>From Jan:
> Hi Michael, you wrote:
>
>>I forgot to mention (in my previous post to Jan) that those reasons I
>>adduced concerning the meaning of the J-clauses ("X exists in the way/as X
>>exists" and the like), that they stretch language to a breaking point in
>>order the render the thatness, the suchness of X without totally leaving the
>>linguistic medium, mean for me that such clauses are indeed utterly
>>philosophical because they bring us the question of be-ing and beings
>>(however differently they might be termed by those purveyors of J-clauses);
>>they are like bejewelled pebbles on a sandy beach that beckon us to pick
>>something up... almost silently (without mentioning or even whispering their
>>names).
>
> Of course i agree that in Heidegger's (later) thinking on language,
> i.e. where language is conceived not merely a human invention or
> property or medium, but as a gift, a conjunctive force coming from,
> happening between and bringing us to (the) world [cf. Die Sprache
> spricht; Die Sprache als Erwesung des Fugs seiner Fuegung] and
> that therefor (our traditional understanding of) logico-linguistic
> phenomena as tautologies, contradictions, inconsistencies etc. must
> be considered in an completely different light. However this leaves
> untouched my point to Jud that in the language-games of materialist,
> of whatever signature, tautologies are not productive in any ontological
> sense.
>
> yours,
> Jan
>
> btw. thanks for the quote from Allen's book, wish he was here.
Jan, I agree with you that the 'materialism' that afixes J-clauses as
programmatic is a materialism without matter (in which I'm including energy
as an equivalent). At some other time, I should like to discuss the
implications of this in a full manner, but for now it seems this
materialism-without-matter (MWM) is one where the nominalism (N) overwhelms
the materialism, and so it might be frustrating to critique the MWM without
first critiquing the N. Or rather, critiquing MWM by way of N might be a
more fecund path. What I am saying (via a trans-lation of the J-clauses) is
that the will to present/display (in perfectly 'logical' language) the
percussive power (thatness in other terms) of the utterly individual, the
uniquely unique (which can not have a name, even "entity", etc, has too much
resonance with such as "sub-stance" or even "matter"; the names are purely
nominal, only there because we have to say something...), totally overwhelms
the will to materialist logics (and predicative speech of the kind, say, "X
because Y" or "X is a kind of Y", etc) that you present in your post to Jud.
Is this not in some ways similar to Heidegger's attempts (almost everywhere
in his texts, early and late) to 'overcome' metaphysics (the western
tradition of philosophy including all the logic, the syntax, the dialectics,
predication, subject-object domains, etc), which, in a way, exists, lives,
in the traditional philosophical language, but without leaving (turning
one's back on, ignoring, demoloshing, etc) the 'enclosure' of metaphysics:
rather seeking a pathway to an exit by way of that very enclosure, seeking
the opening promised by the archaic sending/trans-mission of be-ing in the
first beginning...)?
In the "Eyeh-Asher-Ehyeh" clause mentioned earlier, I hear (my trans-lation)
via the mesmerising power of the repeated "Eyeh" (itself a play on the word
"Yahweh" of Jewish theology), the presence of a 'that' ("Asher"). God's
answer as to a name demanded by Moses (for communication purposes to the
waiting Israel) is thus a heightened condensed "that!" Not that dissimilar
to (if you'll forgive the banality) the "what!" of Popeye the sailor man in
"I am what I am what I am what I am..."
The J-clauses of the Nominalist sound to me to be drier, but all the more
powerful for that, musical evocations (songs) of "exists!" and "ways", and
should not be seen only as grounds in support of the materialism (which, as
you have shown, are shakey). MWM is supremely demanded by N (in the
"without!"), and this demand brings the purveyors of J-clauses into the
proximity (but not coincidence) of both Heidegger and (and this no
conflationary 'and') mysticism (and dry 'music').
