Cologne, 21 June 1996
Triin Kallas has written some thoughts on the turning in the thinking of beyng.
Why Sein und Zeit was left unfinished. Since temporality (Temporalitaet as
opposed to Zeitlichkeit) was envisaged in SZ as the horizon of being as such,
some interpreters (e.g. the Hauptherausgeber, von Herrmann) take the lecture
series in Gesamtausgabe Band 24 (§§19ff) as the implicit completion of SZ. But
on my reading, this text does not succeed in getting beyond Zeitlichkeit.
Heidegger himself refers later to the fact the thinking did not "get through"
with the language of metaphysics, meaning the transcendental mode of climbing
back into conditions of possibility. (I don't have the reference handy.)
I question whether "die Frage nach dem Sein überhaupt" can be translated as
"the question about being in general" because "in general" suggests there is
also an "in particular". But being is not a generic designation at all, and has
no species. It has, perhaps, a folding.
The turning in the thinking of beyng is not a matter of whether Heidegger was
consistent in his thinking. Consistency is a (late) demand of Reason relating to
the absence of contradiction in a set of statements and thus has little
relevance in the thinking of beyng which thinks from the relation to aletheia.
It is true that thinking must pass through humans, but whether it passes through
Dasein AS Dasein is another matter, because human essencing itself has to be
put into Dasein by the Event as a turning in the history of beyng (cf. e.g. the
Beitraege, GA Bd.65 11. "3. Dasein has its origin in the event and its turning.
Therefore it can only be grounded as the truth of beyng and as the truth of
beyng.") Again something to think about.
Triin is right to point out the centrality of Section 44 of SZ, perhaps the
longest section in the book. Heidegger himself keeps on referring back to it,
because it is where aletheia is dealt with in SZ.
One of the best places to read concerning the turning and the finish to SZ is
the written record, corrected by Heidegger, of a seminar on his late, 1962
lecture 'Zeit und Sein'. Another place is the note appended to his 1930 lecture
On the Essencing of Truth in Wegmarken S.198f. But first the written record in
Zur Sache des Denkens:
"SZ is the attempt of an interpretation of being toward the transcendental
horizon of time. What does 'transcendental' mean here? It does not mean the
objectivity of an object of experience as it is constituted in consciousness
[Kant], but rather the drafting-area for the determination of being, i.e. of
presencing as such, as seen from the clearing of Da-sein. In the lecture 'Zeit
und Sein', the sense of time latent in being as presencing [wesing-in; cf. the
archaic English verb 'wesan'], hitherto unthought, is taken back protectively
into a more originary relation. To speak here of something more originary can
easily be misunderstood. If however we initially leave undecided how this more
originary is to be understood, and that means, is not to be understood [or: to
be not understood], it still remains unshaken that thinking, not only in the
lecture itself, but also in the entirety of Heidegger's path, has the character
of the going-back. This is the step back. The polysemie of the title should be
noted. The whither and the how in the reference to 'back' still have to be
situated by discussion.
But then the question can be posed, whether and how this step back, which
constitutes the kind of movedness of this thinking, is related to the
circumstance that the event is not only as a sending but, as this sending, is
moreover withdrawal.
Is the character of withdrawal apparent already in the problematic of SZ? To be
able to see this, we must go into the simple intention of this work, that is,
into the meaning which time has in the question about the sense of being. Time,
which is addressed in SZ as the sense of being, is itself not an answer, not an
ultimate hold for questioning but itself the naming of a question. The name
'time' is the preliminary name for what is later called 'the truth of being'.
..." (S.29/30)
A long quotation, but it says lots. Especially the last sentence gives a
characterization of the turning: "time as a preliminary name for the truth of
being".
It would be also worthwhile reading/quoting what follows in the written record,
which talks about aletheia. But instead I would like to draw your attention to
the concluding note of the talk 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' (1930), the first
paragraph of which was first added in the 1949 edition:
"The question concerning the essence of truth arises from (springs from) the
question concerning the truth of essencing. The former question understands
essence initially in the sense of what-ness (quidditas) or thing-ness
(realitas), truth however as a characteristic of knowledge. The question
concerning the truth of essencing understands essencing verbally and thinks with
this word, still remaining within the imaging thinking of metaphysics, beyng as
the difference between being and beings that holds sway. Truth means lightening
guardianship as a fundamental trait of beyng. The question concerning the
essencing of truth finds its answer in the sentence: the essence of truth is the
truth of essencing. One can see, after the explication [in the lecture], that
the sentence does not simply turn a combination of words around with the
intention of suggesting the appearance of a paradox. The subject of the
sentences, if this fatal grammatical category may still be used at all, is the
truth of essencing. Lightening-concealing guardianship is, i.e. allows to
essence, the correspondence between knowledge and beings. The sentence is not
dialectical. It is not a sentence in the sense of a statement at all. The answer
to the question concerning the essencing of truth is the saying/saga of a
TURNING within the history of beyng." (Wegmarken, 1978 edition, S.198f).
All my translations are hopefully highly questionable. "beyng as the difference
between being and beings that holds sway" is presumably another name for the
event, which becomes a "principal word" in Heidegger's thinking from the
thirties on.
Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\\\\ '''''''
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° (( C ~_} [ ° U ° ]
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ (( < *( \_/ )*
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 | | / \
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Triin Kallas has written some thoughts on the turning in the thinking of beyng.
