tymp lightly tapped out a tune:
> lol... Good god peep I think you need to read some poetry:
>
> I hope this helps your con-fusion.
tymp, thanks for the pomes below, but the point I am aiming for badly is
contained within the notion that in the dry husks of analytical logic
somewhere the logos dwells just as much as in the thinking of heraclitus
hidden by the folded-in-ness of metalogics... I was particularly concerning
myself with a plethora of theoretical problematics that, say, utilise in all
their various forms, a correspondence theory of language (normally pre- and
necessarily shorn of the subtleties of structuralism and ethnomethodology
{remember conversation analysis?}); in that sense whether the statement as
to the truth of a statement itself was true in the same way. Or, how does
the extraordinary relation between speech and the world it speaks of happen
in terms of the very depiction of that relation? Wittgenstein in brief:
whereas language can form a picture the world, we cannot picture (with
language) the form itself. Is this a problem? For whom (for which language
games?)?
regards
michaelP
>
> Nonetheless there are times when clear eyes too love the shadows,
> tasting sleep uncompelled, trying the pleasure it gives,
> Or a loyal man too will gaze into Night and enjoy it,
> Yes, and rightly to her garlands we dedicate, hymns,
> Since to all those astray, the mad and the dead she is sacred,
> Yet herself remains firm, always, her spirit most free.
> But to us in her turn, so that in the wavering moment,
> Deep in the dark there shall be something at least that endures,
> Holy drunkenness she must grant and frenzied oblivion,
> Grant the on-rushing word, sleepless as lovers are too,
> And a wine-cup more full, a life more intense and more daring,
> Holy remembrance too, keeping us wakeful at night.
>
>
> Holderlin - Bread and wine
>
>
> "in his breast guarding eyeless, swift love" -- old Orphic poem fragment
> quoted extensively by neoplatonists
>
> Or try reading what David says in Psalms xvii, 12: et posuit tenebras
> latibulum suum
>
>
> blind man leading the blind,
> regards,
> tympan tzu plato
>
>
>
>
>>If one says: X
>>(a statement)
>>is true whenever Y
>>(Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be true,
>>etc)
>>then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
>>definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
>>statement, like X, like all Xs)).
>>
>>If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
>>(compressed as the truth of Z);
>>on the other hand if Z is untrue
>>(i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue
>>whenever
>>Y)
>>then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
>>speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
>>
>>thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all possible
>>occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
>>commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
>>
>>Or am I thoroughly confused?
>>
>>regards
>>
>>michaelP
>>
>>
>> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
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> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
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--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> lol... Good god peep I think you need to read some poetry:
>
> I hope this helps your con-fusion.
tymp, thanks for the pomes below, but the point I am aiming for badly is
contained within the notion that in the dry husks of analytical logic
somewhere the logos dwells just as much as in the thinking of heraclitus
hidden by the folded-in-ness of metalogics... I was particularly concerning
myself with a plethora of theoretical problematics that, say, utilise in all
their various forms, a correspondence theory of language (normally pre- and
necessarily shorn of the subtleties of structuralism and ethnomethodology
{remember conversation analysis?}); in that sense whether the statement as
to the truth of a statement itself was true in the same way. Or, how does
the extraordinary relation between speech and the world it speaks of happen
in terms of the very depiction of that relation? Wittgenstein in brief:
whereas language can form a picture the world, we cannot picture (with
language) the form itself. Is this a problem? For whom (for which language
games?)?
regards
michaelP
>
> Nonetheless there are times when clear eyes too love the shadows,
> tasting sleep uncompelled, trying the pleasure it gives,
> Or a loyal man too will gaze into Night and enjoy it,
> Yes, and rightly to her garlands we dedicate, hymns,
> Since to all those astray, the mad and the dead she is sacred,
> Yet herself remains firm, always, her spirit most free.
> But to us in her turn, so that in the wavering moment,
> Deep in the dark there shall be something at least that endures,
> Holy drunkenness she must grant and frenzied oblivion,
> Grant the on-rushing word, sleepless as lovers are too,
> And a wine-cup more full, a life more intense and more daring,
> Holy remembrance too, keeping us wakeful at night.
>
>
> Holderlin - Bread and wine
>
>
> "in his breast guarding eyeless, swift love" -- old Orphic poem fragment
> quoted extensively by neoplatonists
>
> Or try reading what David says in Psalms xvii, 12: et posuit tenebras
> latibulum suum
>
>
> blind man leading the blind,
> regards,
> tympan tzu plato
>
>
>
>
>>If one says: X
>>(a statement)
>>is true whenever Y
>>(Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be true,
>>etc)
>>then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
>>definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
>>statement, like X, like all Xs)).
>>
>>If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
>>(compressed as the truth of Z);
>>on the other hand if Z is untrue
>>(i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue
>>whenever
>>Y)
>>then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
>>speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
>>
>>thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all possible
>>occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
>>commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
>>
>>Or am I thoroughly confused?
>>
>>regards
>>
>>michaelP
>>
>>
>> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Scan and help eliminate destructive viruses from your inbound and outbound
> e-mail and attachments.
>
http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-ca&page=byoa/prem&xAPID=1994&DI=1034&SU=htt
p://hotmail.com/enca&HL
> =Market_MSNIS_Taglines
> Start enjoying all the benefits of MSN® Premium right now and get the
> first two months FREE*.
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---