In a - please excuse me for the length - long reply to the Michaels' following
questions/statements/rhetorical "statements":
MH in response to me:
> What else? "Well thought is well said, well said is well thought." (M.H. on the
>craft of thinking)
When it is said, that is. Methinks semantics for Heidegger is about as desirable as the word
"aesthetics". Sometimes, perhaps, my words are not necessarily to be taken at face value.
> And he continues: "I guess we differ on semantics. For me, an institution should
>not be the destroyer of genuine thinking but the holder of such. At least an
>authentic institution." Should and is are far apart.
Sometimes for Heidegger as well, but he still talks about "essence"; even if he thinks
"Americanization" is the chokehold of modernity, he still talks about breathing and breath
(essentia).
In short, if I apply an example to your argument, I could say the world should be a
peaceful rather than violent place. That does not mean I think it is at the moment,
or that the present situation (ie war in Belfast) gives me an excuse not to help
those who work for peace (in Belfast or wherever).To say institutions do not do what
they should do, (an observation I might agree with) is not to say that institutions
cannot (which was what I took to be your initial observation and something I do not agree
with, nor, methinks, would Heidegger would perhaps agree with me). So far, then, I do not
see your response as helpful or logically valid.
>Do you mean holder as
>surrounding vessel or as grasper? Can genuine thinking be held? What is an
>authentic institution? An institution that corresponds to its essence? What is the
>essence of an institution? An institution is instituted, i.e. set up according to
>an idea of what it is to be. The should is measured against this idea. Only
>thinking that puts into images (vorstellendes Denken) can set up an institution.
>The thinking of beyng, if it is anything at all, is not a thinking that puts into
>images and that in line with a (fore-seen) idea, it is rather: receptive, waiting
>thinking that steps back. It is useless for the set-up of entities, whether in an
>institution or elsewhere.
I work in an institution, I wonder if you do, If you do, or have been taught by one,
I think you have a dilemna: follow your notion of Heidegger and leave/discredit this
institution, give this institution some other value than that of providing a place
for thinking, or change your interpretation of what Heidegger would say in this
instance. Monks may go to a monastry, Zen initiates may go to a Zen master. Are they
inauthentic? To say one must find for oneself one's relation to Being, does not mean that
the Way or Path is or must be purely self-discovered, one can be helped to be open to self.
That is why the openness to Zen enlightenment may be beaten into the one who asks for
satori, which may led to satori, but the satori itself is not beaten into one. One becomes
open to it.
1. Genuine thinking may happen anywhere, but some (historically or traditionally sited)
places/areas (eg in the Greek or German language) might (or might not) be better than
others. Otherwise why would Heidegger say so? Should we stop people learning ancient Greek
or modern German? Should we help them to learn them?
2. Why if Heidegger promotes the idea of destiny (read Derrida on Heidegger on the origin
of "race") can institution not be set up according to the destiny of its people?
3. Can an institute not be set up according to what it wishes to be, but it might be set up,
to allow people to dwell within as a people?
4. An essence is not an idea of what something should be, at least from my reading of
Heidegger. An idea as per Plato, or Hegel is not an essence.
5. Cannot a painting of a pair of boots be an institution?
6. An institution for me is a materially located site only in standard usage, but refers to
something not so ostensive: the institution itself is not so located. The faculty building
merely indicates where the people who together hold that which is an institution, are seen
to gather themselves.
>Beyng cannot be held or held onto. It can only be
>received like a guest. The reception can be prepared by clearing the paths of
>thinking-through what has been thought. Perhaps the guest will arrive. Perhaps not.
>One may have an inkling that the guest is coming, a presentiment. But the guest may
>pass on by. Prepatory thinking may be institutionalized. But because of the
>unpredictability of the guest, there is no way of telling whether it is an
>authentic institution or not, or whether the thinking is genuine or not. This is
>the strife of thinking in the coworld. Thinking remains essentially ambiguous.
>There is no such thing as success in the thinking of beyng, no result to point to
>as the proof of the pudding. You go in with empty hands and come out with empty
>hands. Your heart may be full of nothingness, singing.
Then none of us can tell if Heidegger was succesful, yet you use his words as if he
was. There would be no point in reading Heidegger or attending his lectures, if
there was no more hope of success (ie genuine thinking) in that than in say,
gardening.
By your constant references to Heidegger as final authority, it has appeared to me
that you are institutionalising (your interpretation of via your selection of)
Heidegger's writings. I am not saying that such would be right or wrong, only that
it appears to me that you are doing this.
> Passing on from the Championist question: "If we do not employ the distinction
>'collective/individual' (consciousness), how can we distinguish Heidegger from
>Hegel?" Michael Pennamacoor-lummy asks "A second question: what is thought-worthy,
>what calls for thinking in the distinction 'collective/individual' especially when
>we are concerned with thinking? Do ind.s or coll.s think (H-wise)?"
