Thank you Malcolm:
>Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 19:19:04 +1200
>From: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (malcolm riddoch)
>Subject: Re: art of philosophy
> According to Heidegger's Nietzsche in order to be as its own truth will to power must constantly
>will new truths. It can never settle down with itself for fear of a petrifaction of 'life'. For the
>"will is, as the will to power, the command to more power.... The will must in this way posit a
>condition for a willing-out-beyond-itself" (Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's word: God is dead'in 'The
>Question Concerning Technology & other essays', p. 80). Art is apparently that which fulfills this
>condition, and in which "the will to power first frees itself to itself" (p. 85). As this
>self-transcending movement, art:
> "is the value that first opens all heights of ascent. Art is the highest value. In relation to the
>value truth, it is the higher value. The one, ever in a fresh way, calls forth the other. Both
>values determine in their value-relation the unitive essence of the intrinsically value-positing
>will to power" (p. 86).
I wonder if this is doing violence to Nietzsche, or if Nietzsche (from at least one point or
perspective in time) would have agreed with it.
>From Heidegger's point of view, I had thought that art leads to truth, (and that truth was
conditional for great works of art*) not that truth was a subset or of lower value than art, but that
art was one way of reaching the clearing, of gaining a glimpse of truth.
> Art, as the constant self-transcendence of will, becomes the highest value of N's metaphysics. I'm
>not sure whether this does violence to Nietzsche's texts but I guess the constant over reaching of
>will to power would probably constitute something of a 'great stimulant for life'. However, H's
>interpretation of N is also supposed to be his own confrontation with Nazism (Hitlerism) and by the
>40's this had degenerated into a sort of apocalyptic critique of will to power as the incessant
>machination of the will to will which wills itself as constant willing. In this sense N's art as
>constantly willing out beyond itself might lay the grounds for machination following which the
>later H then goes on to give poesis as the essence of techne/technology.
I am not familiar with the current stance on Will to Power, is it now near-universally considered to
be more Nietzsche's sister than Nietzsche, and/or possible to extract the Nietzsche from the rest?
Although Heidegger appeared to be aware (ie mention) that the work was distorted by Nietzsche's
sister, was he aware of the extent, and which bits were "rotten" (a strange phrase from me to
describe those words not of a slide-into-madness Nietzsche's making or intention to publish, but
hopefuly you know what I mean).
> But then H's early to mid 30's critique of Nietzsche/Nazism seems to take a much more optimistic
>view of the possibilities of will to power. H's relation to N's art, while still situating N within
>a metaphysics of subjectness, seems much more ambiguous (ambivalent?).
You mean that it is not easy to see his clear personal opinion of Nietzsche's theory of art or that
he did not make up his mind (in the 30s) yet?
> In 'Origin of the work of art' c. 1935 (whilst not explicitly dealing with N) the work of art is
>an historical truth only in that it gives itself as the withheld determination of one's own
>historical Dasein. The disclosedness of openness, as this thrown Dasein, will always be
>historically determined but this determination can only be said 'poetically'. When art discloses
>the openness within which beings as a whole are grounded it "attains to its historical essence as
>foundation" (Basic Writings', p. 201). The happening of art then grounds the truth of beings in any
>particular epoch of history where: "History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task
>as entry into that people's endowment.... [where] Art as founding is essentially historical" (p.
>202).
I admit to having trouble reconciling the individual experience of art with that of a nation.
Perhaps it is the individual's encounter with the work in the realm of the individual's personally
perceived notion of the cultural background of his/her 'people', but it is still not clear to me.
My big question is: from Heidegger's point of view, when does the work of art (say an ancient Greek
sculpture by Socrates) become a work of art, when it reveals itself in terms of what it will be to
the maker (Socrates), when it is made and then reveals itself in its own making to its maker, when
it is encountered by an Athenian spectator, when the society of the maker (Socrates Athens)
encounters it, then learns it was made by Socrates, when we encounter it two thousand years later,
or when we find out who made it? (I do not think he means the first option at all, even if Gadamer in
Philosopical Hermeneutics_ seems to see all as having aletheic reverb., however diminishing, yet this
is an area I still find dark, dank and mysterious. Speaking of which,cor, Gadamer sure doesn't
privillege design!).
> I don't know if interpreting the essence of the historical destiny of a people as poesis amounts
>to an 'aestheticization' of politics but art remains an open possibility for that confrontation
>with nihilism which, c. 1955, "must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to technology
>[ie. a revealing] and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art" ('The
>question concerning technology'). By this time art is associated with the 'saving power'.
