On Tue, 23 Jul 1996, M.Eldred_artefact wrote:
> ii) The being of beings, the AS of their appearance in the clearing of
> beyng's truth, is not decided once and for all but is subject to the history of
> beyng. Thinking and art can help to decide historically AS what beings can
> appear. This involves twisting and turning the self-evidences of what they are.
> Again, common sense must be perverted, or so it seems. If beings are no longer
> to appear AS objects or AS components of the standing reserve, their AS must be
> twisted, deflected into another orientation. Again there is strife, for how else
> can this decision event-uate? (Some (Chris Rickey perhaps) would say there is
> nothing to decide here.)
Or perhaps not. This is precisely the point I make.
However, two caveats:
Decision: Heidegger says on several occasions that the Ereignis is not
within the power of humans to bring about. Is a decision an effect of
the human will? Is decision (I assume you mean Entscheidung) the same or
different from decision/resolution (Entschlossenheit)?
Strife: Much of the resistance to the violent overtones of Heidegger's
interpretation of Heraclitus' polemos, which is read, particularly in the
early 1930's in terms of Kampf, which offends our peace-loving liberal
sentiments.
There appear to be several levels of strife in Heidegger. One is the
strife of between humans and being, the wrestling with being so that it
clears the site for the AS. This takes place, depending on the text one
uses, in the work of art of a poet or in the Auseinandersetzung between a
philosopher and his/her tradition. In fact, given the exemplary position
Heidegger grants Hoelderlin, it is possible to say they are identical.
This appears to be nothing other than the fixing of identity and
difference, including one's self-identity, because all identity
presupposes a difference from something. Heidegger describes it as a
battle because nothing is fixed by "nature" or for all eternity, and
because all decisions result from dialogue, conversation or discussions.
I'm not certain if this necessarily implies political violence; indeed,
there is a growing body of democratic literature which expressly praises
the agonal nature of genuine democracy.
The other level, taken from what you said, is the wrestling nature of
revolutions in the political realm. In his explication of Plato's Parable
of the Cave, Heidegger follows Plato in saying that the philosopher (later
artist) tears those chained from the wall and drags them to the surface.
Is this doing violence? Even if it means, as it probably does here, to
break up their everyday habits of thinking and opining? Is persuasion
violent?
Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> ii) The being of beings, the AS of their appearance in the clearing of
> beyng's truth, is not decided once and for all but is subject to the history of
> beyng. Thinking and art can help to decide historically AS what beings can
> appear. This involves twisting and turning the self-evidences of what they are.
> Again, common sense must be perverted, or so it seems. If beings are no longer
> to appear AS objects or AS components of the standing reserve, their AS must be
> twisted, deflected into another orientation. Again there is strife, for how else
> can this decision event-uate? (Some (Chris Rickey perhaps) would say there is
> nothing to decide here.)
Or perhaps not. This is precisely the point I make.
However, two caveats:
Decision: Heidegger says on several occasions that the Ereignis is not
within the power of humans to bring about. Is a decision an effect of
the human will? Is decision (I assume you mean Entscheidung) the same or
different from decision/resolution (Entschlossenheit)?
Strife: Much of the resistance to the violent overtones of Heidegger's
interpretation of Heraclitus' polemos, which is read, particularly in the
early 1930's in terms of Kampf, which offends our peace-loving liberal
sentiments.
There appear to be several levels of strife in Heidegger. One is the
strife of between humans and being, the wrestling with being so that it
clears the site for the AS. This takes place, depending on the text one
uses, in the work of art of a poet or in the Auseinandersetzung between a
philosopher and his/her tradition. In fact, given the exemplary position
Heidegger grants Hoelderlin, it is possible to say they are identical.
This appears to be nothing other than the fixing of identity and
difference, including one's self-identity, because all identity
presupposes a difference from something. Heidegger describes it as a
battle because nothing is fixed by "nature" or for all eternity, and
because all decisions result from dialogue, conversation or discussions.
I'm not certain if this necessarily implies political violence; indeed,
there is a growing body of democratic literature which expressly praises
the agonal nature of genuine democracy.
The other level, taken from what you said, is the wrestling nature of
revolutions in the political realm. In his explication of Plato's Parable
of the Cave, Heidegger follows Plato in saying that the philosopher (later
artist) tears those chained from the wall and drags them to the surface.
Is this doing violence? Even if it means, as it probably does here, to
break up their everyday habits of thinking and opining? Is persuasion
violent?
Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---