In article <1dd.2eff4e7d.2eae36e7@xxxxxxx>, GEVANS613@xxxxxxx writes
>An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions of the way it
>exists which
>differ from the way it exists are untruthful. Descriptions of entities
>cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful than the description
>which truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions of
>entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some features
>of the way an entity exists, but not others, are NOT truthful in relation to
>the way that the entity exists.
Do you really believe that we can make assertions that are complete and
totally accurate descriptions of objects? If a description falls short
of this ideal (how do we know it does?) do we then take it as useless
and consign it to the rubbish bin of falsehood?
--
Philip Baker
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions of the way it
>exists which
>differ from the way it exists are untruthful. Descriptions of entities
>cannot be MORE truthful or LESS truthful than the description
>which truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions of
>entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some features
>of the way an entity exists, but not others, are NOT truthful in relation to
>the way that the entity exists.
Do you really believe that we can make assertions that are complete and
totally accurate descriptions of objects? If a description falls short
of this ideal (how do we know it does?) do we then take it as useless
and consign it to the rubbish bin of falsehood?
--
Philip Baker
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---