Dear Toad,
Thank you so much for the wonderful email. By 'wonderful', I mean that you
have shared difficult decisions in reference to aging parents, questions for
intellectual stretching, and concerns about parenting. It is a good sampling
of questions floating about regarding mortality...
Questions of mortality ought always to be present with us because it is the
edge against which we may measure what is best in our responses. Heidegger
hit on something. Heidegger intriqued me because this is one of the
significant matters he hit on. Levinas hit on something. This is also the
something he hit on, only with variation; therefore, he intriques me also.
The first question, it seems to me, is, 'I die. You die. Now, how do we
live?'.
In terms of 'the Good', I dont think we "effect" it. We participate, we
try to participate, in it. We strive toward it, we attempt to discover it,
we try to intuit it. But we do not "effect" it. We may bring it to the
fore of human lives, but we don't make it better nor can we destory it
(although we can so cover it over that it may appear that way). It is
'Good' largely because it is what gives value, reflects what is valued best,
and announces what is best, in living a human life, in being a human. It is
good because it does not matter what race, religion, age, sex, or economy,
one finds oneself within; it is Good because it is Good for living a human
life. This is the reason we can not effect it; it is beyond our petty bias,
slight of brain, and period of development. To live it wholly we would not
be beleaguered by the three previous states of affairs, which would mean we
were perfect humans and we are not perfect humans, and there never was one,
and there never will be. So, here we sit chasing 'the Good' (lot like
chasing rainbows).
I think, Ley, that the best we ever can do is to be sensitive. That means
taking another's position, being compassionate, being thoughtful,
reflecting, striving to eliminate suffering that is only suffering and
nothing further, caring with our whole heart, leaving our own feelings of
slight with the petty stuff of the day, understanding that the other
(whoever that may be and in whatever text one might put that) is not us but
is not that different from us. It is a list as long as a mile. Because
being sensitive does not simply mean the ability to have one's feeling hurt
easily; in fact it doesn't even include that. Being sensitive is to
understand that you can't gather it all in...and therefore you are going to
be insensitive at times. It is important not to be mean, although you may
be insensitive; being mean is to be self centered because you feel slighted.
Being insensitive means you simply have missed something that you ought to
have caught. There is a big difference between the two. Being mean is to
be thoughtful of what one is saying or doing; being insensitive is being
thoughtless. I have been mean once in my life and that was enough to haunt
me for a lifetime. I was extemely close to being mean a second time, and
that was crushing to my very soul. Everyone has the capability of being
mean; the question isn't can I be, but do I want to continue to go toward
it? The answer must be 'no'. Being sensitive is a moral question, it is a
question of participation in what is Good, in 'the Good'. Being sensitive
rests on the acknowlegement of one's mortality, keeping that acknowledgement
close to one's heart opens up the possiblity of intuiting 'the Good'.
Does this make sense? Thank God one does not have to wear a stripe suit
to think about matters of human siginificance!
Cabby will be 18. A major mile stone. She will cross it. You ought to
craft, with care and concern, love and faith, a ceremony for her passage. I
strongly suggest this as a rite of passage. I do this with my children and
Jane's. I just celebrated John's passage to 20. He cried. He felt the
movement into adulthood with all its hurts, responsibilites, and
possbilities, that a young person can note. I wish I could be there for
this moment. I am terribly sad that I can not. If there is one time I
would want to be there it is this. I again am diminished for my distance...
I must go now, write soon and share your life and your thoughts; they are
so rich and I miss them terribly. love ever, frog
>Dear Frog, I am not sure if Mike is still there, but if he is, you should shar
>e this post with him and tell him to drop in on Professor Beavers before he
>leaves town. Obviously he is writing Mike's thesis. We had a fine time in Ind
>iana this past weekend with the family. My three older brothers and I got toge
>ther and decided that we should place our parents in a "assisted living" care f
>acility that raises the care level as the people deteriorate. Both Mom and Dad
> have lost a tremendous amout in mental capacity, but both seem to be doing o.k
>physically. (She is 81, he is 84.) Angelika Potter suggests to me that she in
>tuits something of what The Good is about when she is able to hold fast to the
>knowledge of her own mortality and the mortality of those with whom she is deal
>ing. I am trying to ponder the meaning of this. Perhaps you have some thought
>s? Cabby will be 18 in a week. She is struggling and I seem not to be able to
> help very much. That is wen I see The Bad--when I sense how little we can do
>to effecty the Good. Maybe that is because we envision it so poorly that mostl
>y we would be making mistakes. A book I have picked up and recommend to you is
>AGAINST ETHICS by John Caputo. I think you would have a lot of sympathy with i
>t as I do. Keep fighting the good fight.
