On Tue, 10 Sep 1996, Iain Thomson wrote:
> In a word: yes.
> The charge of relativism only has teethe given the expectation for a
> non-historical conception of truth (which you invoke without
> defending). It is ressentement--not Realism-- to want what we have never had and
> could never have.
>
> Iain
One could have a notion of the truth that is stable that nontheless
permits (or even requires) that the particular truths about any one thing
are contingent. One example is Fichte, whose epistemology purports to be
absolute, but which allows for scientific progress.
That said, Heidegger always underestimated or even discounted the
truth-value of mathematical truths, which of course for centuries have
been rightly or wrongly the standard for truth as a whole.
Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> In a word: yes.
> The charge of relativism only has teethe given the expectation for a
> non-historical conception of truth (which you invoke without
> defending). It is ressentement--not Realism-- to want what we have never had and
> could never have.
>
> Iain
One could have a notion of the truth that is stable that nontheless
permits (or even requires) that the particular truths about any one thing
are contingent. One example is Fichte, whose epistemology purports to be
absolute, but which allows for scientific progress.
That said, Heidegger always underestimated or even discounted the
truth-value of mathematical truths, which of course for centuries have
been rightly or wrongly the standard for truth as a whole.
Chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---