Emma Rooksby recently wrote:
>The simultaneous apparent order and
>entropy inherent in 'chaos theory' is an example of mathematics meeting
>uncertainty, as is Heisenberg's principle.
This in relation to some-of-the-list's reticence regarding the
mathematicisation of Heideggerian thought, mine included (although I have
vacated the ongoing discussion for/until now). Somehow Emma has related
even loosely identified 'uncertainty'/'indeterminancy'/'chaos' et al with
the (seemingly 'poetic') style of Heidegger (seemingly because it too is
beautiful). I find this strange on several counts:
1) Heidegger's writing is very precise but not in the sense that
accountancy is.
2) it is also highly formal in its structure: the arguments flow like a
logical argument although it is not of logic (in the way that logicians or
logistic experts claim their disciplines).
3) an interesting (although let us re-member what the man himself said
about mere curiosity/idle-chat) question that might be developed is in what
way Heidegger's thinking could be called indeterminate: that he spoke of it
in the Anaximander Fragment and constantly speaks of that which can not be
simply grasped by the mathesis he equally constantly made the most subtly
gentle and damning critique of, is certain. But to attempt to speak of some
thing hard to speak of (what is philosophical thought if not this?) is not
it self to be 'woolly' or fundamentally imprecise. Agreed some of
Heidegger's (most ineffectual because they have utterly failed to grasp -
if that is the right term - his thought in any but ineptitude, precisely
echoing the spiritual vacuousness he argued against) critics have exactly
accused his efforts as speaking at great length about nothing thus reducing
his speech to a massive vacuity - but re-member Parmenides in Plato (was
that nothing about nothing?).
4) the argument seems to be that 'chaos theory' is beautiful;
Heidegger's thought is beautiful; thus: 'chaos theory' and Heidegger are
The Same - and Heisenberg speaks of inherent 'uncertainty' in beings;
Heidegger speaks of the innate indeterminateness of Being; thus: Heidegger
and Heisenberg speak of The Same; and thus: they are amenable without
violence to The Same mode of analysis - say, the mathematical. Whilst idly
curious clues might brighten the visage of some with this simplistic
scheme, I feel this is simply not good enough in the context of probably
the most important thinker of our century.
5) if I remember correctly, Heisenberg's celebrated but vastly
misunderstood (even by scientists) uncertainty principle constitutes an
extremely empiricist (and utterly un-poetic!) view of observation: that
precisely icons, models and pictures will not do, they are not all right -
observation is an event in the world that is uncovered or revealed by the
observation; observation is an ineradicable marking of the world, a
measurement is an event that reveals the observer's relation to the world
of observation through an irreversible inter-action; such inter-actions
have results; the results constitute all we know of the world - they do not
constitute a picture. Electrons do not orbit the nucleus. Electrons in
themselves are neither particles nor waves nor wavicles. Whatever they are
(their whatness) and however they behave only observations/measurements can
make them traverse an orbit or manifest their particalness etc. They kindly
oblige our need to make pictures when we inter-act with 'them' in an
experiment. Have I been understood?
6) again if I have got it right, chaos and catastrophe theories are
methods for modelling certain features of the world that are amenable to
such mathematical modelling; they are only the mathematical notions of
chaos and catastrophe. That we have all too easily been fascinated (and
they are indeed fascinating) by such examples of mathematical imperialism
would it self precisely constitute a wonderful topic for Heideggerian
critical thought. Even our fascination for topicality itself would be
rendered more acutely by a Heideggerian process that re-members his
realisation:
"The most thought-provoking thing in our thought-provoking age is that we
are still not thinking"
I have meandered but I would like to add one final point to this
less-than-wonderful barrage of outrage to the suggestion that Heidegger's
thought be subjected to mathematical analysis: would the result of such an
analysis make Heidegger more
clear/simple/plain/economical/concise/precise/etc ? more positivistic? less
provoking? more safe?