> Blessings,
> Toad
>---------------------------Original message----------------------------
>
>
>
>Laurence,
>
>Thanks for your comments. The truth is that I am not finished with my
>thinking on Heidegger and the ethical. I have a stack of articles here to
>get through that assess points of contact between Levinas and Heidegger,
>and I am planning to write an article that shows precisely where Heidegger
>falls short, if, in fact, he does fall short.
>
>In general, my speculation is that, though Being certainly is, in some
>sense, Other, it is not personal. It seems to me that Heidegger is
>mistaken to see the individual as derivative from the social order. (I may
>not be putting this in the precise language.) Another concept of
>individuality sees it arise as the taking-on-of-responsibility. The I
>emerges precisely as responsible whereas for Heidegger the authentic
>projection toward one's death is the principle of individuation.
>
>The earlier conception of the individual as one-in-responsibility is
>present in pre-Greek culture, in particular, Hebrew culture, but one can
>also see traces of it in early Indian culture where the individual is the
>one singled out by God. While we can see the ontological difference
>operative in India, for instance, (in the form of the difference between
>the manifested and unmanifested, in, say, the Bhagavad Gita, for instance,
>and in various Upanishads), there is, at the same time, an ethical
>awakening that comes from contact with a transcendence that is beyond
>being. For the Hebrew culture, especially, this contact with the
>transcendent is ethical awakening in the same gesture that it is the
>principle of individuation. This responsibility as a principle of
>individuation is what is missing in Heidegger.
>
>In my recent thinking on this issue, I am inclined to agree with the basic
>tenets of Heidegger's history of Being, except that this history does not
>start in ancient Greece. The Greek epoch itself is a moment in this
>history, a moment that rests on a prior tradition that pre-exists the
>ontological language of the Greeks. Heidegger seems to forget that the
>Near East holds the secret to the Western world's other and older parent.
>
>(Is it conceivable that a member of the Nazi party would even consider
>this??? Especially a thinker who heralds ancient Greece as the origin of
>the West and Germany its logical successor??)
>
>This older parent sees the individual-in-responsibility as the condition
>for the social order. Society is founded on ethics, not ethics on society.
>But this means, in turn, that while it is true that the history of the
>West might be seen as a forgetting of the meaning of Being, it is also, at
>the same time and at a deeper level, the forgetting of responsibility. (I
>am here presupposing that there is a difference between responsibility
>(viewed existentially) and ethics that is prior to Heidegger's ontological
>difference.) And this means, in turn, not that Heidegger's analysis is
>bogus, but that he does not pursue transcendence to its deepest
>existential level. Slipping this other level "underneath" Heidegger's
>philosophy does not nullify his thinking; rather, it moderates it a bit.
>
>If I can put this into yet another language, Heidegger's ontological
>difference is akin to the difference between the second and third
>hypostasis in Plotinus, meaning, of course, that there is another
>difference that is its prior, that is, the difference between the first
>and second hypostasis. I am wondering what happens to Heidegger's analysis
>when this deeper level is exposed.
>
>On a final note, even though I find Heidegger's thinking to be "ethically
>bankrupt," I do think he is the greatest philosopher of the 20th Century.
>
>Yours,
>Tony
>
> ________________________________________________________________________
>
> A.F. Beavers, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof. Philosophy & Religion
> U of Evansville, Evansville, IN 47722 812-479-2682
> Metaphysics, Contemporary Continental Philosophy
>
> ________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Thank you so much for the wonderful email. By 'wonderful', I mean that you
have shared difficult decisions in reference to aging parents, questions for
intellectual stretching, and concerns about parenting. It is a good sampling
of questions floating about regarding mortality...
