Re: Heidegger/Mathematics/Infinity

Tibor Odor recently wrote (towards the end of his speech):

>>It seems to be a natural assumption that a Physical Theory which
>gives a complete description of the Universe has to be self-representable.
>
>It seems to be a deep and difficult question wether there exist or not a
>self-representable Physical Theory.

We come up against the problem easily visible in Nietzsche (will-to-power)
and Hegel (the Idea) for a monadic theory or a complete if not completable
speech. Such a speech must 'contain' the 'fact' of it self as such a (ie,
complete) speech. The 'Universe' must contain not only all speeches about
it but also the complete speech about it and all the other speeches about
it.

Using the metaphysics of inside/outside or interiority/exteriority such a
speech must be able to account for it self as in-side the Universe that it
speaks of, ie, it must have a theory regarding in-side-ness and
out-side-ness that is in-side the speech and the Universe. It must also
contain a sub-speech concerning the difference between one and two since it
is one (speech) but it must re-side with-in the Universe as one of its
beings thus two must 'exist': the complete speech and the Universe that it
is the complete speech of, and this speech must re-flect its two-ness as
well as its in-ness. Such inclusion of the speeches of manyness and in-ness
have to be included in the complete speech itself as explanable facets of
its completion: and so does that last statement.

Without going any further with the extra-ordinary lengths to which such a
speech would have to go in order to be complete and finite (be some thing
like a big theory) it is easy to see how such a speech might be
im-possible. One can say that the complete&finite speech is essentially
un-completable or in-finite. Either way it does not compute.

What any of this has to do with Heidegger I'm not sure but Heidegger did
re-mind us of our essential finitude.

In one of Elmore Leonard's novels the hero remarks to the reader or maybe
himself just previous to his violent death (while he is dying):

"He had finally made it. It had taken him fifty years to learn that being
was the important thing. Not being something. Just being. Looking around
you and knowing you were being, not preparing for anything. That was a long
time to learn something. He should have known about it when he was seven,
but nobody had told him. The only thing they'd told him was that he had to
be something. See, if he'd known it then, he'd have had all that time to
enjoy being. Except it doesn't have anything to do with time, he thought.
Being is an hour or a minute or even a moment. Being is being..."

If Being is all there is (what can be a-part from Be-ing?) how can one
speech (the self-representable complete speech) be? It must be about Being.
It must re-place Being with its being (a speech) in order to re-present it.
Thus it must exactly cover Being in being (it self). Therefore it can not
be complete or all since only Being is all and the complete speech
obscurates Being. If the complete speech can not be all it must be
incomplete. Therefore it can not be it self (as possible/complete), thus it
can not re-present it-self. The pro-ject is impossible although it might be
fun.

Leonard's hero real-ises that Being is Being and no speech (articulatable
concrete act of the dasein, historical facticity, happenstance, etc) can be
in the same way Being is.

Unified Field Theory; Totalising Totalisation; Absolute System;
Philosopher's Stone; God...
All doomed to fail: humanity is an interesting failure insofar as it tries
for the complete speech.

Keep trying; keep thinking; just being

MP




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