Re: [nominalism] Eisegesis or Anagoges of Truth

Hi,

I insert some comments of mine in the intriguing text below.





At 7:00 -0400 25-10-2004, gevans613@xxxxxxx wrote:
In a message dated 25/10/2004 05:53:08 GMT Standard Time,
mjohnson@xxxxxxxxxx writes:

On Oct 24, 2004, at 1:16 PM, GEVANS613@xxxxxxx wrote:
>  If an observer describes an object existing in the way
>  it exists as something existing in the way it exists, then
> it is a truthful description.
>

(ant)
why, "truthful"? This quality implies two at least functions more:
- a second observer who observes the description;
- the consent of the second observer to the issued description

Hence, as far as the "truthful" quality depends on the observing
subject, not on the observed object, we could assume that the
truth is always subjective...


Johnson:
Can some descriptions be MORE truthful than others?
Can they encompass seemingly contradictory descriptions?
When one description is understood as truth, what of the
manifold possibilities that remain concealed?

(ant)
Since the "truthful" quality of a description depends on the
observing subject's consent, the much many the subjects are
who give it consent, the more "true" the description is.

As for the manifold possibilities that remain concealed, i.e.
the subjects who for some reason of their own don't apply
their consents to the issued description, they fall down in
the domain of statistics, or else of democracy, to form the
statistic - democratic minority.


Johnson:
Can some descriptions be MORE truthful than others?

Jud:
An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions
of the way it exists which differ from the way it exists
 are untruthful. Descriptions of entities cannot be MORE
truthful or LESS truthful than the description which
truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions
of entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some
features of the way an entity exists, but not others, are 
NOT truthful in relation to the way that the entity exists.

(ant)
This "truth" sounds pretty tautology.


Johnson:
Can they encompass seemingly contradictory descriptions?

Jud:
Entitic truth is an absolute.  An object either exists in the
way it exists - or it doesn't exist. There is no eisegesis or
anagoges of truth.
An entity either exists in the way it exists - or it cannot be
referred to as an entity [see Parmenides] - but only as a
human speculation signifying nothing. [see TS Eliot -  
Burnt Norton]

(ant)
Any "entity that exists in the way it exists" cannot be
referred to any else way but by a subject who sees it.
Or who thinks of it. Thus it becomes an observation, i.e.
an human speculation signifying something that can be
adjudged "truthful" according to the consent of the
(majority of) observers themselves who observe the
observation.



Johnson:
When one description is understood as truth, what of
the manifold possibilities that remain concealed?


Jud:
There are no *manifold possibilities that remain
concealed,* for inanimate objects lack conscious design
or purpose, to either *remain concealed* or to *terminate
their concealment and show themselves,* and they are 
incapable intent, and are not in the business of concealment. 

(ant)
"concealed", to whom? To the observer, eventually.
Thus, the "concealed" concept is a function of the
observer subject -- not of just the object which can be
observed or not


(Jud)
If an object is not observed by a human being - it is
the human's being's *fault* for either:

(a) Not being in the spatial position which would enable
him to observe the object.
(b) Not realising that an object is located in a certain place.
(c) Not recognising an object as an object.

(ant)
Or else,
(d) the wanted object did not exist at all. I mean, the
above (a), (b) and (c) "faults" imply the existence of one
more human being-subject -- better if more than one --
who observed, or observes, or will observe that object.



(Jud)
If an object is hidden, the hiding is done by a human hider
and not by the hidden object. If an object is revealed - the
revealing is done by a human revealer, and any *revelation*
that takes place occurs in the brain of the human to whom
the object has been revealed. The moon does not *hide*
the stars which it obscures from human view, the human is
simply in the wrong place to see them.

If Weapons of Mass destruction WERE hidden in Iraq, it
would not be the *fault* of the WOMD that they were 
concealed from human view - it would be the *fault* of
Saddam's men who hid them, and/or Bushes men who
couldn't find them.


Regards,

Jud

(ant)
May we conclude -- q.e.d. -- that the truth is always
subjective? Because depending on the observer subject
(a human being, usually) and not on the truthfulness of
the (observed) object? And that "truthfulness" of any
observation is an attribute it is given by the observer of
the observation itself, and not of the object observed ?

(of course, here I used the terms "subject" and "object"
according with the Latin parse, not just the English)

Regards, antonio


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