We know by now that Jud doesn't like Heidegger. It may
be more profitable, again, to discuss the texts.
Heidegger said,
"The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits
and makes present."
Sein u. Zeit, H. 342, trans. Macquarrie & Robinson.
What did Heidegger mean by that?
John Harvey
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Hi John,
I'm just reading a new English translation of Heidegger's "Phenomenology of Religious Life," his lectures of 1920-21. Heidegger begins this very suggestive work by re-iterating (or perhaps this is the first iteration) the focus of philosophy on "factical life experience," a focus the very nature of which necessarily distinguishes philosophy from science. Contrary to Jud's uninformed ravings, Heidegger explicates the "rigor" of philosophy precisely in terms its "turning around" within the course of factical experience itself. Thus its rigor comes not from some super-imposed criteria of "objectivity," but rather from its(that is philosophy's) willing insistence on maintaining itself as/in a basic movement of factical life.
But the distinctive rigor of philosophizing as Heidegger does it doesn't stop there. He continues to exercise it by insisting that "factical life experience must not be only the point of departure for philososphizing but precisely that which essentially hinders philosophizing itself."(11)
What he's referring to here, I think, is the difficulty of finding the appropriate "motivation" for the philosophical turn within the basic movement of factical life which philosophy itself also is ( that is, a basic movement of factical life). Here we must make the distinction between the making-stand-out of ones own experienced self-world as a theoretical reflection on inner reflection (these phrases are mostly from the translation) which is the way I think Heidegger might characterize Freud's view of temporality of angst (Rene's question), as well being a more refined version of Jud's misconstrual of Heidegger's phenomenology of the temporality of fear.
The first lecture almost reads in part like an attempt on Heidegger's to part to already find himself in the midst of philosophizing in this way by throwing into question the very doing of philosophy in this way. That is, taking himself through the process of beginning to philosophize by showing his students how that very beginning might be thrown into question.
I happen to also be reading some short pieces by the medieval Kabbalist, Samuel Abulafia, who talks about prophecy readying itself to prophesy, that is to speak prophetically, even as he tries to ready himself for a similar undertaking in the very text he is writing. In the course of his remarkable sayings which actually do achieve a level of what he calls prophecy-wisdom, he says the following:
"For there is no god-work in the world outside of the wisdom of the work itself, and only then is it accepted before the blessed Name, and not like a studied law." (32, The Path of Names).
I know, John, this doesn't answer your question directly, but at least it does, as you suggest, get back to the texts.
Best regards,
Allen
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