Hi
Jud wrote:
Jud:
Note:
Caps for emphasis only as usual.
For Heidegger *Being* is an ineffable X which allows, avails and facilitates
the *uncovering [appearance] of an entity.
One could render it thus: *
There doesn't exist an X [*Being*] such that it doesn't exist as Jud's
waterglass, but doesn't exist as the *existence* of Jud's existing waterglass.
So **Being* is nothing more that the activity of a person's brain as he or
she observes and object - just an old medieval term exhumed and revivifies to
describe THE HUMAN ACT OF APPREHENSION. IN OTHER WORDS *BEING* IS NO MORE
THAN BEGINNER'S PSYCHOLOGY DRESSED UP AS *PHILOSOPHY*
Husserl was the ontological pathfinder who led the way, and Heidegger
followed and acquiesced that the *Being* [Meaning: *the *existence*] of all
entities [say the waterglass on my desk before me] lies in the sense we gain of
them in our understanding. This is an outrageous and juvenile ego-centric
transcendental subjectivism.
In other words — the way I sense — the way I apprehend the waterglass —
with the sensors of my eyes as I regard it, and the sensors of my epidermis as I
lift it thus, is the *BEING* of the waterglass which *allows* the water
glass to *appear*
This appears to me to be more or less correct (although I don't think Heidegger would ever attribute anything to eyes, brain, skin etc).
What Heidegger does seem to be saying, to me, is that the waterglass is only intelligible as a waterglass if Dasein exists (but all wrapped up in the most impenetrable language).
"Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the in-itself. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not." SUZ 212. Macquarrie 255).
Anyone like to comment on this for a relative beginner?
Regards Edward.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Jud wrote:
Jud:
Note:
Caps for emphasis only as usual.
For Heidegger *Being* is an ineffable X which allows, avails and facilitates
the *uncovering [appearance] of an entity.
One could render it thus: *
There doesn't exist an X [*Being*] such that it doesn't exist as Jud's
waterglass, but doesn't exist as the *existence* of Jud's existing waterglass.
So **Being* is nothing more that the activity of a person's brain as he or
she observes and object - just an old medieval term exhumed and revivifies to
describe THE HUMAN ACT OF APPREHENSION. IN OTHER WORDS *BEING* IS NO MORE
THAN BEGINNER'S PSYCHOLOGY DRESSED UP AS *PHILOSOPHY*
Husserl was the ontological pathfinder who led the way, and Heidegger
followed and acquiesced that the *Being* [Meaning: *the *existence*] of all
entities [say the waterglass on my desk before me] lies in the sense we gain of
them in our understanding. This is an outrageous and juvenile ego-centric
transcendental subjectivism.
In other words — the way I sense — the way I apprehend the waterglass —
with the sensors of my eyes as I regard it, and the sensors of my epidermis as I
lift it thus, is the *BEING* of the waterglass which *allows* the water
glass to *appear*
This appears to me to be more or less correct (although I don't think Heidegger would ever attribute anything to eyes, brain, skin etc).
What Heidegger does seem to be saying, to me, is that the waterglass is only intelligible as a waterglass if Dasein exists (but all wrapped up in the most impenetrable language).
"Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the in-itself. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not." SUZ 212. Macquarrie 255).
Anyone like to comment on this for a relative beginner?
Regards Edward.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---