I should try to stay out of the issue of art versus/as/with politics, perhaps though one should not
see politics as art or vice versa, for maybe the saving power as truth is so essential to the
experiencing of Being that to conflate it with politics is to erode the usefulness of the latter as
a term in its own right.
> So what to make of H's response to N's views on art? And how to reconcile the notion of a peoples
>historical destiny (specifically mid twentieth century Germans) with the authentic call to one's
>own historical Dasein?
Wish I knew!
I also said:
> >If Heidegger sees the individual versus the collective as a "non-starter",
> >how does
> >he distinguish his philosophy from that of Hegel's World Spirit as in some
> >form of
> >world-mind/spirit/geist: some form of future world-consciousness? Or
> >doesn't he?
Malcolm replied:
> So many huge questions, where do we start?
Pehaps his response to being called a humanist, and what the latter can mean. If art can be
considered as a saving power, as the very portal to cultural history as a living beating emanation
of Being, then perhaps (and there is a recent article on this subject of MH and humanism that comes
to mind) and given his rejection of Hegel's progressive Idealism of Art in MH's_PLT_ (his
description of the Bavarian chalet in essence rather than period-style or future archetype) might
help if perhaps such remembered glimpses of the past as experienced through language are socially
constructed.
Perhaps if Hegel went jogging along the sand dunes of Prussia (insert poetic license here) and saw
over his shoulder driftwood, he would imagine sculptural representations of the human form in the
ever so faintly sensuous sheen of stainless steel. If Heidegger jogged along (um, the sand dunes of
Bavaria) then on spotting a glimpse of the driftwood (which had moved on since Hegel got an idea of
it), he would stop, turn around, imagine the history of the wood, (=from the worn out sea battle of
its bleached skin to the early tremour of the root as it awakens in the lush soil etc), select the
driest bits, and make a bonfire, silhouetted by the smoke of history as the denuded expression of
arboreal will to light crumbles into smoke, ashes and darkness...
How this relates to a people: beats me.
*Nb if he only talks about great works of art, then what of non great works of art, or is greatness a
necessary condition of art, or merely used in _PLT_ as clearer for descriptive purposes?
Thanks for your time, all further comments/replies gratefully accepted!
Erik Champion
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 19:19:04 +1200
>From: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (malcolm riddoch)
>Subject: Re: art of philosophy
> According to Heidegger's Nietzsche in order to be as its own truth will to power must constantly
>will new truths. It can never settle down with itself for fear of a petrifaction of 'life'. For the
>"will is, as the will to power, the command to more power.... The will must in this way posit a
>condition for a willing-out-beyond-itself" (Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's word: God is dead'in 'The
>Question Concerning Technology & other essays', p. 80). Art is apparently that which fulfills this
>condition, and in which "the will to power first frees itself to itself" (p. 85). As this
>self-transcending movement, art:
> "is the value that first opens all heights of ascent. Art is the highest value. In relation to the
>value truth, it is the higher value. The one, ever in a fresh way, calls forth the other. Both
>values determine in their value-relation the unitive essence of the intrinsically value-positing
>will to power" (p. 86).
I wonder if this is doing violence to Nietzsche, or if Nietzsche (from at least one point or
perspective in time) would have agreed with it.
>From Heidegger's point of view, I had thought that art leads to truth, (and that truth was
conditional for great works of art*) not that truth was a subset or of lower value than art, but that
art was one way of reaching the clearing, of gaining a glimpse of truth.
> Art, as the constant self-transcendence of will, becomes the highest value of N's metaphysics. I'm
>not sure whether this does violence to Nietzsche's texts but I guess the constant over reaching of
>will to power would probably constitute something of a 'great stimulant for life'. However, H's
>interpretation of N is also supposed to be his own confrontation with Nazism (Hitlerism) and by the
>40's this had degenerated into a sort of apocalyptic critique of will to power as the incessant
>machination of the will to will which wills itself as constant willing. In this sense N's art as
>constantly willing out beyond itself might lay the grounds for machination following which the
>later H then goes on to give poesis as the essence of techne/technology.
I am not familiar with the current stance on Will to Power, is it now near-universally considered to
be more Nietzsche's sister than Nietzsche, and/or possible to extract the Nietzsche from the rest?
Although Heidegger appeared to be aware (ie mention) that the work was distorted by Nietzsche's
sister, was he aware of the extent, and which bits were "rotten" (a strange phrase from me to
describe those words not of a slide-into-madness Nietzsche's making or intention to publish, but
hopefuly you know what I mean).
