Tom Blancato asks about the status of Schuldigsein in SZ, in the context of
placing 'blame' in the history of Being (a topic developing out of the
interpretation of Seinsvergessenheit and the 'centre-stage' of man).
Perhaps some clarification of this 'category' of Dasein's being --
Being-guilty in the McQuarrie / Robinson translation -- could spur thinking
along.
As I understand 'guilt' in SZ (and the attendent category of
responsibility), Heidegger is placing Dasein's finitude within an
existential context. Finitude is interpreted traditionally according to
various binarisms, deriving perhaps from the Phaedo account of the
(in-finite) soul imprisoned in the body; shuffling off this mortal coil
enables the soul to take flight into the realm of the supersensuous idea.
Heidegger spurns this model as predicated upon a metaphysical account of
human being, reducing the existential 'who' to the ontic 'what' -- akin to
asserting the cogito without enquiring into the sense of 'sum'.
Schuldigsein pertains to the finitude of the throw, of having always
already been thrown into the world, in-sisting within a given horizon of
interpretation. The deployment of the term 'guilt' suggests a certain
moralistic interpretation (together with Verfallen, leading to the
wide-spread notion that Heidegger is transplanting Christian theology into
existential analytic). I suggest we take seriously the ambiguity of the
German 'Schuld', which means 'debt' as well as 'guilt'. In arriving in the
world without having 'chosen' it, in being thrown into a situation, a
historically determined life-world, prior to any individual decision about
such a world, finite Dasein is indebted. Such a debt must be understood
economically rather than simply moralistically -- I know, economics and
morality are closely intertwined, as Nietzsche would be the first to point
out ... still, let's use this distinction heuristically for the time being.
>From this economic understanding of Dasein's finitude develops the
thematics of gift and gratitude, of granting or favouring and of the
thinking that thanks. Responsibility would be a function of
thinking-thanking, inasmuch as responding to the gift -- the call, the
sending, the disclosive e-ventuation or properizing event -- is the
authentic co-respondence to Being. The debt is not thereby discharged,
recompense is not paid, so much as the debt is acknowledged and renewed,
reiterated, recapitulated, 'thematized' (affirmed, perhaps, in the sense of
Nietzsche's amor fati).
As for history as the history of violence, I venture to anticipate Tom
Blancato's irresponsible response: no thanks.
Cheers,
Paul N. Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
placing 'blame' in the history of Being (a topic developing out of the
interpretation of Seinsvergessenheit and the 'centre-stage' of man).
Perhaps some clarification of this 'category' of Dasein's being --
Being-guilty in the McQuarrie / Robinson translation -- could spur thinking
along.
As I understand 'guilt' in SZ (and the attendent category of
responsibility), Heidegger is placing Dasein's finitude within an
existential context. Finitude is interpreted traditionally according to
various binarisms, deriving perhaps from the Phaedo account of the
(in-finite) soul imprisoned in the body; shuffling off this mortal coil
enables the soul to take flight into the realm of the supersensuous idea.
Heidegger spurns this model as predicated upon a metaphysical account of
human being, reducing the existential 'who' to the ontic 'what' -- akin to
asserting the cogito without enquiring into the sense of 'sum'.
Schuldigsein pertains to the finitude of the throw, of having always
already been thrown into the world, in-sisting within a given horizon of
interpretation. The deployment of the term 'guilt' suggests a certain
moralistic interpretation (together with Verfallen, leading to the
wide-spread notion that Heidegger is transplanting Christian theology into
existential analytic). I suggest we take seriously the ambiguity of the
German 'Schuld', which means 'debt' as well as 'guilt'. In arriving in the
world without having 'chosen' it, in being thrown into a situation, a
historically determined life-world, prior to any individual decision about
such a world, finite Dasein is indebted. Such a debt must be understood
economically rather than simply moralistically -- I know, economics and
morality are closely intertwined, as Nietzsche would be the first to point
out ... still, let's use this distinction heuristically for the time being.
>From this economic understanding of Dasein's finitude develops the
thematics of gift and gratitude, of granting or favouring and of the
thinking that thanks. Responsibility would be a function of
thinking-thanking, inasmuch as responding to the gift -- the call, the
sending, the disclosive e-ventuation or properizing event -- is the
authentic co-respondence to Being. The debt is not thereby discharged,
recompense is not paid, so much as the debt is acknowledged and renewed,
reiterated, recapitulated, 'thematized' (affirmed, perhaps, in the sense of
Nietzsche's amor fati).
As for history as the history of violence, I venture to anticipate Tom
Blancato's irresponsible response: no thanks.
Cheers,
Paul N. Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---