Michael Staples wrote:
>So now we have come full circle, no? We are back to defining truth as either
>relative or absolute. This was where my original questions that has sparked
>so many wonderful replys came on the scene. Heidegger is held up as
>supplying an alternative to this either/or scenario (by Dreyfus). Where I
>chimed in was in wondering where the this alternative gets us. If it just
>leads back around in a big circle to... either subjective realism, or some
>sort of absolute notion of truth, then what has been gained?
>
>Michael S.
> ----------
Nietzsche, it seems to me, proposes a "genetic" (in _both_ senses of the
word) solution to this problem. The foundation for anything we might wish to
call truth is, in its most primary sense, encoded into our genes (first
nature) and, in a secondary sense, encoded in our language (second nature).
We reason by means of a scheme we can't escape, but a scheme that is
vouchsafed, if you will, only by means of its inescapebility. A scheme that
is part and parcel of our "being human." It seems to me that Heidegger also
picks up on this notion of "being human" as forming a kind of ground in
which truths might be planted (and in which they might grow)--at least once
one gets beyond all the persiflage, that is.
Steve C.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>So now we have come full circle, no? We are back to defining truth as either
>relative or absolute. This was where my original questions that has sparked
>so many wonderful replys came on the scene. Heidegger is held up as
>supplying an alternative to this either/or scenario (by Dreyfus). Where I
>chimed in was in wondering where the this alternative gets us. If it just
>leads back around in a big circle to... either subjective realism, or some
>sort of absolute notion of truth, then what has been gained?
>
>Michael S.
> ----------
Nietzsche, it seems to me, proposes a "genetic" (in _both_ senses of the
word) solution to this problem. The foundation for anything we might wish to
call truth is, in its most primary sense, encoded into our genes (first
nature) and, in a secondary sense, encoded in our language (second nature).
We reason by means of a scheme we can't escape, but a scheme that is
vouchsafed, if you will, only by means of its inescapebility. A scheme that
is part and parcel of our "being human." It seems to me that Heidegger also
picks up on this notion of "being human" as forming a kind of ground in
which truths might be planted (and in which they might grow)--at least once
one gets beyond all the persiflage, that is.
Steve C.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---