categorisation in =
itself), where the theological question of metaphysics is das Seiende im =
Ganze - being(s) as a whole (God).
My point is, therefore, that in order to read Heidegger, to "hear" him, =
requires the greatest care. Which is rather what I wanted you to hear =
in the word "preparation".
Laurence
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Laurence
Dear Jacob,
You ask me "I wonder if you have actually read carefully the work of =
Kisiel and van=20
Buren." My whole point to you in my last and other posts is concerned =
with what it is to *read* - in this case Heidegger. I am in no sense =
denying the complexity if Kisiel's or van Buren's work - that is not =
what is at issue - it is what it is to read. Which is why I find on the =
one hand your dismissal of my failure to read two writers with whom you =
have a particular concern odd when juxtaposed with your own =
unwillingness to "read" what I might be aiming at in the rest of my post =
which you graced with the comment "text deleted - the rest of your post =
is an expansion of this point - which I question." My point has been =
consistently that there is more going on here than you are reading.
Let me illustrate this with one of your own posts. On the 18th April =
you posted to the list something containing the phrase "H. affirms on =
multiple occasions that philosophy is methodologically atheistic." I =
can only (so far) find one reference to "methodological atheism" - on =
page 109 f. of Gesamtausgabe 20 - Prologomena zur Geschichte des =
Zeitbegriffs, translated as "History of the Concept of Time" by Kisiel. =
(I am grateful to Paul Fletcher of Durham University and his post for =
locating the exact reference).
Let us ask ourselves the question of how your assertion stands in =
relation to the text itself.
Commentators seize upon this passage because it says "Philosophische =
Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus" (Philosophical research is and =
remains atheism) as if it is self-evident both what the research being =
referred to here is, and just what atheism means here also. But if we =
read on, we discover that what is at issue is an "inner necessity" =
(innere Notwendigkeit) and and "eigentliche Kraft" (proper strength or =
power) at issue in the "Anmassung" - the "presumption" (Kisiel has =
"arrogance") of thought itself. Moreover, that there is an intimate =
connection between "diesem Atheismus" (this atheism) and what "ein =
Grosser einmal sagte" (a great individual once said). Who is this great =
individual? Heidegger does not name him, but we are told he said what =
he said in the "Froehlichen Wissenschaft", so we know it is Nietzsche. =20
Why is the work "die Froehlichen Wissenschaft" significant? Because it =
is the place where we find elaborated in the story of the madman what =
Heidegger will later come to call the "word" of Nietzsche - "God is =
dead" (Gott ist Todt).
This transforms the whole perspective - for it immediately historicises =
what "methodological atheism" is - it is not some abstraction of =
scientific methodology that one "takes up" as an instrument when =
undertaking "philosophical research" but rather it occurs somewhere and =
at a time - in Nietzsche's work, with all that implies (for "it is only =
the moral God who is dead") for the death and return of the gods. And =
it is not just any old "atheism" but has a specificity, Nietzsche's tale =
of the madman's proclamation of the death of God, in the very character =
of its telling. =20
Heidegger is not, in other words, making an abstract point, which our =
intoxication with the phrase "methodological atheism" leads us to think =
he is, but rather a much more nuanced, subtle and crucial point about =
philosophy and thinking in its actual unfolding. =20
Can we confirm this? You bet. The phrase methodological athesim occurs =
in section 8, in division (b), "Das Selsbtverstaendnis ...", following =
on from section (a) Die Bedeutung der Maxime 'zu den Sachen selbst'. =
Not only is it clear that we have to nuance considerably what is meant =
by "methodological atheism", we are also being treated to a careful =
unfolding of just what the "philosophical research" is (and so the point =
in thinking at which it occurs) to which this "atheism" belongs in the =
history of philosophy itself.
So the whole notion of "methodological atheism" which we leap to ascribe =
to Heidegger as a "generalised" "methodological" "tool" of thinking =
begins to look rather transformed when one tries to hear what he is =
actually saying. It is still further transformed when understood in the =
light of his later work, and his understanding of the onto-theo-logical =
constitution of metaphysics (which again you identified on the 20th =
April as a "broad sweep" - a dangerously broad categorisation in =
itself), where the theological question of metaphysics is das Seiende im =
Ganze - being(s) as a whole (God).
My point is, therefore, that in order to read Heidegger, to "hear" him, =
requires the greatest care. Which is rather what I wanted you to hear =
in the word "preparation".
Laurence
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---