Cologne, 12 September 1996
Aristotle's truth is the adequate statement: telling it like it is, (no
bullshit). Heidegger points out that it's not just statements that can be
truthful or not but, more originarily, beings themselves reveal themselves as
they are (in their truth), or hide, or reveal themselves in a distorted way.
Heidegger takes a very simple example of this, I think in 'Parmenides' Bd.54, of
a cupboard standing in front of a doorway. (Die Tuer ist durch den Schrank
verstellt.) The wall presents (presentifies, presences, shows, reveals) itself
as a closed wall. In truth, however, it has a doorway. The statement "There's no
doorway." is only derivative of the 'untruth' of the wall's unconcealment. Now
it is the wall itself not 'telling' it (showing itself) like it is. The
unconcealment of the wall as wall has to be given prior to any observation
and/or statement that it has or does not have a doorway. This prior
unconcealment (which is not the Kantian apriori) is aletheia, which includes
lethe (concealment, hiddenness) as well as distortion (Verstellung).
We tend to proceed from human subjects as the locus of truth: subjects tell the
truth, tell lies, half-truths, etc. A person (con-man, impostor) can also
present themself in a distorted (untrue) way (Verstellung). Heidegger points out
that things themselves present themselves in their truth, or in a distorted way
(Verstellung). The house in front of the mountain can distort (verstellen) the
view of the mountain in such a way that there appears to be no mountain there at
all! Who's lying here? Nobody. Things themselves.
Getting back to rhetoric and moods, Heidegger seems to shift the locus from the
realm of practical activity (life in the polis) to the realm of history and the
role of thinking in opening this timespace, deciding AS what beings will appear,
for example. He is then concerned with "fundamental moods" as moods of history.
This is apparent in GA29/30, but also elsewhere, say in his 'Nietzsche', where
he writes:
"Mit dem Augenblick, da 'der Ewige-Wiederkunfts-Gedanke' ueber ihn kam, wurde
die schon seit einiger Zeit sich bahnbrechende Wandlung seiner Grundstimmung
endgueltig." (NI:265)
English:
"At that moment in which the 'thought of eternal recurrence' came over him, the
transformation of his fundamental mood which had been blazing its trail for some
time became final and firm."
It is as if the thinker stands in the space of history by lying in the haze of a
fundamental mood that is the presentiment of another draft of the garb of beings
in their being that still has to be brought to stand in the thinker's language.
The mood calls for and calls to thinking. It is not a mood of being-together,
but a mood of being itself that is sending another historical missive. Far from
acting rhetorically on a mood to bring about a mood swing, the thinker is
exposed ec-statically, subjected to the mood and has to bring it to the language
of thinking. The fundamental moodswing of beyng itself has to be gathered into
language.
Cheers and regards,
Michael
\\\ ° '~': '' /// ° artefact text and translation °~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ - °
.{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ °°° made by art °°° _ °/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eldred
Michael:
I can't help but notice that our conversation concerning the place of
rhetoric in Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology occurs concurrently
with a discussion of Heidegger's "truth." There's no reason the two should
be connected, but why not pursue the possibility? There is obviously a
discontinuity/ contintuity going back to Plato's critique of rhetorical
discourse as limited to Doxa whereas dialectic had the capacity to reach
further out into the realm where truth might be accessable through the
discourse of philosophy. But then at the end of the Phaedrus, there is a
suggestion that there might be a kind of rhetoric, not presently in
practice, or perhaps never practicable,which can come close to, if not
actually join, the reach, the potential achievement of our capacity for
dialectic ( Both would be part of the unity of what Heidegger calls
"Seinskoennen" no?
Then we come to come to Aristotle's Rhetoric which begins by claiming that
Rhetoric is the "Antistrophos" of Dialectic, the main difference apparently
that rhetoric is practiced in the public sphere, the Agora, where
philsophers obiviously are at a punishing disadvantage. But there is a
tantalizing ambiguity in Aristotle's Rhetoric concerning the reach of
rhetoric into the the realm of probable "truth" ( probable because at
least two possiblities present themselves as equally plausable, and so the
most we can hope for is a "likeness" to TRUTH of the absolutely certain
sort)) which is also the realm in which human beings must act. He seems to
be pointing here to the limits of scientific and logical knowing. But he
goes on to say that "truth and likeness to truth are discerned by one and
the same faculty." This statement fits with the whole thrust of the first
book of the Rhetoric that Rhetoric has philsophical legitimacy if it is
theorized not by the sophistical handbook writers, but by philosophers like
Aristotle. This consideration of rhetoric by phiosophers is essential.
moreover, because it deals with the sort of knowing that lies beyond the
limits of science and logic and concerns human action which in turn
constitutes history.
It is this foray into "practical philosophy" which interested Heidegger
most about Aristotle in the early twenties according to Gadamer. Gadamer
suggests that Heidegger meant to follow Aristotle's phenomenological path
>from pathemata to pragmata exemplifed in the Rhetoric( p. 172 in
"Heidegger's Ways."). My cite of Heidegger's "epiphany" which you ask
about was mistakenly protracted. On page 32 of "Heidegger's Ways," it is
"conscience " that Heidegger identifies with Phronesis, not Verstehen per
se. (The direct connection between Phronesis and Verstehen was actually
made to me by Sam Ijsseling in a conversation which your query helped me to
recollect) But Phronesis is en-acted through rhetoric. Hence a possible
connection between the philsophical rhetoric Aristotle outlines in The
Rhetoric and the call of conscience.
Your comments. Michael, continue to be most helpful and clarifying.
