rene and featureless netizens,
I'm having problems with my subject heading. I was saying that I was trying to think what Derrida had left me with without looking at any books that I haven't read in ages. I forget how many years ago I read Of Grammatology but it's the book that I remember where he writes that we need to create a monstrousity. This has never stop being appealing to me. The monstrous is just that ephemeral formless form that is always going through metamorphosis. If I were to pick up the first books I read, Of Grammatology, Dissemination, Margins, I would not get past a couple of pages today, too much Freud, too much Hegel, too much Structuralism. His thinking is too invested in modern habits and doesn't move much before Hegel. Deleuze who seems crazier and hypermodern compared to Derrida is more rooted in the traditions of French philosophy. At any rate the monstrous is the order of the day, the multitude, or in a more American context here would be questions having to do with relativity and pluralism explored by pragmatists. This shapeless mobility no doubt has driven a whole generation insane. The big IT or Kant's X if you will has no name but in so far as it indicates a tragic failure which is at the heart of the understanding of being then what one sees is a dismemberment of all objects that may have been given as intuitive or empirical evidence that we could have grasped in a comprehensive manner and could have seen clearly in definite and determined form. Dismemberment is a process of refinement, of growing sublety and prudence where this means in the manner of hunters a growing skill in dissappearing or taking up the markings of our situation or circumstance. Withdrawal then is countered with withdrawal. In other words the crisis of reason releases a de-cision which creates a growing differentiation amongst all things that is allow to be and this is difference or the in-between in Holderlin are called demigods or the metamorphosis of Dionysus. What has happened is that the understanding of being as it has been increasingly grounded in temporality that has shown itself be a nothing or an abground that is neither being nor non-being ever since even before _Being and Time_ has been put into abeyance, has been bracketed off as a kind of Heideggerian revision of Husserl's epoche of the natural attitude. In Heidegger's case the epoche is that of a cognitive understanding that would determine language as a defintion making activity clearly defining forms to be grasped and as such transmitted to another mind as the passage of informative data that is transparent and easy to see. But in Heidegger communicative process becomes more like that of the octopus where both in order to operate aggressively as a beast of prey or defensively avoid capture it releases a cloud of ink that jamms all signals. The cloud is a cloud where knowledge fails and enters a dark night where 'what is' incubating is the birth of the imagination out which the poet emerges and starts sign-making activity where language now operates as indicative evocation of the ephemeral. There is no longer a clearly definable subject heading for language that would be extending predicates that we could all take to be of substantive interest. The beheading of the subject of a phrase and language in general means the anarchy and hyperbolic freedom of writing. Knowledge and language comes to be hidden in a complex system of nodes or cells. This labyrinth or complex system is imaginatively traversed by the pathmaking (weg) activity that is determined (bestimmung) by the attunement of a connecting tone (bestimmung of a Grundstimmung). In GA39 section twelve (pgs 163-167) Heidgger says that here when we start to think of demigods in a reading of Holderlin's "Halbgotter denk' ich jetz" at the begining of stanza IX of The Rhine; or when we start to think the formless form of the monstrous, here now it is not the the idea of a conceptual understanding of being or a comprehending explication that would lead to some data of knowledge: "The project has nothing that is conceptual, grasping Beyng as such, that is to say grasping 'it' in a concept. Rather the project is *instituting* - in the saying of the poet" (164). So when thinking no longer as an explication but as exposure (ek-tasis) or a comportement (verhalten) that attunes or determines (bestimmung) a fundamental tone is operative then this means that here and now there is no comprehensive knowing of any substantive nature happening. What is happening and with increasing intensity is an Ereignis of beings as a whole. Thought's reponsibility or duty even when anarchic is being accomplished as the instituting establishment of the dimension or site of Beyng, da-Sign, a deft jamming of discourse in a house language. There is no difference between thinking and activity. Thinking through language is doing exactly and with high precision what it says it's doing in the saying (sage) of a poet. It works itself out in an improvisational manner without any expectations by attuning the osciallting vibration of a a bow in tension ready to release its arrow which also is a sort of a priori for co-operative prolepsis in the ethnomethodological sense. In other words a Stimmung is both a bond or knot as much as tone. It bonds us together and in that way it institutes a complex network through its coupling topology or the oscillating dynamics of the translatability of a bow that lends itself to improvisational variations. This is how thinking poets from age to age wave to each other in recognition and cluster together in hidden networks forming a formidable and unbreakable golden chain liberating Persephone or the innovative drifts of a Dionysian riot of youth.
tympan
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