We seemed to have stumbled again on this matter of conscience. The
problems raised regarding its relationship to silence, Christian piety, and
gnosticism point up the suggestive ambiguities of Heidegger's sayings about
it. One seems especially relevant. It's from a passage in The Concept of
Time which Heidegger footnotes in SZ as a significant "thesis" on the
matter:
"Dasein, however, is in itself historical insofar as it is its possibility.
In being futural Dasein is its past; it comes back to it in the "how." The
manner of its coming back is, among, other things, 'conscience.' Only the
how can be repeated. The past--experienced as authentic historicity--is
anything but what is past. It is something to which I can return again and
again."
Relating this to the context in SZ, conscience serves to interrupt the
everyday speaking of Dasein about time, a speaking which arises out of the
exhaustive public moods which keep Dasein mired in the inauthentic
readings/speakings of the past in the discourse of Das Man. The "silent
devotion" I spoke of suggests a way for Dasein to restrain itself from such
speaking, a speaking which can't hear its own inauthentic " clinging to the
present of its busyness." The silence enables a listening ( through
conscience) for the past which can be repeated as "authentic historicity, "
to which Heidegger says " I can return again and again."
This is not a "truncated/restricted conscience" as Tony suggested but a
thought-ful one. It does have overtones of Christian piety and gnosticism,
but I think H. would say those overtones reflect rhetorically overstated
moments in the tradition which contain the "possibility" for yet deeper
moments of our "heritage"( Erbe, which I believe is H's word for a more
authentic core within the tradition,). Hingabe seems to represent the sort
of comportment appropriate for recovering such moments from within the
tradition, a comportment Heidegger learned from Eckhardt, common to
Christian mysticism, but not inappropriate for a thinking which cares to
listeng to those moments within the tradition which contain the
possibilities for repeating our authentic historicity. Again, I think
Heidegger modeled this comportment in his own reading of Parmenides,
especially.
But I agree, I wish I could have said all this minus the pietistic
overtones. I wish Heidegger had also. Can anybody?
Allen
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
problems raised regarding its relationship to silence, Christian piety, and
gnosticism point up the suggestive ambiguities of Heidegger's sayings about
it. One seems especially relevant. It's from a passage in The Concept of
Time which Heidegger footnotes in SZ as a significant "thesis" on the
matter:
"Dasein, however, is in itself historical insofar as it is its possibility.
In being futural Dasein is its past; it comes back to it in the "how." The
manner of its coming back is, among, other things, 'conscience.' Only the
how can be repeated. The past--experienced as authentic historicity--is
anything but what is past. It is something to which I can return again and
again."
Relating this to the context in SZ, conscience serves to interrupt the
everyday speaking of Dasein about time, a speaking which arises out of the
exhaustive public moods which keep Dasein mired in the inauthentic
readings/speakings of the past in the discourse of Das Man. The "silent
devotion" I spoke of suggests a way for Dasein to restrain itself from such
speaking, a speaking which can't hear its own inauthentic " clinging to the
present of its busyness." The silence enables a listening ( through
conscience) for the past which can be repeated as "authentic historicity, "
to which Heidegger says " I can return again and again."
This is not a "truncated/restricted conscience" as Tony suggested but a
thought-ful one. It does have overtones of Christian piety and gnosticism,
but I think H. would say those overtones reflect rhetorically overstated
moments in the tradition which contain the "possibility" for yet deeper
moments of our "heritage"( Erbe, which I believe is H's word for a more
authentic core within the tradition,). Hingabe seems to represent the sort
of comportment appropriate for recovering such moments from within the
tradition, a comportment Heidegger learned from Eckhardt, common to
Christian mysticism, but not inappropriate for a thinking which cares to
listeng to those moments within the tradition which contain the
possibilities for repeating our authentic historicity. Again, I think
Heidegger modeled this comportment in his own reading of Parmenides,
especially.
But I agree, I wish I could have said all this minus the pietistic
overtones. I wish Heidegger had also. Can anybody?
Allen
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---