> > The charge of relativism only has teethe given the expectation for a
> > non-historical conception of truth (which you invoke without
> > defending). It is ressentement--not Realism-- to want what we have never had and
> > could never have.
To call Truth "what we have never had" begs the question. How can we
decide whether relativism is the best philosophical option? Heidegger
makes a strong case for his historical conception of truth. But perhaps
Truth is neither historical nor without history. (I'm making an analogy
to Aristotle's analysis of time as being neither motion nor without
motion.) Perhaps Heidegger got the relation of truth and history wrong.
Perhaps his conception of freedom is not true freedom.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> > non-historical conception of truth (which you invoke without
> > defending). It is ressentement--not Realism-- to want what we have never had and
> > could never have.
To call Truth "what we have never had" begs the question. How can we
decide whether relativism is the best philosophical option? Heidegger
makes a strong case for his historical conception of truth. But perhaps
Truth is neither historical nor without history. (I'm making an analogy
to Aristotle's analysis of time as being neither motion nor without
motion.) Perhaps Heidegger got the relation of truth and history wrong.
Perhaps his conception of freedom is not true freedom.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---