If I understand your use of "Championist", perhaps it is supposed to be a taunt, a vague and
rather illthought out ad hominem. The name itself is not of English origin, and I do not
think my questions so far can be construed as some form or extension of any siginificant and
identifiable aspects of my personality. So unless there is a valid reason for it, please
stop adjectivising my surname for these questions: your interpretation of them, as well, I
believe, is not in line with my intentions in asking them.
>From MP
>From Eric Champion recently:
No such person, as far as I know, exists.The difference and significance could be important,
especially from a Heideggerean language point of view, ditto for my surname used
adjectivally.
>
> The raising of the titanic question as to the nature of thinking (in H) afforded a remark
>from me that making a distinction be-tween individual & collective was a non-starter (it
>is basically a sociological distinction [alongside others such as: masses, (sub)culture,
>(social)class, public, 'community', etc] not appropriate to 'grasping' H's thought on
>thinking)
Not so sure, or so convinced. I wonder if titanic here is oxymoronic, a compliment, an
insult, or all three. Perhaps if I ask small questions, we could discuss far more and far
clearly, perhaps not. What I do know is that these questions are important to me, whether or
not they can be answered.
> -- however much I may wish to perform Heidegger, I could not and did not presume
>to speak for him -- I am suggesting that the versus of ind. & coll. is no-no for us to
>think this in an appropo. manner (it is not just the distinction but also the "versus"
>that constitutes a by-pass to the real meat).
Everything here (eg "real meat") presupposes a selectively "right" Heidegger, despite the
disclaimer "did not presume to speak for him". If you are speaking for yourself, I still do
not see what "us to think this in an appropo. manner" can logically entail.
>So suddenly the move from the nature of
>thinking to how H distinguishes him self from Hegel. A blink, and thinking dis-appears as
>prob and philosophical diff becomes the next tantalising sore spot. Feels like
>remote-controlitis. Eric can not drop his "versus" in making the difference between H & H
>an issue. I would in trepidation like to suggest that the Championist distinction (ind. v
>coll.) is not a fundamental one for either H or H.
Cor.
reply to sentence 1: I actually moved not from "nature of thinking" but from intentionalist
attitude in Heidegger's philosophy of art, to the difference between individual and
collective thinking. This is the biggest jump for me, and yet related (the intentions of the
individual as to the art they produce, with the collective acceptance etc, of that as such,
of the individually created piece of art, and whether such concerns can/should be answered,
are/are not significant). Others, I feel, have stretched what I have said, and jumped
themselves, far further. Yet I am still trying to see into the chasm of producing of and
experiencing of and evaluation of, ART.
reply to sentence 2: I have not, as far as I know, stopped thinking. I have stopped
questioning, but because I have not got answers to what I first asked, and because I feel I
have to defend my questions due to others using my questionings as if they were personal
statements on a "right" or "correct" Heidegger. I would still question, if I could, if
people could help rather than hinder.
reply to sentence 3:
"Feels like"? I was under the impression from you that you were thinking?
reply to sentence 4:
Eric might not, Erik might. Try asking him if he could before you say he cannot. I did not
say "the difference between Heidegger and Hegel" is an issue, or that it is not. I merely
asked for your interpretation of whether it was, or if it even was significant. Please read
the passage below (again):
>If Heidegger sees the individual versus the collective as a "non-starter",
>how does
>he distinguish his philosophy from that of Hegel's World Spirit as in some
>form of
>world-mind/spirit/geist: some form of future world-consciousness? Or
>doesn't he?
Answer yes/no, with a reason why, why not. If sociological is non-important-Heidegger,
please say why, and why what I asked was the former rather than the latter, and why the herd
for Heidegger is not a collective concept. And yes, my question ties back to my query on
what or who justifies the work of art as art, and individual or a collective/community.
As to the following:
>If we do not employ the distinction 'collective/individual', how can we distinguish
>Heidegger from Hegel?
This is NOT my question.
> Let us tinker
I do not want to tinker. I want to learn. Perhaps because I do not have a readily
identifiable name (read reputation), my name is seen as worthy of attack. Perhaps I am
unclear in my personal (unrevealed) viewpoint, and therefore my questions should be
attacked. Since I have tried to keep my own personal answers hidden, so that I can find
other answers, (hopefully better ones), I find this hard to accept. Yet if true, perhaps I
should desist entirely from my efforts here, and just write and read.
In order to find out, I will post something from someone arguably close to Heidegger in
thought and proximity, and perhaps then my own questions/directions will become clearer. If
you do not find what this philosopher says as interesting, and significant, and as
clarifying my questions, then I will desist.
erik champion M.Arch
schools of design & performing arts
UNITEC
tel: 64 9 815 4321 ext 7140
fax: 64 9 846 7369
email: echampion@xxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
questions/statements/rhetorical "statements":
MH in response to me:
> What else? "Well thought is well said, well said is well thought." (M.H. on the
>craft of thinking)
When it is said, that is. Methinks semantics for Heidegger is about as desirable as the word
"aesthetics". Sometimes, perhaps, my words are not necessarily to be taken at face value.
