Cologne, 9 July 1996
Erik Champion asks:
"Does Heidegger use the word 'transcendence'?" (in relation to standing out into
the world.)
Yes indeedy. Cf. e.g. GA Band 26 'Metaphysical Beginnings of Logic starting out
>from Leibniz' (I don't know the English title) Section 9 The Essencing of Truth
and its Essential Relation to 'Ground' (Reason).
Erik continues:
"As for the leap, is it not rather a "crash": for the barriers go down, the
social conventions fall from our eyes, but we ourselves do not leap over the
(Lessing) ditch?"
I don't know about social conventions falling from our eyes. That is a very
existentialist reading à la Sartre.
Erik:
"What is the protection consisting of? Through dwelling poetically, thinking,
great works of art?"
Yes, I think so. These are perhaps the leading roles. But we cannot (should not
try to?) imagine what it could be like once a caring for being percolates to the
level of everyday life. We are in the passageway and cannot see the light at
the end of the tunnel.
Erik:
"This transparency is not of self, but of receptivity to the manifestion of
other selves?"
The wondrous thing about Mitsein seems to be that the other AS other is at all
accessible. We could just as well live alongside each other likes autists. But
Dasein is essentially Mitsein. A gift of being. This is the postmetaphysical
translation of Aristotle's essential link between zoion logon echon and zoion
politikon.
Erik:
"In the having of mood, or the sharing of mood, does that not define us?"
My problem here is with the 'ends' (limits) of the de-fin-ition. Putting
something into its ends is de-fining it (the idea, the category, the essence).
This enables understanding. But mood is more diffuse, does not bring anything to
stand, does not con-fine, gather into limits (which is the essential function
performed by the logos). Mood is more a veil laid over beings, an aura that
affects us. Being affected, we are thrown into moods, without under-standing it.
So I do not think that "definition [can] be open ended rather than enclosing?"
So to speak, by de-fin-ition.
Humans are not transparent. They are in the fold in between.
Jan Straathof writes:
"Isn't it plausible to look at the unity of "the sheepdog & the herd" as a
cybernetic system, completely dependent on the guidance of the shepherd? (the
shepherd as the artist of Mitsein)"
The shepherd does not make the sheep. He is dependent on them being granted.
But he could slaughter them all. But then where would he be?
But the phrase is: shepherd of being, not of beings. Being cannot be
slaughtered, it can only be forgotten. Being cannot be made, so there is no
artist of being. The shepherd is not the specifically shepherd of Mitsein, but
could care for being together. This has nothing to do with guiding others, but
caring for being with others.
(Remember the ontological difference!)
Michael Pennamacoor speaks of cybernetics.
Cybernetics as the science of control of beings is another kettle of fish from
kybernetik as caring for beyng (the kettle itself?). There's nothing to control.
How do you control beyng? It only gives us its gowns (Heidegger: "Ueberwurf")
for the being of beings. We cannot order them. It's a wind-fall. Maybe it's a
profit, maybe it's a burden. Either way, we have to care for it (beyng's our
only worry).
Mr/Ms Schneck asks whether "Dasein _is_ attentiveness".
The naming of the shepherd of beyng is uncomfortable if we imagine some sort of
idyllic Arcadia. Or if the links to Christianity come to mind. It seems to me to
be uppermost to remember that beyng can only be cared for, it cannot be made or
manipulated.
I have to translate attentiveness back into German: "Aufmerksamkeit",
"Gerichtetheit" (directedness towards a specific being). Aufmerksamkeit can mean
in Mitsein showing care and attention to someone else, giving them space,
looking after them, being kind. This entire dimension of Mitsein is
underdeveloped in Heidegger, in my opinion.
Gerichtetheit, on the other hand, is the intentional relation towards beings. In
Husserlian terms it is the directedness of consciousness towards entities. For
attentivenss in this sense, beings are present for Dasein (vergegenwaertigt).
But such presencing into presence is not the whole of Dasein, since it is
stretched out into the future and has-beenness as well. (We are all has-beens.)
If you say "Dasein _is_ attentiveness", how is this different from saying that
Dasein is care (Sorge)?
Michael
Dr Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ ° '~': '' ///
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° °~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ - °
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--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Erik Champion asks:
"Does Heidegger use the word 'transcendence'?" (in relation to standing out into
the world.)
