>My big question is: from Heidegger's point of view, when does the work of
>art (say an ancient Greek
>sculpture by Socrates) become a work of art, when it reveals itself in
>terms of what it will be to
>the maker (Socrates), when it is made and then reveals itself in its own
>making to its maker, when
>it is encountered by an Athenian spectator, when the society of the maker
>(Socrates Athens)
>encounters it, then learns it was made by Socrates, when we encounter it
>two thousand years later
>Erik Champion
I think the work of art becomes significant in the 'Origin of the work of
art', at least in part, when we encounter it as an opportunity to call 'us'
into the historical essence of the *thinking* of being, which he gives as
poesis. 'Us' in one sense but this public lecture was probably also a
political opportunity to make an appeal for the historical destiny of the
Germans, maybe even a reply to Hitler's earlier speech on art (I am finding
it increasingly difficult to separate Heidegger's politics from his
philosophy, especially during 1933-40's).
But what makes for a work of art? When reading through the 'Origin' I
couldn't and still can't see how Van Gogh's shoes or a Greek temple are any
more of a poetic expression of a people's historical destiny than a tv dog
food commercial or a Campbells soup can (is Warhol's art authentically
artistic?). They're all an 'aesthetic' experience of sorts and all have the
potential to disclose one's own being, depending on how they are read. H
seems to privilege classical or grand art over the mundane, but perhaps
more for rhetorical reasons than ontological necessity?
In this sense perhaps the work of art was violently appropriated for H's
thinking of being as a means to positing the work as poesis. He even ends
up privileging poesy over painting because it is 'the most original form of
poetry in the essential sense'. I can see why he might do this given his
preoccupation with language but is there an ontological necessity for it?
Malcolm
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>art (say an ancient Greek
>sculpture by Socrates) become a work of art, when it reveals itself in
>terms of what it will be to
>the maker (Socrates), when it is made and then reveals itself in its own
>making to its maker, when
>it is encountered by an Athenian spectator, when the society of the maker
>(Socrates Athens)
>encounters it, then learns it was made by Socrates, when we encounter it
>two thousand years later
>Erik Champion
I think the work of art becomes significant in the 'Origin of the work of
art', at least in part, when we encounter it as an opportunity to call 'us'
into the historical essence of the *thinking* of being, which he gives as
poesis. 'Us' in one sense but this public lecture was probably also a
political opportunity to make an appeal for the historical destiny of the
Germans, maybe even a reply to Hitler's earlier speech on art (I am finding
it increasingly difficult to separate Heidegger's politics from his
philosophy, especially during 1933-40's).
But what makes for a work of art? When reading through the 'Origin' I
couldn't and still can't see how Van Gogh's shoes or a Greek temple are any
more of a poetic expression of a people's historical destiny than a tv dog
food commercial or a Campbells soup can (is Warhol's art authentically
artistic?). They're all an 'aesthetic' experience of sorts and all have the
potential to disclose one's own being, depending on how they are read. H
seems to privilege classical or grand art over the mundane, but perhaps
more for rhetorical reasons than ontological necessity?
In this sense perhaps the work of art was violently appropriated for H's
thinking of being as a means to positing the work as poesis. He even ends
up privileging poesy over painting because it is 'the most original form of
poetry in the essential sense'. I can see why he might do this given his
preoccupation with language but is there an ontological necessity for it?
Malcolm
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---