In a previous post I asked whether Baudrillard's phenomenological (I would
insist on this) analyses of the triumph of the simulacra, within which
beings increasingly enter into a state of pure circulation, extends or
breaks with Heidegger's critique of the technological understanding's
omniclearing of beings as standing-reserve. If I understand Michael's post
(and I am sympathetic to the general issues of translation Michael
addresses--the uber-setzung of the ubersetzung--if not the somewhat
polemical style in which he puts forth his particular case) he is answering
that the insights of Baudrillard (and Paul Virilio? is he responsible for
the 'ever more rapid' part?):
> do not represent any contradiction of
>>standing presence but are rather one of its consequences.
Michael adds:
>> Unless one can see the
>>difference between being and beings, no sense at all can be made of terms
>>such
>>as "staendige Anwesung".
But we can't 'see' this difference at all. (Michael, it seems to me that
you made a similar claim in an earlier post when you seemed to equate Being
with standing presence, a claim which you quickly retracted or rejected
when several people pounced on it, although I'm not sure that you should
have, given that you still seem to be clinging to something of its
'spirit.' Those who defend the idea that Heidegger equated Being with
Anwesen often do so by referring to the Zollikoner seminare, which seems to
be a favorite of yours, and i for one would invite you to elaborate that
idea if it suits you, against that claim that:) We can only 'see' (or
grasp) Being insofar as it shows up in beings. Even in the 'enduring
whiling' of beings, Being itself remains necessarily self-concealing. Thus
the difference as such cannot be seen, but at best only understood (from
out of a certain understanding of the history of Being) in a way which
facilitates phenomenological possibilities of understanding beings
differently.
As I understand (and that means interpretively appropriate)
Heidegger, it is the open space for the possible experience of Being as
that which simultaneously elicits and defies naming which must be protected
and preserved.
Iain
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
insist on this) analyses of the triumph of the simulacra, within which
beings increasingly enter into a state of pure circulation, extends or
breaks with Heidegger's critique of the technological understanding's
omniclearing of beings as standing-reserve. If I understand Michael's post
(and I am sympathetic to the general issues of translation Michael
addresses--the uber-setzung of the ubersetzung--if not the somewhat
polemical style in which he puts forth his particular case) he is answering
that the insights of Baudrillard (and Paul Virilio? is he responsible for
the 'ever more rapid' part?):
> do not represent any contradiction of
>>standing presence but are rather one of its consequences.
Michael adds:
>> Unless one can see the
>>difference between being and beings, no sense at all can be made of terms
>>such
>>as "staendige Anwesung".
But we can't 'see' this difference at all. (Michael, it seems to me that
you made a similar claim in an earlier post when you seemed to equate Being
with standing presence, a claim which you quickly retracted or rejected
when several people pounced on it, although I'm not sure that you should
have, given that you still seem to be clinging to something of its
'spirit.' Those who defend the idea that Heidegger equated Being with
Anwesen often do so by referring to the Zollikoner seminare, which seems to
be a favorite of yours, and i for one would invite you to elaborate that
idea if it suits you, against that claim that:) We can only 'see' (or
grasp) Being insofar as it shows up in beings. Even in the 'enduring
whiling' of beings, Being itself remains necessarily self-concealing. Thus
the difference as such cannot be seen, but at best only understood (from
out of a certain understanding of the history of Being) in a way which
facilitates phenomenological possibilities of understanding beings
differently.
As I understand (and that means interpretively appropriate)
Heidegger, it is the open space for the possible experience of Being as
that which simultaneously elicits and defies naming which must be protected
and preserved.
Iain
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---