From: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
Reply-To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
nominalism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,heidegger-dialognet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
CC: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
Subject: Re: PHILOSOPHY AS THE DENIAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 2004 07:45:37 EDT
Jud writes:
>"for the sensing of "Being" is just
>the way that the bodybrain registers that it is
>conscious of the world in
>the brain's way of cognising
>which it finds itself — the notion of "Being" is
>that it is "switched on" and that the human being
>which it is — is the human
>being which it is."
Calypso writes:
>Just want to ask what kind of (presumably real or
>existing) thing is a/the way ("bodybrain registers..."
>or "brain's way of cognising...", and so on)?
Henk writes:
>It seems like Kantian/Heideggerian intuition.
Jud answers:
>Hi Henk
>No, "intuition" doesn't exist - only the intuiter
>- the intuiting human holism exists.
>Having the notion of "Heideggerian intuition" is
>simply the human holism in the existential modality
>[existing in the manner of...] of "having the
>notion of Heideggerian intuition".
Jud,
How essential is this holism in your philosophy?
Personally I have no problem with it.
As Gregory Batesion once said: "The division of
the perceived universe into parts and wholes is
convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity
determines how it shall be done."
Heidegger accepts the division between intuition
and concept for argument's sake but in the end he
only speak about the understanding of Being of a
human Dasein.
Calypso writes:
>In the sense that you mean it, what is a "way"
>if it is to be something that "exists"
>(alongside?) with/as well as, the "bodybrain"
>existing thing?
Henk writes:
>Intuition functions in a certain way - and
>uses the senses as an instrument.
Jud answers:
>No, the INTUITER - the INTUITING human holism
>functions in a certain way and exists using
>its senses as an instrument with the help of
>which it can continue intuiting.
OK
Calypso writes:
>If your notion of "way" does not "exist", in
>what other way do mean by "way" that seems so
>essential to the "bodybrain" and all the other
>things that "exist" in your sense?
Henk writes:
>There is intuition, as there is thinking -
>intuitus vel conceptus, as Heidegger says.
Jud answers:
>There is a human holism which at times cognises
>by employing fresh (ready to hand) memory, and
>there is the same human holism which at times
>thinks or cognises employing partly remembered,
>half forgotton fragments of memory, which when
>"bundled" provide a viewpoint upon which some
>endevour can be intitiated or abandoned. We
>refer to the sacond form of thinking as:
>"intuition."
If I understand you correctly this is an
ontological description.
Calypso writes:
>You are always referring to the "ways something
>exists" and so on.
Henk writes:
>Not unlike Heidegger's modes of being.
Jud answers:
>Yes, I prefer "modes of existing" for being
>gets confused with "Being" with horrific
>consequences for philosopy.
Jud,
Do you disagree with Aristoteles that
existing is only one way of Being?
Henk writes:
>BTW, I completely agree with Jud that Being
>is an ontological concept.
>There is no Being-of-an-X as such. Being of
>an X as such is Nothing, following Heidegger.
>Being-as-such is mere ontotheology.
>The question remains what the status is of
>the undifferentiated X that is "registered",
>to borrow Jud's term.
Jud answers:
>The X that is registered is the "self" as a
>sensing organism [one of the names we you when
>referring to the human holism).
Again, if this is an ontological description
I agree with you - as the young Heidegger would
in my opinion.
If this is an ontic description it is too
idealistic for my taste.
Henk writes:
>Heidegger maintains that it is Nothing but
>not a nihil absolutum.
Jud answers:
>There is no catagorisation of "nothing" possible."
>"Nothing" is an absolute which does't exist even
>as an absolute.
This is an interesting point.
Personally I have no problem maintaining that an
empty set exists. The set is not what it
contains - as a name is not the same as the
person named.
However, there is much more to be said about this
subject, certainly in relation to Heidegger's
fundamental ontology.
For the moment only this.
By calling all registered X's Nothing but not
a nihil absolutum Heidegger only wants to
say that X is not - yet - known. It is not yet
this or that thing - and therefore an
undifferentiated something, i.e. a Nothing.
Kant keeps is simple in the first edition of
his first Critique. He calls X a transcendental
object.
In what way would Heidegger's Nothing and Kant's
transcendental object be a problem in the
context of your philosophy?
