In a message dated 28/08/2004 14:36:39 GMT Standard Time, hvtuijl@xxxxxxxxx
writes:
Henk writes:
Jud,
How essential is this holism in your philosophy?
Personally I have no problem with it.
Jud:
Without the holism there would be no human life, no philosophical discussion.
The human holism IS philosophy [and a whole lot more of course].
Henk:
As Gregory Batesion once said: "The division of
the perceived universe into parts and wholes is
convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity
determines how it shall be done."
Jud:
It is not a question [as Bateson says] that it MAY be necessary to divide
the perceived universe into parts — it is CRITICAL necessity for human life to
survive — for human beings to have successfully developed in the first place.
BASIC survival requires the ability of mankind to be able to divide,
categorise, name with different names the constituent parts of his immediate
environment, the world, the cosmos. Without this ability of differentiation there
would be no mankind — no philosophy.
Henk:
Heidegger accepts the division between intuition
and concept for argument's sake but in the end he
only speak about the understanding of Being of a
human Dasein.
Jud:
Dasein is far to crude a concept to engage my intellect.
Whereas physics finds specifics for the proofs of actualities by discovering
temporally prior actualities, Heidegger's brand of philosophy like Kant's
can achieve autonomy only if it escapes from time by escaping from actuality to
possibility. {an imagined observer or subjective experientialist observing
and experiencing the world.] For Kant the strategy for achieving this escape
was to replace an atemporal Deity with an atemporal "subject of experience".
Kant's "possible experience" may well have been the model for Dasein.
Both these approaches leave me cold, for the philosophy and kind of thinking
that I find suitable is a philosophy that deals with what is — and what it
does — rather than that which is not and may or may not possibly do this or
that. "Let's Pretend" philosophy is a non-starter with me, and if I wished to
game with possibilities, I would rather restrict myself to recognised fiction,
rather than fiction of human possibilities in philosophy's weeds.
Calypso writes:
>In the sense that you mean it, what is a "way"
>if it is to be something that "exists"
>(alongside?) with/as well as, the "bodybrain"
>existing thing?
Henk writes:
>Intuition functions in a certain way - and
>uses the senses as an instrument.
Jud answers:
>No, the INTUITER - the INTUITING human holism
>functions in a certain way and exists using
>its senses as an instrument with the help of
>which it can continue intuiting.
Henk:
OK
Calypso writes:
>If your notion of "way" does not "exist", in
>what other way do mean by "way" that seems so
>essential to the "bodybrain" and all the other
>things that "exist" in your sense?
Henk writes:
>There is intuition, as there is thinking —
>intuitus vel conceptus, as Heidegger says.
Jud answers:
>There is a human holism which at times cognises
>by employing fresh (ready to hand) memory, and
>there is the same human holism which at times
>thinks or cognises employing partly remembered,
>half forgotten fragments of memory, which when
>"bundled" provide a viewpoint upon which some
>endeavour can be initiated or abandoned. We
>refer to the second form of thinking as:
>"intuition."
Henk:
If I understand you correctly this is an
ontological description.
Jud:
Well perceived Henk. Lazy phrasing on my behalf:
I re-jig it into an ontic mould thus:
Human holisms at times cognise
by employing fresh (ready to hand) memory, and
at other times thinks or cognises employing partly remembered,
half forgotten fragments of memory, which when
"bundled" provide a viewpoint upon which some
endeavour can be initiated or abandoned. We
refer to the second form of thinking as:"intuition."
If enough time is spent "intuitions" can be unzipped, and the
originative half remembered scraps of data restored [rather like one can
reassemble
bits of torn paper into a readable page.
Calypso writes:
>You are always referring to the "ways something
>exists" and so on.
Henk writes:
>Not unlike Heidegger's modes of being.
Jud answers:
>Yes, I prefer "modes of existing" for being
>gets confused with "Being" with horrific
>consequences for philosophy.
Jud,
Do you disagree with Aristoteles that
existing is only one way of Being?
Jud:
Due to the bad press that the concept "exist" and existing" has had over the
millennia,
and the importance placed upon "Being" as a positive state, a lot depends
upon the semantic value
placed upon the "existing." When used in relation to human beings the word
carries a derogatory sense as if existing was
in some way an inferior state to "being." Thus in La Boheme Mimi "exists" in
a garret have starving and dying of TB, and there is QUITE a different
meaning to the two sentences:
(1) Being alone in London made Frank realise the value of human company.
(2) Existing alone in London made Frank realise the value of human company.
