Michael D. Pennamacoor writes:
In the text 'Overcoming Metaphysics' in the volume 'The End of
>Philosophy', Joan Stambaugh (translator) goes out of her way to remind us
>that:
>
>"Although Heidegger uses the familiar word Uberwindung for 'overcoming', he
>means it in the sense of the less familiar word Verwindung.... When
>something is overcome in the sense of being verwunden, it is, so to speak,
>incorporated."
[snip]
>In line with this, could we suggest that some sense of the word Verwindung
>in its relation to metaphysics could include a note of bringing-along (of
>revealing the structure (dare I suggest some echo of Althusser in his
>exhilarating 'Reading Capital' where he installs the idea of a symptomatic
>reading whereupon elements of the un-thought are thought (out/through) and
>revealed in the reading?)).
No wine yet -- my microbrew beer is chilling for later.
Stambaugh's remarks have always bothered me, as 'incorporation' is such a
charged word, leading me to think of Hegelian Aufhebung, identity of
identity and difference in the interiorization of what has been
exteriorized, accomplished (according to Ph.G, Chapter 8) through
recollection as Er-innerung.
This is a knotty topic and would require much thinking ...
This is why Heidegger insistently returns (again and again) not only to
Parmenides and Heraclitus, but also to Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche:
to pursue precisely what is unthought by this whole ensemble of 'names',
not to 'overcome' them or refute them or any such futile activity, but to
uncover what is yet-to-be-thought, what remains *fragwuerdig*. And (pace
Hegel) this reading rarely presumes to order the history of philosophy (or
order it around) to show why Idealism (or fundamental ontology or the truth
of Beyng or the topology of Being) is the telos or eschaton of the whole
process, but rather to open up an other beginning as prepared by (but
closed off to) these thinkers.
And this is also why Heid. enlists Hoelderlin (again and again) and Trakl
and George (to a lesser extent) -- as fellow wayfarers on the path to the
self-concealing/self-revealing source; they are not (nor can they be)
entirely innocent of metaphysics, but they have been claimed or called by
the presencing of what is, drawn into the clearing, in a more originary
(hinting, intimating, be-wegende) way than 'philosophers' have been.
Or so it seems.
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
University of Toronto
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
In the text 'Overcoming Metaphysics' in the volume 'The End of
>Philosophy', Joan Stambaugh (translator) goes out of her way to remind us
>that:
>
>"Although Heidegger uses the familiar word Uberwindung for 'overcoming', he
>means it in the sense of the less familiar word Verwindung.... When
>something is overcome in the sense of being verwunden, it is, so to speak,
>incorporated."
[snip]
>In line with this, could we suggest that some sense of the word Verwindung
>in its relation to metaphysics could include a note of bringing-along (of
>revealing the structure (dare I suggest some echo of Althusser in his
>exhilarating 'Reading Capital' where he installs the idea of a symptomatic
>reading whereupon elements of the un-thought are thought (out/through) and
>revealed in the reading?)).
No wine yet -- my microbrew beer is chilling for later.
Stambaugh's remarks have always bothered me, as 'incorporation' is such a
charged word, leading me to think of Hegelian Aufhebung, identity of
identity and difference in the interiorization of what has been
exteriorized, accomplished (according to Ph.G, Chapter 8) through
recollection as Er-innerung.
This is a knotty topic and would require much thinking ...
This is why Heidegger insistently returns (again and again) not only to
Parmenides and Heraclitus, but also to Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche:
to pursue precisely what is unthought by this whole ensemble of 'names',
not to 'overcome' them or refute them or any such futile activity, but to
uncover what is yet-to-be-thought, what remains *fragwuerdig*. And (pace
Hegel) this reading rarely presumes to order the history of philosophy (or
order it around) to show why Idealism (or fundamental ontology or the truth
of Beyng or the topology of Being) is the telos or eschaton of the whole
process, but rather to open up an other beginning as prepared by (but
closed off to) these thinkers.
And this is also why Heid. enlists Hoelderlin (again and again) and Trakl
and George (to a lesser extent) -- as fellow wayfarers on the path to the
self-concealing/self-revealing source; they are not (nor can they be)
entirely innocent of metaphysics, but they have been claimed or called by
the presencing of what is, drawn into the clearing, in a more originary
(hinting, intimating, be-wegende) way than 'philosophers' have been.
Or so it seems.
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
University of Toronto
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---