> And he continues: "I guess we differ on semantics. For me, an institution should
>not be the destroyer of genuine thinking but the holder of such. At least an
>authentic institution." Should and is are far apart.
Sometimes for Heidegger as well, but he still talks about "essence"; even if he thinks
"Americanization" is the chokehold of modernity, he still talks about breathing and breath
(essentia).
In short, if I apply an example to your argument, I could say the world should be a
peaceful rather than violent place. That does not mean I think it is at the moment,
or that the present situation (ie war in Belfast) gives me an excuse not to help
those who work for peace (in Belfast or wherever).To say institutions do not do what
they should do, (an observation I might agree with) is not to say that institutions
cannot (which was what I took to be your initial observation and something I do not agree
with, nor, methinks, would Heidegger would perhaps agree with me). So far, then, I do not
see your response as helpful or logically valid.
>Do you mean holder as
>surrounding vessel or as grasper? Can genuine thinking be held? What is an
>authentic institution? An institution that corresponds to its essence? What is the
>essence of an institution? An institution is instituted, i.e. set up according to
>an idea of what it is to be. The should is measured against this idea. Only
>thinking that puts into images (vorstellendes Denken) can set up an institution.
>The thinking of beyng, if it is anything at all, is not a thinking that puts into
>images and that in line with a (fore-seen) idea, it is rather: receptive, waiting
>thinking that steps back. It is useless for the set-up of entities, whether in an
>institution or elsewhere.
I work in an institution, I wonder if you do, If you do, or have been taught by one,
I think you have a dilemna: follow your notion of Heidegger and leave/discredit this
institution, give this institution some other value than that of providing a place
for thinking, or change your interpretation of what Heidegger would say in this
instance. Monks may go to a monastry, Zen initiates may go to a Zen master. Are they
inauthentic? To say one must find for oneself one's relation to Being, does not mean that
the Way or Path is or must be purely self-discovered, one can be helped to be open to self.
That is why the openness to Zen enlightenment may be beaten into the one who asks for
satori, which may led to satori, but the satori itself is not beaten into one. One becomes
open to it.
1. Genuine thinking may happen anywhere, but some (historically or traditionally sited)
places/areas (eg in the Greek or German language) might (or might not) be better than
others. Otherwise why would Heidegger say so? Should we stop people learning ancient Greek
or modern German? Should we help them to learn them?
2. Why if Heidegger promotes the idea of destiny (read Derrida on Heidegger on the origin
of "race") can institution not be set up according to the destiny of its people?
3. Can an institute not be set up according to what it wishes to be, but it might be set up,
to allow people to dwell within as a people?
4. An essence is not an idea of what something should be, at least from my reading of
Heidegger. An idea as per Plato, or Hegel is not an essence.
5. Cannot a painting of a pair of boots be an institution?
6. An institution for me is a materially located site only in standard usage, but refers to
something not so ostensive: the institution itself is not so located. The faculty building
merely indicates where the people who together hold that which is an institution, are seen
to gather themselves.
>Beyng cannot be held or held onto. It can only be
>received like a guest. The reception can be prepared by clearing the paths of
>thinking-through what has been thought. Perhaps the guest will arrive. Perhaps not.
>One may have an inkling that the guest is coming, a presentiment. But the guest may
>pass on by. Prepatory thinking may be institutionalized. But because of the
>unpredictability of the guest, there is no way of telling whether it is an
>authentic institution or not, or whether the thinking is genuine or not. This is
>the strife of thinking in the coworld. Thinking remains essentially ambiguous.
>There is no such thing as success in the thinking of beyng, no result to point to
>as the proof of the pudding. You go in with empty hands and come out with empty
>hands. Your heart may be full of nothingness, singing.
Then none of us can tell if Heidegger was succesful, yet you use his words as if he
was. There would be no point in reading Heidegger or attending his lectures, if
there was no more hope of success (ie genuine thinking) in that than in say,
gardening.
By your constant references to Heidegger as final authority, it has appeared to me
that you are institutionalising (your interpretation of via your selection of)
Heidegger's writings. I am not saying that such would be right or wrong, only that
it appears to me that you are doing this.
> Passing on from the Championist question: "If we do not employ the distinction
>'collective/individual' (consciousness), how can we distinguish Heidegger from
>Hegel?" Michael Pennamacoor-lummy asks "A second question: what is thought-worthy,
>what calls for thinking in the distinction 'collective/individual' especially when
>we are concerned with thinking? Do ind.s or coll.s think (H-wise)?"