Let us think.
MP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>The simultaneous apparent order and
>entropy inherent in 'chaos theory' is an example of mathematics meeting
>uncertainty, as is Heisenberg's principle.
This in relation to some-of-the-list's reticence regarding the
mathematicisation of Heideggerian thought, mine included (although I have
vacated the ongoing discussion for/until now). Somehow Emma has related
even loosely identified 'uncertainty'/'indeterminancy'/'chaos' et al with
the (seemingly 'poetic') style of Heidegger (seemingly because it too is
beautiful). I find this strange on several counts:
1) Heidegger's writing is very precise but not in the sense that
accountancy is.
2) it is also highly formal in its structure: the arguments flow like a
logical argument although it is not of logic (in the way that logicians or
logistic experts claim their disciplines).
3) an interesting (although let us re-member what the man himself said
about mere curiosity/idle-chat) question that might be developed is in what
way Heidegger's thinking could be called indeterminate: that he spoke of it
in the Anaximander Fragment and constantly speaks of that which can not be
simply grasped by the mathesis he equally constantly made the most subtly
gentle and damning critique of, is certain. But to attempt to speak of some
thing hard to speak of (what is philosophical thought if not this?) is not
it self to be 'woolly' or fundamentally imprecise. Agreed some of
Heidegger's (most ineffectual because they have utterly failed to grasp -
if that is the right term - his thought in any but ineptitude, precisely
echoing the spiritual vacuousness he argued against) critics have exactly
accused his efforts as speaking at great length about nothing thus reducing
his speech to a massive vacuity - but re-member Parmenides in Plato (was
that nothing about nothing?).
4) the argument seems to be that 'chaos theory' is beautiful;
Heidegger's thought is beautiful; thus: 'chaos theory' and Heidegger are
The Same - and Heisenberg speaks of inherent 'uncertainty' in beings;
Heidegger speaks of the innate indeterminateness of Being; thus: Heidegger
and Heisenberg speak of The Same; and thus: they are amenable without
violence to The Same mode of analysis - say, the mathematical. Whilst idly
curious clues might brighten the visage of some with this simplistic
scheme, I feel this is simply not good enough in the context of probably
the most important thinker of our century.
5) if I remember correctly, Heisenberg's celebrated but vastly
misunderstood (even by scientists) uncertainty principle constitutes an
extremely empiricist (and utterly un-poetic!) view of observation: that
precisely icons, models and pictures will not do, they are not all right -
observation is an event in the world that is uncovered or revealed by the
observation; observation is an ineradicable marking of the world, a
measurement is an event that reveals the observer's relation to the world
of observation through an irreversible inter-action; such inter-actions
have results; the results constitute all we know of the world - they do not
constitute a picture. Electrons do not orbit the nucleus. Electrons in
themselves are neither particles nor waves nor wavicles. Whatever they are
(their whatness) and however they behave only observations/measurements can
make them traverse an orbit or manifest their particalness etc. They kindly
oblige our need to make pictures when we inter-act with 'them' in an
experiment. Have I been understood?
6) again if I have got it right, chaos and catastrophe theories are
methods for modelling certain features of the world that are amenable to
such mathematical modelling; they are only the mathematical notions of
chaos and catastrophe. That we have all too easily been fascinated (and
they are indeed fascinating) by such examples of mathematical imperialism
would it self precisely constitute a wonderful topic for Heideggerian
critical thought. Even our fascination for topicality itself would be
rendered more acutely by a Heideggerian process that re-members his
realisation:
"The most thought-provoking thing in our thought-provoking age is that we
are still not thinking"
I have meandered but I would like to add one final point to this
less-than-wonderful barrage of outrage to the suggestion that Heidegger's
thought be subjected to mathematical analysis: would the result of such an
analysis make Heidegger more
clear/simple/plain/economical/concise/precise/etc ? more positivistic? less
provoking? more safe?
Let us think.
MP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---