> But then H's early to mid 30's critique of Nietzsche/Nazism seems to take a much more optimistic
>view of the possibilities of will to power. H's relation to N's art, while still situating N within
>a metaphysics of subjectness, seems much more ambiguous (ambivalent?).
You mean that it is not easy to see his clear personal opinion of Nietzsche's theory of art or that
he did not make up his mind (in the 30s) yet?
> In 'Origin of the work of art' c. 1935 (whilst not explicitly dealing with N) the work of art is
>an historical truth only in that it gives itself as the withheld determination of one's own
>historical Dasein. The disclosedness of openness, as this thrown Dasein, will always be
>historically determined but this determination can only be said 'poetically'. When art discloses
>the openness within which beings as a whole are grounded it "attains to its historical essence as
>foundation" (Basic Writings', p. 201). The happening of art then grounds the truth of beings in any
>particular epoch of history where: "History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task
>as entry into that people's endowment.... [where] Art as founding is essentially historical" (p.
>202).
I admit to having trouble reconciling the individual experience of art with that of a nation.
Perhaps it is the individual's encounter with the work in the realm of the individual's personally
perceived notion of the cultural background of his/her 'people', but it is still not clear to me.
My big question is: from Heidegger's point of view, when does the work of art (say an ancient Greek
sculpture by Socrates) become a work of art, when it reveals itself in terms of what it will be to
the maker (Socrates), when it is made and then reveals itself in its own making to its maker, when
it is encountered by an Athenian spectator, when the society of the maker (Socrates Athens)
encounters it, then learns it was made by Socrates, when we encounter it two thousand years later,
or when we find out who made it? (I do not think he means the first option at all, even if Gadamer in
Philosopical Hermeneutics_ seems to see all as having aletheic reverb., however diminishing, yet this
is an area I still find dark, dank and mysterious. Speaking of which,cor, Gadamer sure doesn't
privillege design!).
> I don't know if interpreting the essence of the historical destiny of a people as poesis amounts
>to an 'aestheticization' of politics but art remains an open possibility for that confrontation
>with nihilism which, c. 1955, "must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to technology
>[ie. a revealing] and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art" ('The
>question concerning technology'). By this time art is associated with the 'saving power'.
I should try to stay out of the issue of art versus/as/with politics, perhaps though one should not
see politics as art or vice versa, for maybe the saving power as truth is so essential to the
experiencing of Being that to conflate it with politics is to erode the usefulness of the latter as
a term in its own right.
> So what to make of H's response to N's views on art? And how to reconcile the notion of a peoples
>historical destiny (specifically mid twentieth century Germans) with the authentic call to one's
>own historical Dasein?
Wish I knew!
I also said:
> >If Heidegger sees the individual versus the collective as a "non-starter",
> >how does
> >he distinguish his philosophy from that of Hegel's World Spirit as in some
> >form of
> >world-mind/spirit/geist: some form of future world-consciousness? Or
> >doesn't he?
Malcolm replied:
> So many huge questions, where do we start?
Pehaps his response to being called a humanist, and what the latter can mean. If art can be
considered as a saving power, as the very portal to cultural history as a living beating emanation
of Being, then perhaps (and there is a recent article on this subject of MH and humanism that comes
to mind) and given his rejection of Hegel's progressive Idealism of Art in MH's_PLT_ (his
description of the Bavarian chalet in essence rather than period-style or future archetype) might
help if perhaps such remembered glimpses of the past as experienced through language are socially
constructed.
Perhaps if Hegel went jogging along the sand dunes of Prussia (insert poetic license here) and saw
over his shoulder driftwood, he would imagine sculptural representations of the human form in the
ever so faintly sensuous sheen of stainless steel. If Heidegger jogged along (um, the sand dunes of
Bavaria) then on spotting a glimpse of the driftwood (which had moved on since Hegel got an idea of
it), he would stop, turn around, imagine the history of the wood, (=from the worn out sea battle of
its bleached skin to the early tremour of the root as it awakens in the lush soil etc), select the
driest bits, and make a bonfire, silhouetted by the smoke of history as the denuded expression of
arboreal will to light crumbles into smoke, ashes and darkness...
How this relates to a people: beats me.
*Nb if he only talks about great works of art, then what of non great works of art, or is greatness a
necessary condition of art, or merely used in _PLT_ as clearer for descriptive purposes?
Thanks for your time, all further comments/replies gratefully accepted!
Erik Champion
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---