WRT Allen, I thought he was still lurking somewhat though not actively
participating.
regards
michaelP
>
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> Hi Michael, you wrote:
>
>>I forgot to mention (in my previous post to Jan) that those reasons I
>>adduced concerning the meaning of the J-clauses ("X exists in the way/as X
>>exists" and the like), that they stretch language to a breaking point in
>>order the render the thatness, the suchness of X without totally leaving the
>>linguistic medium, mean for me that such clauses are indeed utterly
>>philosophical because they bring us the question of be-ing and beings
>>(however differently they might be termed by those purveyors of J-clauses);
>>they are like bejewelled pebbles on a sandy beach that beckon us to pick
>>something up... almost silently (without mentioning or even whispering their
>>names).
>
> Of course i agree that in Heidegger's (later) thinking on language,
> i.e. where language is conceived not merely a human invention or
> property or medium, but as a gift, a conjunctive force coming from,
> happening between and bringing us to (the) world [cf. Die Sprache
> spricht; Die Sprache als Erwesung des Fugs seiner Fuegung] and
> that therefor (our traditional understanding of) logico-linguistic
> phenomena as tautologies, contradictions, inconsistencies etc. must
> be considered in an completely different light. However this leaves
> untouched my point to Jud that in the language-games of materialist,
> of whatever signature, tautologies are not productive in any ontological
> sense.
>
> yours,
> Jan
>
> btw. thanks for the quote from Allen's book, wish he was here.
Jan, I agree with you that the 'materialism' that afixes J-clauses as
programmatic is a materialism without matter (in which I'm including energy
as an equivalent). At some other time, I should like to discuss the
implications of this in a full manner, but for now it seems this
materialism-without-matter (MWM) is one where the nominalism (N) overwhelms
the materialism, and so it might be frustrating to critique the MWM without
first critiquing the N. Or rather, critiquing MWM by way of N might be a
more fecund path. What I am saying (via a trans-lation of the J-clauses) is
that the will to present/display (in perfectly 'logical' language) the
percussive power (thatness in other terms) of the utterly individual, the
uniquely unique (which can not have a name, even "entity", etc, has too much
resonance with such as "sub-stance" or even "matter"; the names are purely
nominal, only there because we have to say something...), totally overwhelms
the will to materialist logics (and predicative speech of the kind, say, "X
because Y" or "X is a kind of Y", etc) that you present in your post to Jud.
Is this not in some ways similar to Heidegger's attempts (almost everywhere
in his texts, early and late) to 'overcome' metaphysics (the western
tradition of philosophy including all the logic, the syntax, the dialectics,
predication, subject-object domains, etc), which, in a way, exists, lives,
in the traditional philosophical language, but without leaving (turning
one's back on, ignoring, demoloshing, etc) the 'enclosure' of metaphysics:
rather seeking a pathway to an exit by way of that very enclosure, seeking
the opening promised by the archaic sending/trans-mission of be-ing in the
first beginning...)?
In the "Eyeh-Asher-Ehyeh" clause mentioned earlier, I hear (my trans-lation)
via the mesmerising power of the repeated "Eyeh" (itself a play on the word
"Yahweh" of Jewish theology), the presence of a 'that' ("Asher"). God's
answer as to a name demanded by Moses (for communication purposes to the
waiting Israel) is thus a heightened condensed "that!" Not that dissimilar
to (if you'll forgive the banality) the "what!" of Popeye the sailor man in
"I am what I am what I am what I am..."
The J-clauses of the Nominalist sound to me to be drier, but all the more
powerful for that, musical evocations (songs) of "exists!" and "ways", and
should not be seen only as grounds in support of the materialism (which, as
you have shown, are shakey). MWM is supremely demanded by N (in the
"without!"), and this demand brings the purveyors of J-clauses into the
proximity (but not coincidence) of both Heidegger and (and this no
conflationary 'and') mysticism (and dry 'music').
WRT Allen, I thought he was still lurking somewhat though not actively
participating.
regards
michaelP
>
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---