There have been a high number of posts related to the issue of
truth, relativism, and thinking, so I'd like to clarify a few things, ask a
question about thinking, and hopefully point the discussion in a more
fruitful direction.
I would argue that Heidegger is not a relativist regarding truth
because he maintains that there is a truth about the correspondence theory
of truth--namely, that it relies upon the prior condition of aletheia ("The
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking"). He does not say that the
truths of science are relative truths--true for some and false for others.
In fact he does say that "the technological scientific rationalizaton
ruling the present age justifies itself everyday more surprisingly by its
immense results". These results are disturbing, but his main concern here
is over what science does *cannot* do. What science does not "think" about,
and what philosophy has not thought about, is Being itself as the opening
and possibility for beings, for the truth of beings. Thus it is the task of
thinking (the question I was asking earlier) to discover, or at least think
about, this more fundamental notion related to Being--aletheia--and the way
in which its "opening" makes truth possible. It would help here to quote H
at length:
"Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which Being and
thinking and their belonging together exist. Insofar as truth is understood
in the traditional 'natural' sense as the correspondence of knowledge with
beings, demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as
the certainty of the knowledge of Being, aletheia, unconcealment in the
sense of the opening, may not be equated with truth. Rather, aletheia,
unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth.
=46or truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in th=
e
element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of
verification of veritas already move with that veritas in the realm of the
prevalent opening."
Well, how the heck do we think the "opening"? And if aletheia is
not truth, which he says it isn't--"to raise the question of aletheia. .
.is not the same as raising the question of truth"--but is its possibility:
is this not the truth of aletheia? And if thought has always been ratio, or
logos, how do we think about aletheia?
A couple of you discussed a "middle way" in the context of
arguments regarding relativism, noting the dichotomy between relativism and
absolute truth. It seems to me that we can't make a convincing claim for
universal relativism without being contradictory or tautologous; yet the
alternative is not that relativism is false--or worse yet, worthless; nor
is the alternative absolute truth. Our arguments about truth and relativism
need to be more precisely formulated in order to sort out what exactly we
are talking about--lest a muddle way! I think there is a middle way, but I
don't think that Heidegger is offering a middle way between truth and
relativism. He does suggest that there is a more important task for
thinking than truth and logic, but there is no indication of relativism in
this context.
Also, it would seem that anthropomorphic truth is just the kind of
truth that Heidegger would characterize as calculative, rationative
thinking, and hence as having an inauthentic relationship to Being. The
technologization of thought has removed us further from Being, right? Also,
I would like those critics of technology, science, and logic to note that
it is a contingent, *not a necessary* fact of history that those practices
are oppressive. The claim that science is inherently oppressive or
illogical is arguable, and is so only on the basis of logic and evidence.
Oppress that!
My question about thinking then is this: What is the contemplation of
aletheia without ratio? In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of
Thinking," Heidegger is not a relativist, but he points the way toward a
more primordial notion of truth: that which makes truth possible. He wants
us to think about, to be on the way to, aletheia. My question is, does he
offer a way to think about the way we think about aletheia? Or is he
merely opening up a possibility which is not at all possible for thinking?
Is the task of thinking a "muddle" way which thinks not for lack of
reference and guide?
Chris Johns
johns.23@xxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
truth, relativism, and thinking, so I'd like to clarify a few things, ask a
question about thinking, and hopefully point the discussion in a more
fruitful direction.
I would argue that Heidegger is not a relativist regarding truth
because he maintains that there is a truth about the correspondence theory
of truth--namely, that it relies upon the prior condition of aletheia ("The
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking"). He does not say that the
truths of science are relative truths--true for some and false for others.
In fact he does say that "the technological scientific rationalizaton
ruling the present age justifies itself everyday more surprisingly by its
immense results". These results are disturbing, but his main concern here
is over what science does *cannot* do. What science does not "think" about,
and what philosophy has not thought about, is Being itself as the opening
and possibility for beings, for the truth of beings. Thus it is the task of
thinking (the question I was asking earlier) to discover, or at least think
about, this more fundamental notion related to Being--aletheia--and the way
in which its "opening" makes truth possible. It would help here to quote H
at length:
"Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which Being and
thinking and their belonging together exist. Insofar as truth is understood
in the traditional 'natural' sense as the correspondence of knowledge with
beings, demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as
the certainty of the knowledge of Being, aletheia, unconcealment in the
sense of the opening, may not be equated with truth. Rather, aletheia,
unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth.
=46or truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in th=
e
element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of
verification of veritas already move with that veritas in the realm of the
prevalent opening."
Well, how the heck do we think the "opening"? And if aletheia is
not truth, which he says it isn't--"to raise the question of aletheia. .
.is not the same as raising the question of truth"--but is its possibility:
is this not the truth of aletheia? And if thought has always been ratio, or
logos, how do we think about aletheia?
A couple of you discussed a "middle way" in the context of
arguments regarding relativism, noting the dichotomy between relativism and
absolute truth. It seems to me that we can't make a convincing claim for
universal relativism without being contradictory or tautologous; yet the
alternative is not that relativism is false--or worse yet, worthless; nor
is the alternative absolute truth. Our arguments about truth and relativism
need to be more precisely formulated in order to sort out what exactly we
are talking about--lest a muddle way! I think there is a middle way, but I
don't think that Heidegger is offering a middle way between truth and
relativism. He does suggest that there is a more important task for
thinking than truth and logic, but there is no indication of relativism in
this context.
Also, it would seem that anthropomorphic truth is just the kind of
truth that Heidegger would characterize as calculative, rationative
thinking, and hence as having an inauthentic relationship to Being. The
technologization of thought has removed us further from Being, right? Also,
I would like those critics of technology, science, and logic to note that
it is a contingent, *not a necessary* fact of history that those practices
are oppressive. The claim that science is inherently oppressive or
illogical is arguable, and is so only on the basis of logic and evidence.
Oppress that!
My question about thinking then is this: What is the contemplation of
aletheia without ratio? In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of
Thinking," Heidegger is not a relativist, but he points the way toward a
more primordial notion of truth: that which makes truth possible. He wants
us to think about, to be on the way to, aletheia. My question is, does he
offer a way to think about the way we think about aletheia? Or is he
merely opening up a possibility which is not at all possible for thinking?
Is the task of thinking a "muddle" way which thinks not for lack of
reference and guide?
Chris Johns
johns.23@xxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---