In sentence (2) the employment of the word "existing" rather than "being"
puts a much starker emphasis on Frank London experience, although in fact
the ontological message of Frank's existential and experiential state is
conveyed by both words.
For me then I disagree most strongly with Aristotle on this occasion, as
indeed I do on many others.
Henk writes:
>BTW, I completely agree with Jud that Being
>is an ontological concept.
>There is no Being-of-an-X as such. Being of
>an X as such is Nothing, following Heidegger.
>Being-as-such is mere ontotheology.
>The question remains what the status is of
>the undifferentiated X that is "registered",
>to borrow Jud's term.
Jud answers:
>The X that is registered is the "self" as a
>sensing organism [one of the names we you when
>referring to the human holism).
Henk:
Again, if this is an ontological description
I agree with you — as the young Heidegger would
in my opinion.
If this is an ontic description it is too
idealistic for my taste.
Jud:
For me the concept of: "self" and "I" and "ME", etc., is synonymous with the
holism which is doing the sensing of its state of existing, and its sensing
and perception of its environment." There is no mediation, no facilitation
between the act of perception of the holism and the perception per se. There is
only "one perceiving party" involved - Henk - Jud or Michael. The act of
perception is "soma-overall" one, in a similar way that the whole body is
involved in the topographical perception of a narrow ravine, the spatial
evaluation, and the decision to jump and act of jumping across the potentially
dangerous gap. the holistic bodybrain acting as the unity it is, and always will be
until death. A limb may cease to work, an eye may become blind, a section of
the brain may become ineffective or cease to function altogether, but the
holistic unity is never dissolved other than in death.
Henk writes:
>Heidegger maintains that it is Nothing but
>not a nihil absolutum.
Jud answers:
>There is no categorisation of "nothing" possible."
>"Nothing" is an absolute which doesn't exist even
>as an absolute.
Henk:This is an interesting point.
Personally I have no problem maintaining that an
empty set exists. The set is not what it
contains — as a name is not the same as the
person named.
Jud:
Henk exists in a state of thinking an empty set exists.
"Nothing" doesn't even exist to be denominated with any name -
whether that name be "nothing." The expression: "There is nothing in the
fridge" is meaningless for two reasons.
(1) There IS something in the fridge — air.
(2) "There is an empty set in the fridge" is equally entitically meaningless
["an empty container" is fine]
(3) Nothing cannot be in the fridge, because if it was — it wouldn't be
nothing — it would be something.
Henk:
However, there is much more to be said about this
subject, certainly in relation to Heidegger's
fundamental ontology.
For the moment only this.
By calling all registered X's Nothing but not
a nihil absolutum Heidegger only wants to
say that X is not — yet — known. It is not yet
this or that thing — and therefore an
undifferentiated something, i.e. a Nothing.
Jud:
As I have said, the X for me is the perceiving human holism.
To call the X or human holism "Being" achieves nothing, the non existent,
indescribable, intangible duality known as "Being" is utterly futile [in
Michael's words it is useless] and only results in misery for the human race - FOR
WHAT? So that guys can chunner on at great length about the ontological ins
and outs of the Rhine Dam? We ALL know what the Rhine dam is and the reasons
why it was built, and the pros and cons of its effect on the environment
versus the convenience of the electric power it generates to operate the fridges
containing "nothing" and the bay incubators and life-support systems
containing something.
Henk:
Kant keeps is simple in the first edition of
his first Critique. He calls X a transcendental
object.
Jud:
With the greatest of respect Henk, and I mean this most sincerely I don't
give a dam what Kant said about X being a transcendental object,
it is still meaningless and the fact that the great Metaphysician of
Konigsberg spake thus doesn't make it true. I simply do not accept appeals to
authority based on ANY philosopher — even from philosophers nearer to my particular
worldview. For me "Object" and "Transcendental" are contradictions in
terms. For me the Kant of Konigsberg and the Cant of the fourth line of the
English version of the Internationale are the same:
Thus:
For reason in revolt now thunders
and at last ends the age of cant.
Jud:
In what way would Heidegger's Nothing and Kant's
transcendental object be a problem in the
context of your philosophy?
Jud:
In what way would an adjustable monkey-wrench left in the cylinder
compartment of a reciprocating gasoline engine in a car effect the production of
rotational energy to drive the wheels? :-) The vehicle would scream to a halt
in a shambles of disfunctional chaos — and reason would lose a tiny almost
inaudible voice to add to the humanity's scream of protest against the
tempest of insanity which threatens to engulf the world.
regards,
Jud:
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