Cologne, 19 June 1996
Michael D. Pennamacoor wrote thoughtfully:
"I seem to remember Heidegger mentioning poeisis as being a-kin to physis, an
emergence, an up-surgence of the always already hidden, a bringing-forth into
an open."
The kinship relates to poiesis and physis as modes of being as laid out by
Aristotle in Theta 1-3 of his Metaphysics under the heading of dynamis and
lucidly interpreted by Heidegger, especially in his 1931 lectures as presented
in GA Band 33 'Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft'. Here one can gain an
impression of just how precise and sobre Heidegger's phenomenological
analyses are, something that tends to be lost sight of since the later, more
'poetical' Heidegger was published and translated before the lecture series
started to come out. In my opinion, these analyses of Aristotle have not yet
been sufficiently taken into account in discussions of Heidegger.
Be that as it may, dynamis in Aristotle is the mode of being of poiesis: "being
the governing starting point for a change in something else or insofar it is
something else". Poiesis is such a starting point for change as techne-like
knowledge, which sees (in the idea) what is to be brought forth or produced and
thus forms the starting point for the actual (energeia) production, energeia
being the opposing concept to dynamis. Energeia is (literally) setting the
dynamis to work in the work (en ergon).
Physis as a mode of being, on the other hand, is where something has the
governing starting point for a change within itself. Thus Heidegger
characterizes it as a self-upsurgence because a physis-like being governs its
own emergence into the open.
Heidegger says that in metaphysical thinking, poiesis gains the upper hand over
physis. The culmination of this is modern technological knowledge in which
beings are not just guided forth into the open in production but torn forth.
I cannot see however how "art-work-ing provides the clearing for such bringing-
forth" because art as techne is a form of 'seeing' into the being of beings but
cannot itself make the clearing (of the truth of being).
Heidegger (and I) agree with MP that "the linguistic is not the essence of
language". Heidegger determines the latter in a late essay (Die Sprache) on
Trakls poem 'Ein Winterabend' as "the ringing of stillness". This ringing is
"not anything human" (Unterwegs zur Sprache S. 30). But Heidegger is quick to
tie back this ringing into poetic language, in this case Trakl's.
Moreover, this ringing of stillness has a definite meaning for Heidegger,
because language calls into stillness, thus gathering world and thing into the
foursome.
My concern is not so much, as MP puts it, "we have gotten so used to language
in the (dis?)guise of stating that we have by-passed its musicality," but rather
that the ringing of stillness is translated into language and meaning at all. In
particular, I find the "meaning" of the foursome entirely problematic. What
happens if the meaning is left open? I agree that listening (learning to listen)
to the musicality of language could be beneficial (by loosening the hold on
beings, by leaving them free of meaning). But Heidegger, I find, did not take
this step. John Cage did (cf. e.g. his works 'Roaratorio' and 'Muoyce', in which
the language of Finnegans Wake plays a meaning-less, musical role).
I don't follow MP's concluding comment, however: "The all-at-once-ness of the
speed-up of modern technologies produces in the corpus-electronicus a tribal
resonance, a song, a ringing, a (b)ringing to presence of history in icons of
space, bringing being to time and time to being. Heidegger sings the song of
time." A translation would be welcome.
Cheers!
Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ /// '''''''
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° ( ~ L ~ ) [ ° U ° ]
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ { <-> } *( \_/ )*
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 \___/ / \
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Michael D. Pennamacoor wrote thoughtfully:
"I seem to remember Heidegger mentioning poeisis as being a-kin to physis, an
emergence, an up-surgence of the always already hidden, a bringing-forth into
an open."
The kinship relates to poiesis and physis as modes of being as laid out by
Aristotle in Theta 1-3 of his Metaphysics under the heading of dynamis and
lucidly interpreted by Heidegger, especially in his 1931 lectures as presented
in GA Band 33 'Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft'. Here one can gain an
impression of just how precise and sobre Heidegger's phenomenological
analyses are, something that tends to be lost sight of since the later, more
'poetical' Heidegger was published and translated before the lecture series
started to come out. In my opinion, these analyses of Aristotle have not yet
been sufficiently taken into account in discussions of Heidegger.
Be that as it may, dynamis in Aristotle is the mode of being of poiesis: "being
the governing starting point for a change in something else or insofar it is
something else". Poiesis is such a starting point for change as techne-like
knowledge, which sees (in the idea) what is to be brought forth or produced and
thus forms the starting point for the actual (energeia) production, energeia
being the opposing concept to dynamis. Energeia is (literally) setting the
dynamis to work in the work (en ergon).
Physis as a mode of being, on the other hand, is where something has the
governing starting point for a change within itself. Thus Heidegger
characterizes it as a self-upsurgence because a physis-like being governs its
own emergence into the open.
Heidegger says that in metaphysical thinking, poiesis gains the upper hand over
physis. The culmination of this is modern technological knowledge in which
beings are not just guided forth into the open in production but torn forth.
I cannot see however how "art-work-ing provides the clearing for such bringing-
forth" because art as techne is a form of 'seeing' into the being of beings but
cannot itself make the clearing (of the truth of being).
Heidegger (and I) agree with MP that "the linguistic is not the essence of
language". Heidegger determines the latter in a late essay (Die Sprache) on
Trakls poem 'Ein Winterabend' as "the ringing of stillness". This ringing is
"not anything human" (Unterwegs zur Sprache S. 30). But Heidegger is quick to
tie back this ringing into poetic language, in this case Trakl's.
Moreover, this ringing of stillness has a definite meaning for Heidegger,
because language calls into stillness, thus gathering world and thing into the
foursome.
My concern is not so much, as MP puts it, "we have gotten so used to language
in the (dis?)guise of stating that we have by-passed its musicality," but rather
that the ringing of stillness is translated into language and meaning at all. In
particular, I find the "meaning" of the foursome entirely problematic. What
happens if the meaning is left open? I agree that listening (learning to listen)
to the musicality of language could be beneficial (by loosening the hold on
beings, by leaving them free of meaning). But Heidegger, I find, did not take
this step. John Cage did (cf. e.g. his works 'Roaratorio' and 'Muoyce', in which
the language of Finnegans Wake plays a meaning-less, musical role).
I don't follow MP's concluding comment, however: "The all-at-once-ness of the
speed-up of modern technologies produces in the corpus-electronicus a tribal
resonance, a song, a ringing, a (b)ringing to presence of history in icons of
space, bringing being to time and time to being. Heidegger sings the song of
time." A translation would be welcome.
Cheers!
Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ /// '''''''
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° ( ~ L ~ ) [ ° U ° ]
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ { <-> } *( \_/ )*
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 \___/ / \
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---