Yes indeedy. Cf. e.g. GA Band 26 'Metaphysical Beginnings of Logic starting out
>from Leibniz' (I don't know the English title) Section 9 The Essencing of Truth
and its Essential Relation to 'Ground' (Reason).
Erik continues:
"As for the leap, is it not rather a "crash": for the barriers go down, the
social conventions fall from our eyes, but we ourselves do not leap over the
(Lessing) ditch?"
I don't know about social conventions falling from our eyes. That is a very
existentialist reading à la Sartre.
Erik:
"What is the protection consisting of? Through dwelling poetically, thinking,
great works of art?"
Yes, I think so. These are perhaps the leading roles. But we cannot (should not
try to?) imagine what it could be like once a caring for being percolates to the
level of everyday life. We are in the passageway and cannot see the light at
the end of the tunnel.
Erik:
"This transparency is not of self, but of receptivity to the manifestion of
other selves?"
The wondrous thing about Mitsein seems to be that the other AS other is at all
accessible. We could just as well live alongside each other likes autists. But
Dasein is essentially Mitsein. A gift of being. This is the postmetaphysical
translation of Aristotle's essential link between zoion logon echon and zoion
politikon.
Erik:
"In the having of mood, or the sharing of mood, does that not define us?"
My problem here is with the 'ends' (limits) of the de-fin-ition. Putting
something into its ends is de-fining it (the idea, the category, the essence).
This enables understanding. But mood is more diffuse, does not bring anything to
stand, does not con-fine, gather into limits (which is the essential function
performed by the logos). Mood is more a veil laid over beings, an aura that
affects us. Being affected, we are thrown into moods, without under-standing it.
So I do not think that "definition [can] be open ended rather than enclosing?"
So to speak, by de-fin-ition.
Humans are not transparent. They are in the fold in between.
Jan Straathof writes:
"Isn't it plausible to look at the unity of "the sheepdog & the herd" as a
cybernetic system, completely dependent on the guidance of the shepherd? (the
shepherd as the artist of Mitsein)"
The shepherd does not make the sheep. He is dependent on them being granted.
But he could slaughter them all. But then where would he be?
But the phrase is: shepherd of being, not of beings. Being cannot be
slaughtered, it can only be forgotten. Being cannot be made, so there is no
artist of being. The shepherd is not the specifically shepherd of Mitsein, but
could care for being together. This has nothing to do with guiding others, but
caring for being with others.
(Remember the ontological difference!)
Michael Pennamacoor speaks of cybernetics.
Cybernetics as the science of control of beings is another kettle of fish from
kybernetik as caring for beyng (the kettle itself?). There's nothing to control.
How do you control beyng? It only gives us its gowns (Heidegger: "Ueberwurf")
for the being of beings. We cannot order them. It's a wind-fall. Maybe it's a
profit, maybe it's a burden. Either way, we have to care for it (beyng's our
only worry).
Mr/Ms Schneck asks whether "Dasein _is_ attentiveness".
The naming of the shepherd of beyng is uncomfortable if we imagine some sort of
idyllic Arcadia. Or if the links to Christianity come to mind. It seems to me to
be uppermost to remember that beyng can only be cared for, it cannot be made or
manipulated.
I have to translate attentiveness back into German: "Aufmerksamkeit",
"Gerichtetheit" (directedness towards a specific being). Aufmerksamkeit can mean
in Mitsein showing care and attention to someone else, giving them space,
looking after them, being kind. This entire dimension of Mitsein is
underdeveloped in Heidegger, in my opinion.
Gerichtetheit, on the other hand, is the intentional relation towards beings. In
Husserlian terms it is the directedness of consciousness towards entities. For
attentivenss in this sense, beings are present for Dasein (vergegenwaertigt).
But such presencing into presence is not the whole of Dasein, since it is
stretched out into the future and has-beenness as well. (We are all has-beens.)
If you say "Dasein _is_ attentiveness", how is this different from saying that
Dasein is care (Sorge)?
Michael
Dr Michael Eldred ° artefact text and translation \\\ ° '~': '' ///
artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx °°° made by art °°° °~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ - °
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _ °/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 .{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---