Questions of mortality ought always to be present with us because it is the
edge against which we may measure what is best in our responses. Heidegger
hit on something. Heidegger intriqued me because this is one of the
significant matters he hit on. Levinas hit on something. This is also the
something he hit on, only with variation; therefore, he intriques me also.
The first question, it seems to me, is, 'I die. You die. Now, how do we
live?'.
In terms of 'the Good', I dont think we "effect" it. We participate, we
try to participate, in it. We strive toward it, we attempt to discover it,
we try to intuit it. But we do not "effect" it. We may bring it to the
fore of human lives, but we don't make it better nor can we destory it
(although we can so cover it over that it may appear that way). It is
'Good' largely because it is what gives value, reflects what is valued best,
and announces what is best, in living a human life, in being a human. It is
good because it does not matter what race, religion, age, sex, or economy,
one finds oneself within; it is Good because it is Good for living a human
life. This is the reason we can not effect it; it is beyond our petty bias,
slight of brain, and period of development. To live it wholly we would not
be beleaguered by the three previous states of affairs, which would mean we
were perfect humans and we are not perfect humans, and there never was one,
and there never will be. So, here we sit chasing 'the Good' (lot like
chasing rainbows).
I think, Ley, that the best we ever can do is to be sensitive. That means
taking another's position, being compassionate, being thoughtful,
reflecting, striving to eliminate suffering that is only suffering and
nothing further, caring with our whole heart, leaving our own feelings of
slight with the petty stuff of the day, understanding that the other
(whoever that may be and in whatever text one might put that) is not us but
is not that different from us. It is a list as long as a mile. Because
being sensitive does not simply mean the ability to have one's feeling hurt
easily; in fact it doesn't even include that. Being sensitive is to
understand that you can't gather it all in...and therefore you are going to
be insensitive at times. It is important not to be mean, although you may
be insensitive; being mean is to be self centered because you feel slighted.
Being insensitive means you simply have missed something that you ought to
have caught. There is a big difference between the two. Being mean is to
be thoughtful of what one is saying or doing; being insensitive is being
thoughtless. I have been mean once in my life and that was enough to haunt
me for a lifetime. I was extemely close to being mean a second time, and
that was crushing to my very soul. Everyone has the capability of being
mean; the question isn't can I be, but do I want to continue to go toward
it? The answer must be 'no'. Being sensitive is a moral question, it is a
question of participation in what is Good, in 'the Good'. Being sensitive
rests on the acknowlegement of one's mortality, keeping that acknowledgement
close to one's heart opens up the possiblity of intuiting 'the Good'.
Does this make sense? Thank God one does not have to wear a stripe suit
to think about matters of human siginificance!
Cabby will be 18. A major mile stone. She will cross it. You ought to
craft, with care and concern, love and faith, a ceremony for her passage. I
strongly suggest this as a rite of passage. I do this with my children and
Jane's. I just celebrated John's passage to 20. He cried. He felt the
movement into adulthood with all its hurts, responsibilites, and
possbilities, that a young person can note. I wish I could be there for
this moment. I am terribly sad that I can not. If there is one time I
would want to be there it is this. I again am diminished for my distance...
I must go now, write soon and share your life and your thoughts; they are
so rich and I miss them terribly. love ever, frog
>Dear Frog, I am not sure if Mike is still there, but if he is, you should shar
>e this post with him and tell him to drop in on Professor Beavers before he
>leaves town. Obviously he is writing Mike's thesis. We had a fine time in Ind
>iana this past weekend with the family. My three older brothers and I got toge
>ther and decided that we should place our parents in a "assisted living" care f
>acility that raises the care level as the people deteriorate. Both Mom and Dad
> have lost a tremendous amout in mental capacity, but both seem to be doing o.k
>physically. (She is 81, he is 84.) Angelika Potter suggests to me that she in
>tuits something of what The Good is about when she is able to hold fast to the
>knowledge of her own mortality and the mortality of those with whom she is deal
>ing. I am trying to ponder the meaning of this. Perhaps you have some thought
>s? Cabby will be 18 in a week. She is struggling and I seem not to be able to
> help very much. That is wen I see The Bad--when I sense how little we can do
>to effecty the Good. Maybe that is because we envision it so poorly that mostl
>y we would be making mistakes. A book I have picked up and recommend to you is
>AGAINST ETHICS by John Caputo. I think you would have a lot of sympathy with i
>t as I do. Keep fighting the good fight.