Why Sein und Zeit was left unfinished. Since temporality (Temporalitaet as
opposed to Zeitlichkeit) was envisaged in SZ as the horizon of being as such,
some interpreters (e.g. the Hauptherausgeber, von Herrmann) take the lecture
series in Gesamtausgabe Band 24 (§§19ff) as the implicit completion of SZ. But
on my reading, this text does not succeed in getting beyond Zeitlichkeit.
Heidegger himself refers later to the fact the thinking did not "get through"
with the language of metaphysics, meaning the transcendental mode of climbing
back into conditions of possibility. (I don't have the reference handy.)
I question whether "die Frage nach dem Sein überhaupt" can be translated as
"the question about being in general" because "in general" suggests there is
also an "in particular". But being is not a generic designation at all, and has
no species. It has, perhaps, a folding.
The turning in the thinking of beyng is not a matter of whether Heidegger was
consistent in his thinking. Consistency is a (late) demand of Reason relating to
the absence of contradiction in a set of statements and thus has little
relevance in the thinking of beyng which thinks from the relation to aletheia.
It is true that thinking must pass through humans, but whether it passes through
Dasein AS Dasein is another matter, because human essencing itself has to be
put into Dasein by the Event as a turning in the history of beyng (cf. e.g. the
Beitraege, GA Bd.65 11. "3. Dasein has its origin in the event and its turning.
Therefore it can only be grounded as the truth of beyng and as the truth of
beyng.") Again something to think about.
Triin is right to point out the centrality of Section 44 of SZ, perhaps the
longest section in the book. Heidegger himself keeps on referring back to it,
because it is where aletheia is dealt with in SZ.
One of the best places to read concerning the turning and the finish to SZ is
the written record, corrected by Heidegger, of a seminar on his late, 1962
lecture 'Zeit und Sein'. Another place is the note appended to his 1930 lecture
On the Essencing of Truth in Wegmarken S.198f. But first the written record in
Zur Sache des Denkens:
"SZ is the attempt of an interpretation of being toward the transcendental
horizon of time. What does 'transcendental' mean here? It does not mean the
objectivity of an object of experience as it is constituted in consciousness
[Kant], but rather the drafting-area for the determination of being, i.e. of
presencing as such, as seen from the clearing of Da-sein. In the lecture 'Zeit
und Sein', the sense of time latent in being as presencing [wesing-in; cf. the
archaic English verb 'wesan'], hitherto unthought, is taken back protectively
into a more originary relation. To speak here of something more originary can
easily be misunderstood. If however we initially leave undecided how this more
originary is to be understood, and that means, is not to be understood [or: to
be not understood], it still remains unshaken that thinking, not only in the
lecture itself, but also in the entirety of Heidegger's path, has the character
of the going-back. This is the step back. The polysemie of the title should be
noted. The whither and the how in the reference to 'back' still have to be
situated by discussion.
But then the question can be posed, whether and how this step back, which
constitutes the kind of movedness of this thinking, is related to the
circumstance that the event is not only as a sending but, as this sending, is
moreover withdrawal.
Is the character of withdrawal apparent already in the problematic of SZ? To be
able to see this, we must go into the simple intention of this work, that is,
into the meaning which time has in the question about the sense of being. Time,
which is addressed in SZ as the sense of being, is itself not an answer, not an
ultimate hold for questioning but itself the naming of a question. The name
'time' is the preliminary name for what is later called 'the truth of being'.
..." (S.29/30)
A long quotation, but it says lots. Especially the last sentence gives a
characterization of the turning: "time as a preliminary name for the truth of
being".
It would be also worthwhile reading/quoting what follows in the written record,
which talks about aletheia. But instead I would like to draw your attention to
the concluding note of the talk 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' (1930), the first
paragraph of which was first added in the 1949 edition:
"The question concerning the essence of truth arises from (springs from) the
question concerning the truth of essencing. The former question understands
essence initially in the sense of what-ness (quidditas) or thing-ness
(realitas), truth however as a characteristic of knowledge. The question
concerning the truth of essencing understands essencing verbally and thinks with
this word, still remaining within the imaging thinking of metaphysics, beyng as
the difference between being and beings that holds sway. Truth means lightening
guardianship as a fundamental trait of beyng. The question concerning the
essencing of truth finds its answer in the sentence: the essence of truth is the
truth of essencing. One can see, after the explication [in the lecture], that
the sentence does not simply turn a combination of words around with the
intention of suggesting the appearance of a paradox. The subject of the
sentences, if this fatal grammatical category may still be used at all, is the
truth of essencing. Lightening-concealing guardianship is, i.e. allows to
essence, the correspondence between knowledge and beings. The sentence is not
dialectical. It is not a sentence in the sense of a statement at all. The answer
to the question concerning the essencing of truth is the saying/saga of a
TURNING within the history of beyng." (Wegmarken, 1978 edition, S.198f).
All my translations are hopefully highly questionable. "beyng as the difference
between being and beings that holds sway" is presumably another name for the
event, which becomes a "principal word" in Heidegger's thinking from the
thirties on.
Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\\\\ '''''''
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° (( C ~_} [ ° U ° ]
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ (( < *( \_/ )*
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 | | / \
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---