If I understand your use of "Championist", perhaps it is supposed to be a taunt, a vague and
rather illthought out ad hominem. The name itself is not of English origin, and I do not
think my questions so far can be construed as some form or extension of any siginificant and
identifiable aspects of my personality. So unless there is a valid reason for it, please
stop adjectivising my surname for these questions: your interpretation of them, as well, I
believe, is not in line with my intentions in asking them.
>From MP
>From Eric Champion recently:
No such person, as far as I know, exists.The difference and significance could be important,
especially from a Heideggerean language point of view, ditto for my surname used
adjectivally.
>
> The raising of the titanic question as to the nature of thinking (in H) afforded a remark
>from me that making a distinction be-tween individual & collective was a non-starter (it
>is basically a sociological distinction [alongside others such as: masses, (sub)culture,
>(social)class, public, 'community', etc] not appropriate to 'grasping' H's thought on
>thinking)
Not so sure, or so convinced. I wonder if titanic here is oxymoronic, a compliment, an
insult, or all three. Perhaps if I ask small questions, we could discuss far more and far
clearly, perhaps not. What I do know is that these questions are important to me, whether or
not they can be answered.
> -- however much I may wish to perform Heidegger, I could not and did not presume
>to speak for him -- I am suggesting that the versus of ind. & coll. is no-no for us to
>think this in an appropo. manner (it is not just the distinction but also the "versus"
>that constitutes a by-pass to the real meat).
Everything here (eg "real meat") presupposes a selectively "right" Heidegger, despite the
disclaimer "did not presume to speak for him". If you are speaking for yourself, I still do
not see what "us to think this in an appropo. manner" can logically entail.
>So suddenly the move from the nature of
>thinking to how H distinguishes him self from Hegel. A blink, and thinking dis-appears as
>prob and philosophical diff becomes the next tantalising sore spot. Feels like
>remote-controlitis. Eric can not drop his "versus" in making the difference between H & H
>an issue. I would in trepidation like to suggest that the Championist distinction (ind. v
>coll.) is not a fundamental one for either H or H.
Cor.
reply to sentence 1: I actually moved not from "nature of thinking" but from intentionalist
attitude in Heidegger's philosophy of art, to the difference between individual and
collective thinking. This is the biggest jump for me, and yet related (the intentions of the
individual as to the art they produce, with the collective acceptance etc, of that as such,
of the individually created piece of art, and whether such concerns can/should be answered,
are/are not significant). Others, I feel, have stretched what I have said, and jumped
themselves, far further. Yet I am still trying to see into the chasm of producing of and
experiencing of and evaluation of, ART.
reply to sentence 2: I have not, as far as I know, stopped thinking. I have stopped
questioning, but because I have not got answers to what I first asked, and because I feel I
have to defend my questions due to others using my questionings as if they were personal
statements on a "right" or "correct" Heidegger. I would still question, if I could, if
people could help rather than hinder.
reply to sentence 3:
"Feels like"? I was under the impression from you that you were thinking?
reply to sentence 4:
Eric might not, Erik might. Try asking him if he could before you say he cannot. I did not
say "the difference between Heidegger and Hegel" is an issue, or that it is not. I merely
asked for your interpretation of whether it was, or if it even was significant. Please read
the passage below (again):
>If Heidegger sees the individual versus the collective as a "non-starter",
>how does
>he distinguish his philosophy from that of Hegel's World Spirit as in some
>form of
>world-mind/spirit/geist: some form of future world-consciousness? Or
>doesn't he?
Answer yes/no, with a reason why, why not. If sociological is non-important-Heidegger,
please say why, and why what I asked was the former rather than the latter, and why the herd
for Heidegger is not a collective concept. And yes, my question ties back to my query on
what or who justifies the work of art as art, and individual or a collective/community.
As to the following:
>If we do not employ the distinction 'collective/individual', how can we distinguish
>Heidegger from Hegel?
This is NOT my question.
> Let us tinker
I do not want to tinker. I want to learn. Perhaps because I do not have a readily
identifiable name (read reputation), my name is seen as worthy of attack. Perhaps I am
unclear in my personal (unrevealed) viewpoint, and therefore my questions should be
attacked. Since I have tried to keep my own personal answers hidden, so that I can find
other answers, (hopefully better ones), I find this hard to accept. Yet if true, perhaps I
should desist entirely from my efforts here, and just write and read.
In order to find out, I will post something from someone arguably close to Heidegger in
thought and proximity, and perhaps then my own questions/directions will become clearer. If
you do not find what this philosopher says as interesting, and significant, and as
clarifying my questions, then I will desist.
erik champion M.Arch
schools of design & performing arts
UNITEC
tel: 64 9 815 4321 ext 7140
fax: 64 9 846 7369
email: echampion@xxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---