In a message dated 28/10/2004 11:04:24 GMT Standard Time, michael@s
andwich-de-sign.co.uk writes:
tymp lightly tapped out a tune:
> lol... Good god peep I think you need to read some poetry:
>
> I hope this helps your con-fusion.
tymp, thanks for the pomes below, but the point I am aiming for badly is
contained within the notion that in the dry husks of analytical logic
somewhere the logos dwells just as much as in the thinking of heraclitus
hidden by the folded-in-ness of metalogics... I was particularly concerning
myself with a plethora of theoretical problematics that, say, utilise in all
their various forms, a correspondence theory of language (normally pre- and
necessarily shorn of the subtleties of structuralism and ethnomethodology
{remember conversation analysis?}); in that sense whether the statement as
to the truth of a statement itself was true in the same way. Or, how does
the extraordinary relation between speech and the world it speaks of happen
in terms of the very depiction of that relation? Wittgenstein in brief:
whereas language can form a picture the world, we cannot picture (with
language) the form itself. Is this a problem? For whom (for which language
games?)?
Jud:
There is no such THING as: * the dry husks of analytical logic,* nor for
that matter is there such a THING as: *the wet, cold porridge of
transcendentalistic illogic.* There are only *human analytical logicians,* and *human
transcendentalist illogicians.* There is no: *extraordinary relation between speech
and the world it speaks,* there is only: *the perfectly natural relation
between the human speaker and the entitic environment of which he/she speaks.*
The series of sound signals or textual marks that an addressor uses in his
attempt to communicate his/her conclusions regarding the being to being
relation, can never TRULY communicate the way the observed being exists to the
addressee, only impressions, approximations, estimations and opinions.
It therefore follows that the much vaunted Heideggerian *Being*, which is a
product of this being to being relation, is also impressionistic,
approximate, gauged and opinionated. As regards Wittgenstein, you are on the right path,
but you need to go further - for whereas language can form a crude picture
of an object, we cannot reproduce this crude picture with the utterance of
sounds, nor with the making marks on paper which faithfully reproduce the entity
itself, but only the way that we perceive it. This replication-failure is a
major problem for the notion of *object givenness,* for what is *given* and
transcendentally transacted is a base, untruthful, manqué copy [in an entirely
different medium,] rather than a truthful duplicate of the object which is
appraised.
Hence *object givenness* = *philosophical mendacity.*
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
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