Jud Evans:
>>An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions of the way it
>>exists which
>>differ from the way it exists are untruthful. Descriptions of entities
>>cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful than the description
>>which truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions of
>>entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some features
>>of the way an entity exists, but not others, are NOT truthful in relation
>to
>>the way that the entity exists.
>
>
>Philip Baker:
>Do you really believe that we can make assertions that are complete and
>totally accurate descriptions of objects? If a description falls short
>of this ideal (how do we know it does?) do we then take it as useless
>and consign it to the rubbish bin of falsehood?
>
>Jud:
>Either you missed the previous [*Dasein* and the Gerundialisation of
>Philosophy Part 4 of] or you
>read it un-hermeneutically and/or forgot what you had read.
>Nowhere in the 4 articles have I ever said that:
>
>*We can make assertions that are complete and totally accurate descriptions
>of objects.*
>
>As I suggested in the article which prompted Johnson's post, what
>corresponds to the entitic truth of the object
>is the way that the object actually exists [all objects are by default
>existentially truthful to the way that they exist.] set aside the HUMAN idea
>of
>the truth of an object, which is always a BEST MATCH assessment, based upon a
>sensorial judgement that flows from the juxtapositioning
>of subject and object. This is the whole basis of this particular attack of
>mine on the phenomenology of the Heidegger/Husserl fantasy.
>A human perception, understanding and description of an object will ALWAYS
>fall short of being a totally accurate perception, understanding and
>description of any object. The theoretical concept of an absolute
>correspondence
>between the entitic truth of an object and the human version of this truth is
>a
>fantasy which can never be realised and therefore never corresponds. Therefore
>the Heideggerian delirium of *object givenness* is total rubbish.
>
>This was my original passage which is pertinent to the discussion:
>
>*Now not only is the truth of entitic actuality to be found in the
>correctly observed object existing in the actual way it exists, the truth of
>entitic actuality also resides in the observer existing in the actual way
>that he or she exists as an observing subject too.
>Therefore for the observer who describes an object existing in the way it
>exists as something existing in the
>
>way it exists, then that is the truthful description of actual way it
>observationally and perceptually exists for the observer. The
>juxtapositioning
>of
>these two entitic truths is therefore the "best match" objective
>realisation of the subject's subjective impressions and
>the object's objective reality.
>
>The key words that you missed are the second, third and fourth words of the
>second sentence, and the last three words of the penultimate sentence above
>*FOR THE OBSERVER.* In other words the observer's version of entitic reality
>and the entitic reality of an object is always a best match version, and not a
>version that ABSOLUTELY corresponds with the actuality of the object.
>
>Bottom line for Heideggerians? Because Heidegger [ following Husserl]
>believed that the *Being* of beings was instantiated through the
>phenomenological
>process of an understanding of the *object givenness,* of an object, and
>because [as I have explained above] humans can never perceive and understand
>an
>object as it actually is in its entitic reality, the *Being* of objects* which
>is instantiated by the human instantiator is always a second-rate *BEST MATCH
>BEING* and not the true *Being* of a being.
>
Philip Baker:
The "best match" idea implies degrees of truth. The better the match the
more true. But then you go on to say:
"Descriptions of entities cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful
than the description which truthfully describes the way an entity
exists. Descriptions of entities which correctly or incorrectly
describe some features of the way an entity exists, but not others,
are NOT truthful in relation to the way that the entity exists."
This implies (if I've resolved the convolutions correctly) that partial
correctness is no better than simple falsehood.
BTW I always read your posts "un-hermeneutically".
--
Philip Baker
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>>An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions of the way it
>>exists which
>>differ from the way it exists are untruthful. Descriptions of entities
>>cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful than the description
>>which truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions of
>>entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some features
>>of the way an entity exists, but not others, are NOT truthful in relation
>to
>>the way that the entity exists.
>
>
>Philip Baker:
>Do you really believe that we can make assertions that are complete and
>totally accurate descriptions of objects? If a description falls short
>of this ideal (how do we know it does?) do we then take it as useless
>and consign it to the rubbish bin of falsehood?
>
>Jud:
>Either you missed the previous [*Dasein* and the Gerundialisation of
>Philosophy Part 4 of] or you
>read it un-hermeneutically and/or forgot what you had read.
>Nowhere in the 4 articles have I ever said that:
>
>*We can make assertions that are complete and totally accurate descriptions
>of objects.*
>
>As I suggested in the article which prompted Johnson's post, what
>corresponds to the entitic truth of the object
>is the way that the object actually exists [all objects are by default
>existentially truthful to the way that they exist.] set aside the HUMAN idea
>of
>the truth of an object, which is always a BEST MATCH assessment, based upon a
>sensorial judgement that flows from the juxtapositioning
>of subject and object. This is the whole basis of this particular attack of
>mine on the phenomenology of the Heidegger/Husserl fantasy.
>A human perception, understanding and description of an object will ALWAYS
>fall short of being a totally accurate perception, understanding and
>description of any object. The theoretical concept of an absolute
>correspondence
>between the entitic truth of an object and the human version of this truth is
>a
>fantasy which can never be realised and therefore never corresponds. Therefore
>the Heideggerian delirium of *object givenness* is total rubbish.
>
>This was my original passage which is pertinent to the discussion:
>
>*Now not only is the truth of entitic actuality to be found in the
>correctly observed object existing in the actual way it exists, the truth of
>entitic actuality also resides in the observer existing in the actual way
>that he or she exists as an observing subject too.
>Therefore for the observer who describes an object existing in the way it
>exists as something existing in the
>
>way it exists, then that is the truthful description of actual way it
>observationally and perceptually exists for the observer. The
>juxtapositioning
>of
>these two entitic truths is therefore the "best match" objective
>realisation of the subject's subjective impressions and
>the object's objective reality.
>
>The key words that you missed are the second, third and fourth words of the
>second sentence, and the last three words of the penultimate sentence above
>*FOR THE OBSERVER.* In other words the observer's version of entitic reality
>and the entitic reality of an object is always a best match version, and not a
>version that ABSOLUTELY corresponds with the actuality of the object.
>
>Bottom line for Heideggerians? Because Heidegger [ following Husserl]
>believed that the *Being* of beings was instantiated through the
>phenomenological
>process of an understanding of the *object givenness,* of an object, and
>because [as I have explained above] humans can never perceive and understand
>an
>object as it actually is in its entitic reality, the *Being* of objects* which
>is instantiated by the human instantiator is always a second-rate *BEST MATCH
>BEING* and not the true *Being* of a being.
>
Philip Baker:
The "best match" idea implies degrees of truth. The better the match the
more true. But then you go on to say:
"Descriptions of entities cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful
than the description which truthfully describes the way an entity
exists. Descriptions of entities which correctly or incorrectly
describe some features of the way an entity exists, but not others,
are NOT truthful in relation to the way that the entity exists."
This implies (if I've resolved the convolutions correctly) that partial
correctness is no better than simple falsehood.
BTW I always read your posts "un-hermeneutically".
--
Philip Baker
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---