Christopher,
Perhaps "simply another structure" was a bad word as you seem to mean that
simply implies "not more important" in a different way than I meant "not
more important". I meant it *is* another structure of Dasein. It is
extremely important to Heideggter's work but that does not stop it from
simply being another structure. (I don't think it does anyway - smile).
Awwww! References. Okay, but some clarification first:
(keep in mind this is one guys opinion; I just sound like I am lecturing
because that is faster than explaining it as my opinion all the time).
The whole thing revolves around what you mean by Death. Heidegger
uses it in two senses (well, three really, the common way, as
"Being-twaords-Death" [existentiell] and as "Being-twoards-the-end"
[existential]. In the first case he is using the word in its normal sense,
as the "end" of Life. This is something that Dasein can never be (in a sense
Dasein can not die since death is something that can not be experienced. As
Gelven points out, this is very close to the Epicurean (sp?) concept that
you do not need to fear death because "As soon as it is, you are not and, as
long you are, it is not.") In Heideggers more formal use of the word he
means what we always *are* ("being-toward-the-end").
Now this "Death" Heidegger says is "possible at each and every
moment" but taking this in the way it is commonly taken is to make what I
see as a fatal flaw when in comes to reading about Death in Heidgger. (Sit
back - this might take a bit).
When you think of Dasein as being constituted by "understanding"
(read: "possibility" or "not-yet") then you get a better sense of death
"being-possible" at "each and every moment". This does not mean that we can
die at "any time". It does not mean that any second now we could keel over.
It does not even mean that every instant contains within it the possibility
that we could die (which is how it is normally taken). Although, all these
things are true.
What is does mean is much more subtle and deep than that. It means
that at every moment I am "die-ing". Being-towards-the-end is always a
possibility that I have (*have contained within my Being* and not as a
possibility of something that *could happen to me*).
If you will allow me my "going-to-the-store" analogy again: Picture
a person who was in a constant state of "going-to-the-store".
"Going-to-the-store" is possible at each and every moment. The stress here
is on *possible*. This person would always contain "going-to-the-store" as
a possibility. "Going-to-the-store" would be definative of their being. It
is an existentiell/existential structure with the only opening to the full
"ontological" structure that seems to be available because it encompasses
(in the case of "death", the end).
Thus when E.F. Kaelin, in his book "Heidegger's Being and Time: A
Reading for Readers" (Florida State Univ. Press, 1988, p. 163) says:
"But the not-yet of our actual death does not take away the certainty of our
possible death, which never, qua possible, ever occurs at all. As an actual
event, it is possible at any moment at all."
He is waaay off base. Death qua possible is always happening, death
as an actual event, can never happen. Death is always with us (always a
pssibility) and an actual event requires us to be around to disclose it
(which will never happen because we have ceased, at this time, to *be*.
I personally feel that the problem arises from the translation of
"Jaden Augenblick" ("at any moment") because the distinction between "each"
and "every" and "any" does not work the same in English as in German but it
gets translated in all of these ways (I speak no German and only have this
fact as second hand from German Profs.).
I hope that clears it up a bit. I am not sure that it will but this
is getting waaay too long to write a full essay on the subject.
1) This one is a little weak as it hinges on the word "constitutive" (but I
believe that all the structures of Dasein were "constitutive of..." -maybe I
am wrong though).
"The 'not-yet' has already been included in the very Being of the fruit, not
as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive.
Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it too *is* already its
'not-yet'". [(B&T, page 244, Division 2, section 1, part 48) (Macquarrie and
Robinson, page 288)]
2) "... just as Dasein *is* already its 'not-yet' constantly as long as it
is, it *is* already its end too. The 'ending' which we have in view when we
speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein],
but a *Being-towards-the-end* [Sein zum Ende] of this entity. Death is a
way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. 'As soon as man comes
to life, he is at once old enough to die'". [(ibid) (M&R trans, 289)]
This definitely points to "being-towards-the-end" as having the same
character as "not-yet" which is a basic structure of Dasein. All structures
of Dasein are structures with respect to the "analytic" (and I assume you
are separating the Analytic from the Ontology by using this phrase). All
structures have an existentiell and an existential mode (don't they?).
3) "it is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is
*constantly something still to be settled [eine standige
Unabgeschlossenheit]*. Such a lack of totality signifies that there is
something still ourtstanding in one's potentiality-for-being." [(B&T,
236)(M&R trans, 279)]
I guess, in the end, you have a point, since the full concept of Heideggers
"death" becomes an existential one (as does any other structure) but the
existentiell notion of death is pretty hard to approach (if it exists at
all). Being-towards-death is the existentiell (see the opening to Division2)
and "Being-twoards-the-end" is the existential. I still do not see how this
becomes "not a structure of Dasein". Granted, it is with the structure of
"death" that Heidegger makes his way from the Anlaytic proper to the
Ontologic Proper but it still stems from (and is part of - "constitutive
of") Dasein.
"The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as
follows: *death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility -
non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstipped.* Death
is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity *towards* its end." (B&T,
M&R trans, p. 303)
Sorry I went on so long. I will look for the actual quote about Death in
Division 1.
