peep,
:-) yes I thought you might say something. I don't know I suppose. The way you imagine it sounds like a lost something as an absenting is also a lighting up of beings that present themselves. hmm... I understand this ah... nostalgia of a lost object perhaps it constitutes a bundle of valued subjective properties whose loss we have to mourn which is to say let go and in leaving this tendency to look towards something that is withdrawn then there is left an uprightness whose disposition is to be open. The upright disposition is a comportment (verhalten) abandoning itself to a clearing allowing the things themselves to be. Not sure what Heidegger's text might say here a closer look seems to be called for but this is something that I'm trying to work through. There is a difference here. It seems to do with a difference in the quality of desire. For sure it no longer is a question of an understanding as an explanatory explication but intelligence gone over to desire as happens in Plotinus also. A difference maybe between desire and passion as one text beside me says where desire would be the anger and bitterness of a pillar of justice and then its mellowing out and flowing into a comportment is a merciful passion. This is the reading of Boehme or Schelling it seems. A decision or krisis which seems forced to me, non-willed and so spontaneous takes us from desire to the passion of signing. Indicative evocation... of a distance we can never cross is communicated whose compensation and substitute is a limit experience of language without reference. There is something too complicated for me in thinking a crossed out beyng ---> xbeyngx on this side of the ontological difference between beings and being. If here we are making 'reference' to the ineffable then Damascius of all the neo-platonist draws the conclusion that there is nothing but indicative evocation at the door of the sanctuary or there is only improvisation in a given situation. For him it was like a thousand year old issue so I think we just touch the basics. In comportment what is called thinking? I think it's called silence (sige in Greek).
tympan
tymp, (in my reading of heidegger) the difference between be-ing (of a
being) and that being (not "some alleged beying and beings") 'is' not a
"transcendental absolute", 'is' not transcendental at all but utterly
immanent already. There 'is' no "beying" set over against (stepping
across/over)"beings"; the relation between be-ing and beings is a complex
interweaving whereby the very lighting up of beings necessitates the eclipse
of be-ing (of such beings): be-ing withdraws as beings come to presence.
regards
michaelPeep
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