-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]Namens michaelP
Verzonden: vrijdag 24 september 2004 20:11
Aan: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Onderwerp: Re: pain/peinne a ma coeur
> Because a critics like Jud's is itself lastly a consequence of od:
> Das Sein [-as Sein des Seienden-] wird zum Gespoett.
I 'understand' everything up to "wird zum Gespoett"; can you please
trans-late for me?
Being merely something to make a mock of.
Equivalent with the inability to take oneself seriously.
> Heidegger says it, and Jud proves it. In this world, as it is now,
> Being and truth HAVE no place, that's Seinsverlassenheit: the world,
> that which is, is LEFT by Being.
> When od, as the realm of metaphysics,
With no attempt at an anticipatory denial on my part, please explain/reason
how/why ontological difference is (the last vestige of?) metaphysics: again
I am not denying such a claim, but want it substantiated in some way...
When, as you acknowledge, metaphysics and metaphysical s-p logic are, for
the time being, the only way of representation and language, that are still
'working' (actual/effective), then they must be inherent in every speaking,
not the least in an effort to explain ontological difference.
Heidegger himself did not question this grip of metaphysical conceptuality,
esp. when, in The principle of ground, he looks back at his own efforts
end 20ies, beginning 30ies, which he considers to be the always more
unpromising and self-willing avoidings of the truth of being-itself.
Dasein in BT, although as being-in-the-world immediately conceived beyond
any form of conscience (Bewusstsein), is far from being by itself a liberation
from metaphysics. Only a first step, which was to be continued by incessant
BEING the Da. Again, with metaphysical backdrop.
The complexity of the relation subject-Dasein (metaphysics-thinking of Being)
turns a simple and direct (one-sided) access of ontological difference into
an impossibility. Rather is to be shown, that metaphysical thinking makes
usage of the realm of od, without ever being able - but also not obliged -
to target the difference of beings and beingness itself. And that only now,
in the time of the completion of metaphysics (technology), we are obliged to
go the way into the ground of metaphysics, as Heidegger undertook after BT,
and for which he had to question 'Dasein' again and again. (see the idea of
a fundamental ontology in GA26 - 1928)
In thinking, one always stands in the way of oneself. And the better the
thinking and the thinker, the stronger the misleading, and the greater the
risks. Only acknowledgment helps further. But that presupposes the will/ability
to fight oneself, and the truth represented by this self
> is completed like metaphysics itself,
> then further development of ontol. difference, the reduction of what is to
> an essential being, must be considered as madness. Right.
Not necessarily. I'm not sure at all that "further development of ontol.
difference" is at all "the reduction of what is to an essential being".
Precisely the ontological difference demands/commands the (different)
difference between be-ing and any being (or all beings, or
beings-as-a-whole, or the common-ness or averageness or 'essence' of beings,
etc), and demands it not be reduced to such flattening. To do THIS would be
madness! What re-mains with the dissolution of the OD?
OR: dissolution of the od means the same as completion of metaphysics, the insight
into which solely can lead to a turning of od.
Compare in Nietzsche 2, 'European nihilism' (1940), the introduction of ontological
difference in a paragraph following the one called The end of metaphysics.
Is this the same as
what remains when the destruction of appearance means the destruction of the
real in Nietzsche? A play of surfaces without the depth that surfaces need
to BE superficial?
If you mean, that with the supersensible also the sensible falls, that is:
that the distinction of true world and world of appearance falls, then yes,
there is the end of metaphysics as thought by Nietzsche. But an end as such
is, acc. to him, not much, but downfall here, means upgoing elsewhere.
When the end is thought not merely as end tout court, but as the specific end
of a specific will-to-power (namely the moralistic form), then ending is to
Nietzsche a positive phenomenon, because it asks for a new, and stronger,
conception of WtP. Without Nietzsche's end of metaphysics, metaphysics in
Heidegger's sense is not complete (and cannot be completed).
> That is what can be seen
> everywhere now: the continuance of burned-out metaphysical notions, which
> bring highly destructive PHYSICAL annihilation.
Right on, there. But then it demands we difference the metaphysical with
utmost care.
I'd say: it demands to see that metaphysical representation (Vorstellen)
cannot reach od as its own ground.
> The language item was generally meant. Can't everybody see that talking
> of Heidegger presupposes knowledge of the German language? Or does one
> play chess without knowing the rules?
> Imo the name Heidegger cannot be linked to your predilections, so if
> this is what you want, i'd stay away from *him*. But this is already so
> since Wagner-Nietzsche. Celan: don't enlarge art (with philosophy and
> great themes etc.), but drive her into narrowness. So that she first
> grows into the ground (not toward applause), and is so able to surprize
> the modern bottomless. I'd say the duty of art lies there, but who wants
> duty and responsibility?
A certain acquaintance, surely, but not necessarily, fluency; especially
given the fact of others' fluency on the list: my point. Surely you can
admit a seriousness not entirely academic?
It's the academic seriousness that i doubt, not necessarily yours, Michael.
