Hi Michael, you wrote:
>I forgot to mention (in my previous post to Jan) that those reasons I
>adduced concerning the meaning of the J-clauses ("X exists in the way/as X
>exists" and the like), that they stretch language to a breaking point in
>order the render the thatness, the suchness of X without totally leaving the
>linguistic medium, mean for me that such clauses are indeed utterly
>philosophical because they bring us the question of be-ing and beings
>(however differently they might be termed by those purveyors of J-clauses);
>they are like bejewelled pebbles on a sandy beach that beckon us to pick
>something up... almost silently (without mentioning or even whispering their
>names).
Of course i agree that in Heidegger's (later) thinking on language,
i.e. where language is conceived not merely a human invention or
property or medium, but as a gift, a conjunctive force coming from,
happening between and bringing us to (the) world [cf. Die Sprache
spricht; Die Sprache als Erwesung des Fugs seiner Fuegung] and
that therefor (our traditional understanding of) logico-linguistic
phenomena as tautologies, contradictions, inconsistencies etc. must
be considered in an completely different light. However this leaves
untouched my point to Jud that in the language-games of materialist,
of whatever signature, tautologies are not productive in any ontological
sense.
yours,
Jan
btw. thanks for the quote from Allen's book, wish he was here.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>I forgot to mention (in my previous post to Jan) that those reasons I
>adduced concerning the meaning of the J-clauses ("X exists in the way/as X
>exists" and the like), that they stretch language to a breaking point in
>order the render the thatness, the suchness of X without totally leaving the
>linguistic medium, mean for me that such clauses are indeed utterly
>philosophical because they bring us the question of be-ing and beings
>(however differently they might be termed by those purveyors of J-clauses);
>they are like bejewelled pebbles on a sandy beach that beckon us to pick
>something up... almost silently (without mentioning or even whispering their
>names).
Of course i agree that in Heidegger's (later) thinking on language,
i.e. where language is conceived not merely a human invention or
property or medium, but as a gift, a conjunctive force coming from,
happening between and bringing us to (the) world [cf. Die Sprache
spricht; Die Sprache als Erwesung des Fugs seiner Fuegung] and
that therefor (our traditional understanding of) logico-linguistic
phenomena as tautologies, contradictions, inconsistencies etc. must
be considered in an completely different light. However this leaves
untouched my point to Jud that in the language-games of materialist,
of whatever signature, tautologies are not productive in any ontological
sense.
yours,
Jan
btw. thanks for the quote from Allen's book, wish he was here.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---