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Van: owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]Namens
GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
Verzonden: dinsdag 26 oktober 2004 12:52
Aan: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
CC: GEVANS613@xxxxxxx
Onderwerp: Re: Eisegesis or Anagoges of Truth
In a message dated 25/10/2004 23:50:36 GMT Standard Time, phil@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
writes:
In article <1dd.2eff4e7d.2eae36e7@xxxxxxx>, GEVANS613@xxxxxxx writes
>An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions of the way it
>exists which
>differ from the way it exists are untruthful. Descriptions of entities
>cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful than the description
>which truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions of
>entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some features
>of the way an entity exists, but not others, are NOT truthful in relation
to
>the way that the entity exists.
Philip Baker writes:
Do you really believe that we can make assertions that are complete and
totally accurate descriptions of objects? If a description falls short
of this ideal (how do we know it does?) do we then take it as useless
and consign it to the rubbish bin of falsehood?
Jud:
Either you missed the previous [*Dasein* and the Gerundialisation of
Philosophy Part 4 of] or you
read it un-hermeneutically and/or forgot what you had read.
Nowhere in the 4 articles have I ever said that:
*We can make assertions that are complete and totally accurate descriptions
of objects.*
Jud,
I think that Philip reads you better than you yourself.
But - and this reminds a bit too clearly of Anthony-where-did-I-ever-say-that?
- you even would deny, if you would have used exactly the same words:
*We can make assertions that are complete and totally accurate descriptions
of objects.
Cos, as a rigid nominalist, you must say: this linguistic sequence here,
although identical to the previous one, does not contain the EXACT identical
physical signs that i see 10 lines up.
Meanwhile, we all see the cheating. You said:
"...the description which truthfully describes the way an entity exists...",
which Philip translated salva veritate by "
which just tells about the deep Platonism of all nominalists.
Basically, you have not followed Nietzsche's critics of ANY conception
that (still) believes in reality an sich. All correspondence, incl. all science,
according to Nietzsche, is nothing in itself, nothing 'ideal', but is always
already relative to a lifeform, that as hard, or even harder, needs art and
illusion. For instance: if man could not feel the quality warmth/cold, he would
never get the idea of measuring the temperature (a fortiori lord Kelvin).
But what is worse: the problems caused by the failure to meet Nietzsche's problem,
you give them immediately to Heidegger. But Heidegger has an answer: truth as
openness. THIS truth, though, cannot itself be expressed in terms of correspondence,
but precedes it, also when not seen. That is: as long as correspondence is all one can
think of re truth - and already the whole of metaphysics did not look beyond - , one
has forgotten that things already appear within a light, that is irreducible and
geschichtlich, bound to a tiem and a place, like in our time correspondence or coherence,
that are however almost completely pragmatically devalued.
I heard that also the latest developments in string theory are forced to accept a last
anthropic ground for the properties of particles, admitting still to Kant that we have
only knowledge of phenomena, never of noumena.
Heidegger, though, already in the time of BT, was informed as to the Grundlagen crisis
of the sciences (formalism vs intuitionism in mathematics; in later years he discussed
physics with von Weizsaecker and Heisenberg.
Science just follows the nihilistic proces of metaphysics, has received its idea of
reality, as it is taken away from it.
I'm afraid your idea of reality and truth are themselves innocent dreams, merely using
historical notions, that are no longer believed in, except maybe in that fairy-landmass,
where there seems to be a serious crisis in all of its fundaments.
cheers
rene
As I suggested in the article which prompted Johnson's post, what
corresponds to the entitic truth of the object
is the way that the object actually exists [all objects are by default
existentially truthful to the way that they exist.] set aside the HUMAN idea of
the truth of an object, which is always a BEST MATCH assessment, based upon a
sensorial judgement that flows from the juxtapositioning
of subject and object. This is the whole basis of this particular attack of
mine on the phenomenology of the Heidegger/Husserl fantasy.
A human perception, understanding and description of an object will ALWAYS
fall short of being a totally accurate perception, understanding and
description of any object. The theoretical concept of an absolute correspondence
between the entitic truth of an object and the human version of this truth is a
fantasy which can never be realised and therefore never corresponds. Therefore
the Heideggerian delirium of *object givenness* is total rubbish.
This was my original passage which is pertinent to the discussion:
*Now not only is the truth of entitic actuality to be found in the
correctly observed object existing in the actual way it exists, the truth of
entitic actuality also resides in the observer existing in the actual way
that he or she exists as an observing subject too.
Therefore for the observer who describes an object existing in the way it
exists as something existing in the
way it exists, then that is the truthful description of actual way it
observationally and perceptually exists for the observer. The juxtapositioning of
these two entitic truths is therefore the "best match" objective
realisation of the subject's subjective impressions and
the object's objective reality.
The key words that you missed are the second, third and fourth words of the
second sentence, and the last three words of the penultimate sentence above
*FOR THE OBSERVER.* In other words the observer's version of entitic reality
and the entitic reality of an object is always a best match version, and not a
version that ABSOLUTELY corresponds with the actuality of the object.
Bottom line for Heideggerians? Because Heidegger [ following Husserl]
believed that the *Being* of beings was instantiated through the phenomenological
process of an understanding of the *object givenness,* of an object, and
because [as I have explained above] humans can never perceive and understand an
object as it actually is in its entitic reality, the *Being* of objects* which
is instantiated by the human instantiator is always a second-rate *BEST MATCH
BEING* and not the true *Being* of a being.
In that sense Heidegger's *Being* is an ersatz, artificial, inferior,
substitute, imitative and false version of so called *Being,* and the whole phoney
phenomenological farce is exposed for what it really is - ill thought-out
juvenilia not fit to be graced with the word *philosophy.*
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
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