> Blessings,
> Toad
>---------------------------Original message----------------------------
>
>
>
>Laurence,
>
>Thanks for your comments. The truth is that I am not finished with my
>thinking on Heidegger and the ethical. I have a stack of articles here to
>get through that assess points of contact between Levinas and Heidegger,
>and I am planning to write an article that shows precisely where Heidegger
>falls short, if, in fact, he does fall short.
>
>In general, my speculation is that, though Being certainly is, in some
>sense, Other, it is not personal. It seems to me that Heidegger is
>mistaken to see the individual as derivative from the social order. (I may
>not be putting this in the precise language.) Another concept of
>individuality sees it arise as the taking-on-of-responsibility. The I
>emerges precisely as responsible whereas for Heidegger the authentic
>projection toward one's death is the principle of individuation.
>
>The earlier conception of the individual as one-in-responsibility is
>present in pre-Greek culture, in particular, Hebrew culture, but one can
>also see traces of it in early Indian culture where the individual is the
>one singled out by God. While we can see the ontological difference
>operative in India, for instance, (in the form of the difference between
>the manifested and unmanifested, in, say, the Bhagavad Gita, for instance,
>and in various Upanishads), there is, at the same time, an ethical
>awakening that comes from contact with a transcendence that is beyond
>being. For the Hebrew culture, especially, this contact with the
>transcendent is ethical awakening in the same gesture that it is the
>principle of individuation. This responsibility as a principle of
>individuation is what is missing in Heidegger.
>
>In my recent thinking on this issue, I am inclined to agree with the basic
>tenets of Heidegger's history of Being, except that this history does not
>start in ancient Greece. The Greek epoch itself is a moment in this
>history, a moment that rests on a prior tradition that pre-exists the
>ontological language of the Greeks. Heidegger seems to forget that the
>Near East holds the secret to the Western world's other and older parent.
>
>(Is it conceivable that a member of the Nazi party would even consider
>this??? Especially a thinker who heralds ancient Greece as the origin of
>the West and Germany its logical successor??)
>
>This older parent sees the individual-in-responsibility as the condition
>for the social order. Society is founded on ethics, not ethics on society.
>But this means, in turn, that while it is true that the history of the
>West might be seen as a forgetting of the meaning of Being, it is also, at
>the same time and at a deeper level, the forgetting of responsibility. (I
>am here presupposing that there is a difference between responsibility
>(viewed existentially) and ethics that is prior to Heidegger's ontological
>difference.) And this means, in turn, not that Heidegger's analysis is
>bogus, but that he does not pursue transcendence to its deepest
>existential level. Slipping this other level "underneath" Heidegger's
>philosophy does not nullify his thinking; rather, it moderates it a bit.
>
>If I can put this into yet another language, Heidegger's ontological
>difference is akin to the difference between the second and third
>hypostasis in Plotinus, meaning, of course, that there is another
>difference that is its prior, that is, the difference between the first
>and second hypostasis. I am wondering what happens to Heidegger's analysis
>when this deeper level is exposed.
>
>On a final note, even though I find Heidegger's thinking to be "ethically
>bankrupt," I do think he is the greatest philosopher of the 20th Century.
>
>Yours,
>Tony
>
> ________________________________________________________________________
>
> A.F. Beavers, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof. Philosophy & Religion
> U of Evansville, Evansville, IN 47722 812-479-2682
> Metaphysics, Contemporary Continental Philosophy
>
> ________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---