-Nik
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
Perhaps "simply another structure" was a bad word as you seem to mean that
simply implies "not more important" in a different way than I meant "not
more important". I meant it *is* another structure of Dasein. It is
extremely important to Heideggter's work but that does not stop it from
simply being another structure. (I don't think it does anyway - smile).
Awwww! References. Okay, but some clarification first:
(keep in mind this is one guys opinion; I just sound like I am lecturing
because that is faster than explaining it as my opinion all the time).
The whole thing revolves around what you mean by Death. Heidegger
uses it in two senses (well, three really, the common way, as
"Being-twaords-Death" [existentiell] and as "Being-twoards-the-end"
[existential]. In the first case he is using the word in its normal sense,
as the "end" of Life. This is something that Dasein can never be (in a sense
Dasein can not die since death is something that can not be experienced. As
Gelven points out, this is very close to the Epicurean (sp?) concept that
you do not need to fear death because "As soon as it is, you are not and, as
long you are, it is not.") In Heideggers more formal use of the word he
means what we always *are* ("being-toward-the-end").
Now this "Death" Heidegger says is "possible at each and every
moment" but taking this in the way it is commonly taken is to make what I
see as a fatal flaw when in comes to reading about Death in Heidgger. (Sit
back - this might take a bit).
When you think of Dasein as being constituted by "understanding"
(read: "possibility" or "not-yet") then you get a better sense of death
"being-possible" at "each and every moment". This does not mean that we can
die at "any time". It does not mean that any second now we could keel over.
It does not even mean that every instant contains within it the possibility
that we could die (which is how it is normally taken). Although, all these
things are true.
What is does mean is much more subtle and deep than that. It means
that at every moment I am "die-ing". Being-towards-the-end is always a
possibility that I have (*have contained within my Being* and not as a
possibility of something that *could happen to me*).
If you will allow me my "going-to-the-store" analogy again: Picture
a person who was in a constant state of "going-to-the-store".
"Going-to-the-store" is possible at each and every moment. The stress here
is on *possible*. This person would always contain "going-to-the-store" as
a possibility. "Going-to-the-store" would be definative of their being. It
is an existentiell/existential structure with the only opening to the full
"ontological" structure that seems to be available because it encompasses
(in the case of "death", the end).
Thus when E.F. Kaelin, in his book "Heidegger's Being and Time: A
Reading for Readers" (Florida State Univ. Press, 1988, p. 163) says:
"But the not-yet of our actual death does not take away the certainty of our
possible death, which never, qua possible, ever occurs at all. As an actual
event, it is possible at any moment at all."
He is waaay off base. Death qua possible is always happening, death
as an actual event, can never happen. Death is always with us (always a
pssibility) and an actual event requires us to be around to disclose it
(which will never happen because we have ceased, at this time, to *be*.
I personally feel that the problem arises from the translation of
"Jaden Augenblick" ("at any moment") because the distinction between "each"
and "every" and "any" does not work the same in English as in German but it
gets translated in all of these ways (I speak no German and only have this
fact as second hand from German Profs.).
I hope that clears it up a bit. I am not sure that it will but this
is getting waaay too long to write a full essay on the subject.
1) This one is a little weak as it hinges on the word "constitutive" (but I
believe that all the structures of Dasein were "constitutive of..." -maybe I
am wrong though).
"The 'not-yet' has already been included in the very Being of the fruit, not
as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive.
Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it too *is* already its
'not-yet'". [(B&T, page 244, Division 2, section 1, part 48) (Macquarrie and
Robinson, page 288)]
2) "... just as Dasein *is* already its 'not-yet' constantly as long as it
is, it *is* already its end too. The 'ending' which we have in view when we
speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein],
but a *Being-towards-the-end* [Sein zum Ende] of this entity. Death is a
way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. 'As soon as man comes
to life, he is at once old enough to die'". [(ibid) (M&R trans, 289)]
This definitely points to "being-towards-the-end" as having the same
character as "not-yet" which is a basic structure of Dasein. All structures
of Dasein are structures with respect to the "analytic" (and I assume you
are separating the Analytic from the Ontology by using this phrase). All
structures have an existentiell and an existential mode (don't they?).
3) "it is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is
*constantly something still to be settled [eine standige
Unabgeschlossenheit]*. Such a lack of totality signifies that there is
something still ourtstanding in one's potentiality-for-being." [(B&T,
236)(M&R trans, 279)]
I guess, in the end, you have a point, since the full concept of Heideggers
"death" becomes an existential one (as does any other structure) but the
existentiell notion of death is pretty hard to approach (if it exists at
all). Being-towards-death is the existentiell (see the opening to Division2)
and "Being-twoards-the-end" is the existential. I still do not see how this
becomes "not a structure of Dasein". Granted, it is with the structure of
"death" that Heidegger makes his way from the Anlaytic proper to the
Ontologic Proper but it still stems from (and is part of - "constitutive
of") Dasein.
"The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as
follows: *death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility -
non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstipped.* Death
is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity *towards* its end." (B&T,
M&R trans, p. 303)
Sorry I went on so long. I will look for the actual quote about Death in
Division 1.
-Nik
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------