Marilynn:
> Hi, Michael,
>
> I'm replacing your terms with those of Chrysippus.
>
>
>> If one says: X
>> (a statement)
>> is true whenever Y
>> (Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be
> true,
>> etc)
>
> X=it is light
> Y=it is day
> Z = If it is day, then it is (necessarily) light.
Yes, everything you point out, Marilynn, below is right; I cannot respond
properly now, but I think I should have added (if my long-since forgotten
knowledge of formal logic holds, upside-down A) some for-alls (not easily
symbolisable in pure text terms) in my statements about
statements/propositions. Z should read more like:
"for all statements of the kind "Y then X" (and for-all Y, for-all X)"(=Z, Z
being what can be said to true for each and every instance of X and Y)
if (for all) Y then Z?
Confused? I am. I mean to speak in formal terms concerning the form of
truthful statements: if the form works (is said to be true, produce truths,
in some language game, i.e., produces truths) for all individual
instantiations of Z, is by the same criteria, Z (as a statement of the same
kind as X) also true?
Hopelessly so, now (too much red wine after a loud audition of beefheart's
'Spotlight Kid') confused, but there's someething fluttering dangerously
close. I'll have another go tomorrow. And thanks for locating the itch.
regards
michaelP
>
>> then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
>> definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
>> statement, like X, like all Xs)).
>>
>> If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
>> (compressed as the truth of Z);
>> on the other hand if Z is untrue
>> (i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue
> whenever
>> Y)
>
> Z' = If it is day, Not (it is light)
>
>> then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
>> speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
>
>
> Z' may be true (some of the time) during a solar eclipse - or dark cloud
> cover signifying an impeding storm. It depends on how much light is light.
> Which version of the truth do you want?
>
> Your setting ahead of time whether Z or Z' based on opinion, experience, or
> dogma. The conclusion is already assumed, not discovered. The "truth" of Z
> is not established by its own form of 'X is true whenever Y'.
>
> If you already set "If X, then Y", then NOT Z (~Z) would be an "invalid"
> statement. Validity is not the same as truth-value. But truth depends on
> what you are filling in as the variables, while the abstract placeholders
> remain the same. The issue of truth is one of content, not of syntaxic
> validity. The truth of the statement is often presupposed intuitively by
> the content and is not generated by syntax or eutax. Quine -> most
> statements taken to be analytic a priori are not so at all. If we can agree
> that day and light are equivalent in meaning, then such a statement would be
> analytic a priori (and pretty useless at best). But I doubt this is the case
> for any referents other than mathematicals and perhaps some simple synonyms.
>
>
>> thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all
> possible
>> occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
>> commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
>>
>> Or am I thoroughly confused?
>>
>
> I lost you on the last sentence.
> I hope this didn't add to the confusion.
>
>
> Marilynn
>
>
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> Hi, Michael,
>
> I'm replacing your terms with those of Chrysippus.
>
>
>> If one says: X
>> (a statement)
>> is true whenever Y
>> (Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be
> true,
>> etc)
>
> X=it is light
> Y=it is day
> Z = If it is day, then it is (necessarily) light.
Yes, everything you point out, Marilynn, below is right; I cannot respond
properly now, but I think I should have added (if my long-since forgotten
knowledge of formal logic holds, upside-down A) some for-alls (not easily
symbolisable in pure text terms) in my statements about
statements/propositions. Z should read more like:
"for all statements of the kind "Y then X" (and for-all Y, for-all X)"(=Z, Z
being what can be said to true for each and every instance of X and Y)
if (for all) Y then Z?
Confused? I am. I mean to speak in formal terms concerning the form of
truthful statements: if the form works (is said to be true, produce truths,
in some language game, i.e., produces truths) for all individual
instantiations of Z, is by the same criteria, Z (as a statement of the same
kind as X) also true?
Hopelessly so, now (too much red wine after a loud audition of beefheart's
'Spotlight Kid') confused, but there's someething fluttering dangerously
close. I'll have another go tomorrow. And thanks for locating the itch.
regards
michaelP
>
>> then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
>> definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
>> statement, like X, like all Xs)).
>>
>> If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
>> (compressed as the truth of Z);
>> on the other hand if Z is untrue
>> (i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue
> whenever
>> Y)
>
> Z' = If it is day, Not (it is light)
>
>> then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
>> speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
>
>
> Z' may be true (some of the time) during a solar eclipse - or dark cloud
> cover signifying an impeding storm. It depends on how much light is light.
> Which version of the truth do you want?
>
> Your setting ahead of time whether Z or Z' based on opinion, experience, or
> dogma. The conclusion is already assumed, not discovered. The "truth" of Z
> is not established by its own form of 'X is true whenever Y'.
>
> If you already set "If X, then Y", then NOT Z (~Z) would be an "invalid"
> statement. Validity is not the same as truth-value. But truth depends on
> what you are filling in as the variables, while the abstract placeholders
> remain the same. The issue of truth is one of content, not of syntaxic
> validity. The truth of the statement is often presupposed intuitively by
> the content and is not generated by syntax or eutax. Quine -> most
> statements taken to be analytic a priori are not so at all. If we can agree
> that day and light are equivalent in meaning, then such a statement would be
> analytic a priori (and pretty useless at best). But I doubt this is the case
> for any referents other than mathematicals and perhaps some simple synonyms.
>
>
>> thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all
> possible
>> occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
>> commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
>>
>> Or am I thoroughly confused?
>>
>
> I lost you on the last sentence.
> I hope this didn't add to the confusion.
>
>
> Marilynn
>
>
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
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