Bringing Martin on the stage
I'm sorry, but I think your suggestion to stay away from Heidegger if the
accent is on the poetic, the musical, is highly insulting, and worse,
narrow. It's not a matter of "enlarge [ing] art (with philosophy and great
themes etc.)", perhaps more a matter of incorporation, of an other kind of
total commitment; perhaps in the same manner you bring EmineM to bare...
By seeing him, as the only artist, seriously dealing with everyday nihilism.
(The rest is just swimming in it) That does not make it philosophy, but not
mere puberal rage either: he is more occupied with breaking through the S-P
structure than most Heideggerians.
I don't see how Heidegger can be artistically stimulating; at most moderating,
exhorting to meditation. Art, like philosophy, then becomes wholly problematic.
bottomless, and, maybe, so ready for a search for a new bottom, finding a home
in the modern homelessness. 'Hannah and Martin' seems to me just more
homelessness on the stage of Erlebnis and Machenschaft.
Heidegger saw the intimacy of poesis and thinking, no? despite their
differences, no?
Paradoxically, they are 'the same' THANKS TO their radical difference.
Only what is 'the same' (fom the ground up), can stand apart on
separated tops.
Duty and responsibility are precisely incorporated in what
I referred to as "commitment" above, and thus are seriously involved in
other ways of intimating with Heidegger?
> I delight in the apocalypsos you bring to the list.
>
> i don't, Michael.
A pity. Delight is not at all happiness or simple (or complex) pleasure. A
dark light is still a light and alight(ing).
>> *this too is not reproach. The reason for it lies in the metaphysics itself,
>> that is in our body. Last distinctions have been cleared away by absolute
>> idealism, because it went, had to go after the unconditional, despite
>> Kant's warnings. We just don't tolerate, despite all structuralism, that
>> something else is thinking in us, but i cannot help exposing it, because
>> anonymous self-evidence is the real terror. And global Americanism its most
>> dangerous form.
>> And as long as it is sought elsewhere, the room for 'possible discussion'
>> is really cut off. So, looking for the origin in oneself, is inevitably
>> painful yes, and it is easier to blame Slim Shady. If necessary, i play
>> that part.
>
> Sometimes I perform a kurt cobain** [see below]
>
>> IF it is true what you say, and what others who went away, said, why can't
>> they just go on, why do they leave?
>
> I do not think Anthony left because of his (seemingly bitter) differences
> with you
>
> he himself said so.
>
> anymore than Michael did.
>
> idem
Publicly?
After another attack he was gone.
> It seems to me that the list had become
> so bitchy and bitty and bitter (mea culpa in some degree) and so little to
> do with enjoying Heidegger (etc) and the good grace of stimulating
> discussions between mutually respecting interlocutors whatever the
> differences. And Allen did not leave so much as take a holiday. And, I am
> always leaving...
>
> Enjoying (one's) Heidegger... by lying away what does not fit in with one's
> own idiosyncrasies - i don't respect that. And we, sorry: i, see that
> mendacity enough everywhere now. But, while i expose, why don't they go on,
> when they're so sure as they say they are? I repeat this point, because it
> is interesting: there is, apparently, a limit to lying. And although the
> liars can't/don't want to understand their unmasking, still they're worried.
> Why would that be? Here's a perspective...
So, open up such a perspective, huh? I do not see how or why enjoying [see
delight above] Heidegger is _necessarily_ achieved by what you call "lying".
Your expose[acute accent]s seem to exclude your own... I think in some cases
your passion (wonderful as such) exceeds your reason (bewidering sometimes
as such) and thus exposes your self to the slings and arrows of preachdom
(so much like Jud, but mercifully, without his utter agnorance). But, my
respect (for you) grows for your total commitment and fundamental verstehen
despite your 'tone'.
The tone would be decisive for the meaning of the word. In order to
denote what never is just occurrent, Heidegger precisely picked that
word, which, 200 years of German philosophy backwards, was coined to
denote the occurrent (Dasein, Wirklicheit). But one cannot have the
change of tone, if one has not the initial tone.
regards/egards
rene
much regards
michael
>
> regards
> rene
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> Dies it point to a lack of confidence, they simply
>> are not capable of acknowledging? But then what about the confidence of
this
> our
>> Western world, is it not another lie, hiding behind automatic weapons? When
> i'm right,
>> and there is no real confidence, THEN what happens now, is irresponsible,
> and my
>> doggish insistence really quite innocent.
>
> Exactly. But taking too much notice of "confidence" is itself a confidence
> trick. I think we should be thinking (or rather smelling) of 'taste' for
> reasons of the absence of concrete others and the desultory absent presence
> of yet others, perhaps...
>
> And the "hiding behind automatic weapons" can take many forms, often
> unacknowledged, no?
>
> regards
>
> michaelP
>>
>>
>>
> **
> I am buried up to my neck in
> Contradictionary flies
> I take pride as the king of illiterature
> I'm very ape and very nice
> If you ever need anything please don't hesitate to ask someone else first
> I'm too busy acting like I'm not naive.
> I've seen it all I was here first
> Out of the ground
> Into the sky
> Out of the sky
> Into the dirt
>
> (Very Ape [from Nirvana 'In Utero'])
>
>
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