Regards,
Henk
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Reply-To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
nominalism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,heidegger-dialognet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
CC: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
Subject: Re: PHILOSOPHY AS THE DENIAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 2004 07:45:37 EDT
Jud writes:
>"for the sensing of "Being" is just
>the way that the bodybrain registers that it is
>conscious of the world in
>the brain's way of cognising
>which it finds itself — the notion of "Being" is
>that it is "switched on" and that the human being
>which it is — is the human
>being which it is."
Calypso writes:
>Just want to ask what kind of (presumably real or
>existing) thing is a/the way ("bodybrain registers..."
>or "brain's way of cognising...", and so on)?
Henk writes:
>It seems like Kantian/Heideggerian intuition.
Jud answers:
>Hi Henk
>No, "intuition" doesn't exist - only the intuiter
>- the intuiting human holism exists.
>Having the notion of "Heideggerian intuition" is
>simply the human holism in the existential modality
>[existing in the manner of...] of "having the
>notion of Heideggerian intuition".
Jud,
How essential is this holism in your philosophy?
Personally I have no problem with it.
As Gregory Batesion once said: "The division of
the perceived universe into parts and wholes is
convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity
determines how it shall be done."
Heidegger accepts the division between intuition
and concept for argument's sake but in the end he
only speak about the understanding of Being of a
human Dasein.
Calypso writes:
>In the sense that you mean it, what is a "way"
>if it is to be something that "exists"
>(alongside?) with/as well as, the "bodybrain"
>existing thing?
Henk writes:
>Intuition functions in a certain way - and
>uses the senses as an instrument.
Jud answers:
>No, the INTUITER - the INTUITING human holism
>functions in a certain way and exists using
>its senses as an instrument with the help of
>which it can continue intuiting.
OK
Calypso writes:
>If your notion of "way" does not "exist", in
>what other way do mean by "way" that seems so
>essential to the "bodybrain" and all the other
>things that "exist" in your sense?
Henk writes:
>There is intuition, as there is thinking -
>intuitus vel conceptus, as Heidegger says.
Jud answers:
>There is a human holism which at times cognises
>by employing fresh (ready to hand) memory, and
>there is the same human holism which at times
>thinks or cognises employing partly remembered,
>half forgotton fragments of memory, which when
>"bundled" provide a viewpoint upon which some
>endevour can be intitiated or abandoned. We
>refer to the sacond form of thinking as:
>"intuition."
If I understand you correctly this is an
ontological description.
Calypso writes:
>You are always referring to the "ways something
>exists" and so on.
Henk writes:
>Not unlike Heidegger's modes of being.
Jud answers:
>Yes, I prefer "modes of existing" for being
>gets confused with "Being" with horrific
>consequences for philosopy.
Jud,
Do you disagree with Aristoteles that
existing is only one way of Being?
Henk writes:
>BTW, I completely agree with Jud that Being
>is an ontological concept.
>There is no Being-of-an-X as such. Being of
>an X as such is Nothing, following Heidegger.
>Being-as-such is mere ontotheology.
>The question remains what the status is of
>the undifferentiated X that is "registered",
>to borrow Jud's term.
Jud answers:
>The X that is registered is the "self" as a
>sensing organism [one of the names we you when
>referring to the human holism).
Again, if this is an ontological description
I agree with you - as the young Heidegger would
in my opinion.
If this is an ontic description it is too
idealistic for my taste.
Henk writes:
>Heidegger maintains that it is Nothing but
>not a nihil absolutum.
Jud answers:
>There is no catagorisation of "nothing" possible."
>"Nothing" is an absolute which does't exist even
>as an absolute.
This is an interesting point.
Personally I have no problem maintaining that an
empty set exists. The set is not what it
contains - as a name is not the same as the
person named.
However, there is much more to be said about this
subject, certainly in relation to Heidegger's
fundamental ontology.
For the moment only this.
By calling all registered X's Nothing but not
a nihil absolutum Heidegger only wants to
say that X is not - yet - known. It is not yet
this or that thing - and therefore an
undifferentiated something, i.e. a Nothing.
Kant keeps is simple in the first edition of
his first Critique. He calls X a transcendental
object.
In what way would Heidegger's Nothing and Kant's
transcendental object be a problem in the
context of your philosophy?
Regards,
Henk
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---