Tom Blancato writes:
>I think the question of violence *is* asked in Derrida, but I think in
>some ways or often it remains in utility only, even in Derrida. But has the
>question of violence been asked in later Heidegger? I don't think so, but
>that's also a function of my scholarship, which is poor.
My suggestion is that Heidegger does indeed ask the question of violence,
and of nonviolence, throughout his work, especially in IM (which, by the
way, is the English translation of EM -- *Einfuerung in die *Metaphysik),
but also in the _Gelassenheit_ volume, translated as _Discourse on
Thinking_. It is in the latter text that the violence perpetrated by
technological thinking is countered by the formula "the will not to will",
which is a function of 'letting-be' and 'releasement'. Heidegger takes
great pains to distinguish this latter constellation of terms from quietism
and pacifism, by calling into question the classical schema of activity and
passivity -- letting-be is active or spontaneous receptivity (to use
Kantian terms); 'letting' (lassen) is an activity, but one more attuned to
the matter of thinking than mastery or domination (which coincides, I
suggest, with Seinsvergessenheit).
>And then we have the "ontological intervention" thing. I simply can't
>accept "war" or "polemos" as a signifier which can be so easily and
>freely ripped from its geopoligical origins (not that those are the
>*only* origins). My general impression remains that he "uses" the
>question of violence in order to get adjudicated violence (the violence
>to metaphysics of Destruktion), but this remains parasitic on the
>question "proper", a question which remains unasked. For I think that to
>truly ask this question would require a kind of thread (and no doubt, a
>rather transformative one) which would have to traverse Heidegger's
>writing in a *thematic-substantive* way.
Might I recommend here Derrida's essay in the _Commemorations_ volume,
edited by John Sallis, titled "Philopolemology: Heidegger's Ear", the
fourth installment in Derrida's "Geschlecht" series. This essay directly
addresses the problematic of using 'polemos' as ontological vs. using
'polemos' as geopolitical, a strategy Derrida (as one can readily foresee,
if one is familiar with JD) deconstructs, according to a law of
supplementarity.
Nor can we allow any simple and
>easy distinction "early/later Heidegger", I suspect.
There are distinctions to be drawn, I think, but I agree they are not easy.
Michael Eldred has suggested approaching the early Heidegger from the
perspective of moodedness, which opens the question of Stimmung /
Bestimmung pursued throughout Heidegger's 'career'. The planning and
reckoning of technological thinking subdues or subordinates the more
primordial access to beings, and to the question of being, afforded by the
attunement of mood. This topic is pursued through the Hoelderlin lectures
and essays, the Parmenides lecture (see the discussion of 'Scheu' in the
context of a reading of Pindar), and in the 1937 lecture, _Basic Questions
of Philosophy_, where Gk thaumazein is discussed as wonder, Er-staunen,
which is central in determining the status of the will in Heidegger's later
thought. (Aside: I've always had difficulties with a sentence from the
Befindlichkeit section of the In-sein chapter from SZ: "Dasein can, should,
and must become master of its moods". I've forgotten the page number. What
is the upshot of this claim? In what way is 'mastery' being asserted here?
Isn't this a rather Stoic / Augustinean claim?)
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>I think the question of violence *is* asked in Derrida, but I think in
>some ways or often it remains in utility only, even in Derrida. But has the
>question of violence been asked in later Heidegger? I don't think so, but
>that's also a function of my scholarship, which is poor.
My suggestion is that Heidegger does indeed ask the question of violence,
and of nonviolence, throughout his work, especially in IM (which, by the
way, is the English translation of EM -- *Einfuerung in die *Metaphysik),
but also in the _Gelassenheit_ volume, translated as _Discourse on
Thinking_. It is in the latter text that the violence perpetrated by
technological thinking is countered by the formula "the will not to will",
which is a function of 'letting-be' and 'releasement'. Heidegger takes
great pains to distinguish this latter constellation of terms from quietism
and pacifism, by calling into question the classical schema of activity and
passivity -- letting-be is active or spontaneous receptivity (to use
Kantian terms); 'letting' (lassen) is an activity, but one more attuned to
the matter of thinking than mastery or domination (which coincides, I
suggest, with Seinsvergessenheit).
>And then we have the "ontological intervention" thing. I simply can't
>accept "war" or "polemos" as a signifier which can be so easily and
>freely ripped from its geopoligical origins (not that those are the
>*only* origins). My general impression remains that he "uses" the
>question of violence in order to get adjudicated violence (the violence
>to metaphysics of Destruktion), but this remains parasitic on the
>question "proper", a question which remains unasked. For I think that to
>truly ask this question would require a kind of thread (and no doubt, a
>rather transformative one) which would have to traverse Heidegger's
>writing in a *thematic-substantive* way.
Might I recommend here Derrida's essay in the _Commemorations_ volume,
edited by John Sallis, titled "Philopolemology: Heidegger's Ear", the
fourth installment in Derrida's "Geschlecht" series. This essay directly
addresses the problematic of using 'polemos' as ontological vs. using
'polemos' as geopolitical, a strategy Derrida (as one can readily foresee,
if one is familiar with JD) deconstructs, according to a law of
supplementarity.
Nor can we allow any simple and
>easy distinction "early/later Heidegger", I suspect.
There are distinctions to be drawn, I think, but I agree they are not easy.
Michael Eldred has suggested approaching the early Heidegger from the
perspective of moodedness, which opens the question of Stimmung /
Bestimmung pursued throughout Heidegger's 'career'. The planning and
reckoning of technological thinking subdues or subordinates the more
primordial access to beings, and to the question of being, afforded by the
attunement of mood. This topic is pursued through the Hoelderlin lectures
and essays, the Parmenides lecture (see the discussion of 'Scheu' in the
context of a reading of Pindar), and in the 1937 lecture, _Basic Questions
of Philosophy_, where Gk thaumazein is discussed as wonder, Er-staunen,
which is central in determining the status of the will in Heidegger's later
thought. (Aside: I've always had difficulties with a sentence from the
Befindlichkeit section of the In-sein chapter from SZ: "Dasein can, should,
and must become master of its moods". I've forgotten the page number. What
is the upshot of this claim? In what way is 'mastery' being asserted here?
Isn't this a rather Stoic / Augustinean claim?)
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---