Re: all or nothing at all, part X

Hi Jud,

i am not a person that likes to write long posts (and i'm not fond of
reading long posts either), that's why i will keep my message short again
this time, although this shortness does not mean that your posts didn't
deserve a longer reply, there is enough in it to debate about, but my
limited command of the english language constrains me much in the
way i want to express myself, which then also tend to become a source
of misunderstandings.

I want make two comments though, one about Heidegger and one about
Wittgenstein, and third i will try to anwer one of your questions.

(1) Let me first say that i find your thinking and phrasing is moving
more and more in a Heideggerian direction. Your notion of the 'human
holism', esp. the non-dualistic (anti-Cartesian) part of it when you talk
about the wholeness of the body and its consciousness, seems rather
close to what Heidegger tries convey in his notion of Dasein. Also the
different 'modalities' of the 'human holism ' you mention regularly, bear
a certain resemblance with "Modalitaet, Modus" which Heidegger often
uses in SuZ to describe the existentialia of Dasein. (btw. are 'sensorising'
and 'mentalising' common expressions in english ?)

The question if Heidegger's "Being" is an disguised equation for "God"
is very interesting one. I agree there is a strong theological undercurrent
in Heidegger's thinking, but the way he thinks and elaborates Being bears
no resemblance whatsoever with the traditional notion of God. The God
of the tradition is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient, but Being is
according to Heidegger finit, hiding-in and in-need-of the being of human
being. In this sense Being is a very fragil happening, and has nothing to
do
with God as The Ultimate Entity. But as said, theological issues are imo
quite apparent and urgent in Heidegger's (later) thinking; when Nietzsche
proclaimed the "death of God" he certainly liberated western thought of
a heavy burden (or a great lie, you might say), but at the same time (t)his
absence created immense void. Many philosophers and intellectuals then
triumphantically embraced Science as the new master of the univers; the
sciences, man's most fantastic accomplishment, would fill up the gap left
by the dead God. For Heidegger however the "death of God" opened up
also a complete new field of philosophical opportunities and visions, one
which he did not want to surrender to the sciences, because he was very
afraid that a blind faith in the sciences would bring more harm, despair
and destruction to mankind than any God or religion had ever done in the
past. I think we should place his thinking first of all in this context,
i.e. in
the absence of God in a society of totalizing scientism.

When Heidegger uses expressions as "pre-ontical", "pre-ontological" he
never does it in a chronological sense, but always in a phenomenological
sense, i.e. as original, primordial, as pre-conditional, as that what lies
enclosed or sealed in.

The example of the caring and creative mother was not from Heidegger's
SuZ, but mine. And if you think that i'm spouting some Nazi attitudes to
women, so be it. But Jud, i manytimes get the impression you have read
little of Heidegger, only maybe his _Basic Concepts_ which you often
mention (btw. which part of the GA is it ?), but did your really read SuZ
from cover to cover ? The way you interpret his words and phrasings
stands miles away of what i think would be an intellectually honest and
fair critique of this work.

(2) When Wittgenstein says that we can only understand the meaning of a
word when we are thoroughly acquainted with the way of life of a certain
linguistic community [i.t. its Lebenform], he means that only after a long
and rich learning process a person becomes a language-user. The example
you gave of the tribesman with his blowpipe is a nice one to show this;
because when you or he pronounces the word "tergat" it does not in any
immediate sense make me to understand that the word "tergat" is refering to
the blowpipe. It's quite possible that i don't recognize it as a blowpipe,
but as a drumstick or a fetish object; or i might think that you are saying
his name or that he is a man of the *tergat* tribe of warriors, or that you
are just making a joke by pronouncing a nonsense word. But let us take
a more Wittgensteinian approach to your example, let's suppose we both
encounter the tribesman for the first time, and he sticks up his blowpipe
and says "tergat", what then would we think of this word ? Is he saying:
"welcome" or "go away" or "attack" (to his fellow tribesmen) or is he
just saying his name ? We do not know what he is saying, because there
is no immediate understanding here whatsoever here Jud. Only after a
long stay with the tribe we could understand their words, because only
then have we familiarized ourselves with their customs and life-world.

(3) You asked if i can give you an example of some phenomenon which
cannot be reduced to an material or energetic entity. I thought we were
already beyond this question, esp. after our discussion of the vacuum a
couple of weeks ago. I took it you'd agreed then that a "partial vacuum"
can exist, because you said you were not denying that there are conditions
where what we describe or refer to as a "partial vacuum" can be achieved.
A partial vacuum is a certain space wherein some parts are occupied with
matter and some other parts of that space are called vacuum. The vacuum
part of the partially vacuum space is empty, i.e. it contains or occupies no
matter but it must exist: ergo this phenomenon is a non-material being.

yours,
Jan




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