What really complicates any attempt to come to grips with
Heidegger's activities in the 30's and 40's is the fact that almost every
public account that Heidegger gave either withheld facts or concealed them
altogether. This is especially true in regard to the statements that he gave
in the denazification hearings in the period immediately after the War.
Someone mentioned Arendt's essay that attempts to understand Heidegger. It
is in this connection that the Ettinger book is very helpful. It makes clear
that Heidegger did not tell Arendt the whole truth about his involvement in
order to have her help him in the quest to get back to teaching. The book
raises a very interesting question as to what Arendt would have done had she
consulted Jaspers about the extent of Heidegger's involvement.
This deception on the part of Heidegger makes me wonder exactly what
connection this has with his philosophical work. In most cases I would be
willing to concede that there is no connection. Being and Time is not party
propaganda. But what is interesting is the extent to which Heidegger goes in
order to avoid taking responsibility for his actions. His activities were
such that he did do harm to people, especially heartbreaking was his conduct
in regard to Max Muller and some of his Jewish colleagues, not to mention
his failure to appear at Husserl's funeral. Heidegger attempts to minimize
his participation in party activities, but the facts always say otherwise.He
never does own up to any of this. All of his public declarations are found
to be wanting in truth when compared to the facts. One might conjecture that
the philosophical connection here is that Heidegger's emphasis on Being and
the destining of Being is so ingrained in him that he can no longer see his
actions as his own. Or that his philosophical views merely provide him with
a means for avoiding the call of conscience. In either case it is alarming
that he is not able to see that what he did was wrong. But it is just as
distressing to see that his philosophical thought functions in an
instrumental way for him in this matter. Heidegger appears to see that the
surrender to being absolves him in some way.
It is here that I find the grounds for a critical engagement of his
thought. My primary interest here is Heidegger's failure to take up the
question of phronesis and ethics in his later writings. In the 20's he
appears to have taken up Aristotle's account. But that is never followed
through in a very serious manner. Also there is a real failure to comprehend
Plato. The labeling of Plato and Aristotle as the originators of the
technological tradition that caused the forgetfulness of Being is too
facile. Plato's dialogues are clearly concerned with the dominance of the
technical. In Plato there is a focus on a reasoning that is neither
productive or theoretical, that is where one finds his conception of
phronesis. Heidegger never takes this as a serious alternative to the
technological. Instead he turns to the poetic, a kind of productive mode of
thinking that is to counter the forgetful tendencies of technology. But
Heidegger never sees that poetry is not capable of maintaining its autonomy
>from the technological. Plato's point is that poetry requires a philosophial
grounding that enables the poetic to resist the hegemonic tendencies of the
technical mode of thinking. It is phronesis that supplies this grounding.
Through phronesis the meaning and significance of poetry is able to resist
the temptation to lose that significance in the immediacy of pleasure to
which technical thinking reduces everything. Perhaps this is the failure of
Heidegger's thought. He has allowed his thought to be usurped by a technical
thinking that empties it of its content in order to further the interests of
that collective mentality. In the end Heidegger himself could resist the
identification of his views with that of the party, in spite of the fact
that he did not approve of the rather vulgar sorts that were leading the
party. Heidegger's lament at the end of the war is not sorrow for all of the
death and destruction that occurred, especially the Holocaust. Rather it is
the lament of a failure of the party, the failure of Germany. He reminds us
that when speaking of the Holocaust one must also speak of the holocaust of
Germans. While I do not read his writings as propaganda tracts, they are as
disquieting as they are intriguing.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Heidegger's activities in the 30's and 40's is the fact that almost every
public account that Heidegger gave either withheld facts or concealed them
altogether. This is especially true in regard to the statements that he gave
in the denazification hearings in the period immediately after the War.
Someone mentioned Arendt's essay that attempts to understand Heidegger. It
is in this connection that the Ettinger book is very helpful. It makes clear
that Heidegger did not tell Arendt the whole truth about his involvement in
order to have her help him in the quest to get back to teaching. The book
raises a very interesting question as to what Arendt would have done had she
consulted Jaspers about the extent of Heidegger's involvement.
This deception on the part of Heidegger makes me wonder exactly what
connection this has with his philosophical work. In most cases I would be
willing to concede that there is no connection. Being and Time is not party
propaganda. But what is interesting is the extent to which Heidegger goes in
order to avoid taking responsibility for his actions. His activities were
such that he did do harm to people, especially heartbreaking was his conduct
in regard to Max Muller and some of his Jewish colleagues, not to mention
his failure to appear at Husserl's funeral. Heidegger attempts to minimize
his participation in party activities, but the facts always say otherwise.He
never does own up to any of this. All of his public declarations are found
to be wanting in truth when compared to the facts. One might conjecture that
the philosophical connection here is that Heidegger's emphasis on Being and
the destining of Being is so ingrained in him that he can no longer see his
actions as his own. Or that his philosophical views merely provide him with
a means for avoiding the call of conscience. In either case it is alarming
that he is not able to see that what he did was wrong. But it is just as
distressing to see that his philosophical thought functions in an
instrumental way for him in this matter. Heidegger appears to see that the
surrender to being absolves him in some way.
It is here that I find the grounds for a critical engagement of his
thought. My primary interest here is Heidegger's failure to take up the
question of phronesis and ethics in his later writings. In the 20's he
appears to have taken up Aristotle's account. But that is never followed
through in a very serious manner. Also there is a real failure to comprehend
Plato. The labeling of Plato and Aristotle as the originators of the
technological tradition that caused the forgetfulness of Being is too
facile. Plato's dialogues are clearly concerned with the dominance of the
technical. In Plato there is a focus on a reasoning that is neither
productive or theoretical, that is where one finds his conception of
phronesis. Heidegger never takes this as a serious alternative to the
technological. Instead he turns to the poetic, a kind of productive mode of
thinking that is to counter the forgetful tendencies of technology. But
Heidegger never sees that poetry is not capable of maintaining its autonomy
>from the technological. Plato's point is that poetry requires a philosophial
grounding that enables the poetic to resist the hegemonic tendencies of the
technical mode of thinking. It is phronesis that supplies this grounding.
Through phronesis the meaning and significance of poetry is able to resist
the temptation to lose that significance in the immediacy of pleasure to
which technical thinking reduces everything. Perhaps this is the failure of
Heidegger's thought. He has allowed his thought to be usurped by a technical
thinking that empties it of its content in order to further the interests of
that collective mentality. In the end Heidegger himself could resist the
identification of his views with that of the party, in spite of the fact
that he did not approve of the rather vulgar sorts that were leading the
party. Heidegger's lament at the end of the war is not sorrow for all of the
death and destruction that occurred, especially the Holocaust. Rather it is
the lament of a failure of the party, the failure of Germany. He reminds us
that when speaking of the Holocaust one must also speak of the holocaust of
Germans. While I do not read his writings as propaganda tracts, they are as
disquieting as they are intriguing.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---