Allen.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Aristotle's truth is the adequate statement: telling it like it is, (no
bullshit). Heidegger points out that it's not just statements that can be
truthful or not but, more originarily, beings themselves reveal themselves as
they are (in their truth), or hide, or reveal themselves in a distorted way.
Heidegger takes a very simple example of this, I think in 'Parmenides' Bd.54, of
a cupboard standing in front of a doorway. (Die Tuer ist durch den Schrank
verstellt.) The wall presents (presentifies, presences, shows, reveals) itself
as a closed wall. In truth, however, it has a doorway. The statement "There's no
doorway." is only derivative of the 'untruth' of the wall's unconcealment. Now
it is the wall itself not 'telling' it (showing itself) like it is. The
unconcealment of the wall as wall has to be given prior to any observation
and/or statement that it has or does not have a doorway. This prior
unconcealment (which is not the Kantian apriori) is aletheia, which includes
lethe (concealment, hiddenness) as well as distortion (Verstellung).
We tend to proceed from human subjects as the locus of truth: subjects tell the
truth, tell lies, half-truths, etc. A person (con-man, impostor) can also
present themself in a distorted (untrue) way (Verstellung). Heidegger points out
that things themselves present themselves in their truth, or in a distorted way
(Verstellung). The house in front of the mountain can distort (verstellen) the
view of the mountain in such a way that there appears to be no mountain there at
all! Who's lying here? Nobody. Things themselves.
Getting back to rhetoric and moods, Heidegger seems to shift the locus from the
realm of practical activity (life in the polis) to the realm of history and the
role of thinking in opening this timespace, deciding AS what beings will appear,
for example. He is then concerned with "fundamental moods" as moods of history.
This is apparent in GA29/30, but also elsewhere, say in his 'Nietzsche', where
he writes:
"Mit dem Augenblick, da 'der Ewige-Wiederkunfts-Gedanke' ueber ihn kam, wurde
die schon seit einiger Zeit sich bahnbrechende Wandlung seiner Grundstimmung
endgueltig." (NI:265)
English:
"At that moment in which the 'thought of eternal recurrence' came over him, the
transformation of his fundamental mood which had been blazing its trail for some
time became final and firm."
It is as if the thinker stands in the space of history by lying in the haze of a
fundamental mood that is the presentiment of another draft of the garb of beings
in their being that still has to be brought to stand in the thinker's language.
The mood calls for and calls to thinking. It is not a mood of being-together,
but a mood of being itself that is sending another historical missive. Far from
acting rhetorically on a mood to bring about a mood swing, the thinker is
exposed ec-statically, subjected to the mood and has to bring it to the language
of thinking. The fundamental moodswing of beyng itself has to be gathered into
language.
Cheers and regards,
Michael
\\\ ° '~': '' /// ° artefact text and translation °~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ - °
.{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ °°° made by art °°° _ °/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eldred
Michael:
I can't help but notice that our conversation concerning the place of
rhetoric in Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology occurs concurrently
with a discussion of Heidegger's "truth." There's no reason the two should
be connected, but why not pursue the possibility? There is obviously a
discontinuity/ contintuity going back to Plato's critique of rhetorical
discourse as limited to Doxa whereas dialectic had the capacity to reach
further out into the realm where truth might be accessable through the
discourse of philosophy. But then at the end of the Phaedrus, there is a
suggestion that there might be a kind of rhetoric, not presently in
practice, or perhaps never practicable,which can come close to, if not
actually join, the reach, the potential achievement of our capacity for
dialectic ( Both would be part of the unity of what Heidegger calls
"Seinskoennen" no?
Then we come to come to Aristotle's Rhetoric which begins by claiming that
Rhetoric is the "Antistrophos" of Dialectic, the main difference apparently
that rhetoric is practiced in the public sphere, the Agora, where
philsophers obiviously are at a punishing disadvantage. But there is a
tantalizing ambiguity in Aristotle's Rhetoric concerning the reach of
rhetoric into the the realm of probable "truth" ( probable because at
least two possiblities present themselves as equally plausable, and so the
most we can hope for is a "likeness" to TRUTH of the absolutely certain
sort)) which is also the realm in which human beings must act. He seems to
be pointing here to the limits of scientific and logical knowing. But he
goes on to say that "truth and likeness to truth are discerned by one and
the same faculty." This statement fits with the whole thrust of the first
book of the Rhetoric that Rhetoric has philsophical legitimacy if it is
theorized not by the sophistical handbook writers, but by philosophers like
Aristotle. This consideration of rhetoric by phiosophers is essential.
moreover, because it deals with the sort of knowing that lies beyond the
limits of science and logic and concerns human action which in turn
constitutes history.
It is this foray into "practical philosophy" which interested Heidegger
most about Aristotle in the early twenties according to Gadamer. Gadamer
suggests that Heidegger meant to follow Aristotle's phenomenological path
>from pathemata to pragmata exemplifed in the Rhetoric( p. 172 in
"Heidegger's Ways."). My cite of Heidegger's "epiphany" which you ask
about was mistakenly protracted. On page 32 of "Heidegger's Ways," it is
"conscience " that Heidegger identifies with Phronesis, not Verstehen per
se. (The direct connection between Phronesis and Verstehen was actually
made to me by Sam Ijsseling in a conversation which your query helped me to
recollect) But Phronesis is en-acted through rhetoric. Hence a possible
connection between the philsophical rhetoric Aristotle outlines in The
Rhetoric and the call of conscience.
Your comments. Michael, continue to be most helpful and clarifying.
Allen.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---