On the wondertfully complex relationship between Dichten and Denken in H.,
I wonder if you are familiar with G. Bruns' book, HEIDEGGER'S
ESTRANGEMENTS, which deals extensively with the problem, including the
bearing of Heidegger's own language ( rhetoric) has on it.
I'd like to comment on part of Paul Murphy's post:
>My layman's view is a theory of dialectic...and the intuition
>that once upon a time they were a unity, and strive perpetually to
>regain that unalienated conflict-free condition of innocence.
>What, in my simplicity,I find so difficult is a seeming willful
>perversity in H to exploit the Dichten genre under the rubric Denken,
>the while disparaging the thesis historically identified by the latter word.
>...Hermeneutical brilliance aside, why aren't H's extreme pretentions
>labeled (after Socrates) rhetorical legerdemain? sophistry?
I think any attempt to utilize use poetic language to reflect
philosophically on the poetic aspects of language might be construed as
pretentious rhetorical overkill, and indeed there are moments in Heidgger
when he reaches too far, trying to make too much with too little. But when
it "works," the world-creating, world- discovering force of his linguistic
inventiveness puts him way beyond the charge of sophistic pretense. Of
course such moments in H. can still look like "rhetorical legerdemain" to
those unwilling to hear the words as reflecting and calling forth profound
thinking, and of course there is no way to ultimately convince them
otherwise. (One trying to make this case might also be accused of simply
joining in Heidegger's rhetorical legerdemain.) I guess I'm suggesting that
you can't put H.'s "hermeneutical brilliance aside" in assessing his
"rhetoric" because that brilliance is consituted by the very
rhetoric one is assessing, hearing, understanding ( or should that be
hearing, understanding, assessing?).
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
I wonder if you are familiar with G. Bruns' book, HEIDEGGER'S
ESTRANGEMENTS, which deals extensively with the problem, including the
bearing of Heidegger's own language ( rhetoric) has on it.
I'd like to comment on part of Paul Murphy's post:
>My layman's view is a theory of dialectic...and the intuition
>that once upon a time they were a unity, and strive perpetually to
>regain that unalienated conflict-free condition of innocence.
>What, in my simplicity,I find so difficult is a seeming willful
>perversity in H to exploit the Dichten genre under the rubric Denken,
>the while disparaging the thesis historically identified by the latter word.
>...Hermeneutical brilliance aside, why aren't H's extreme pretentions
>labeled (after Socrates) rhetorical legerdemain? sophistry?
I think any attempt to utilize use poetic language to reflect
philosophically on the poetic aspects of language might be construed as
pretentious rhetorical overkill, and indeed there are moments in Heidgger
when he reaches too far, trying to make too much with too little. But when
it "works," the world-creating, world- discovering force of his linguistic
inventiveness puts him way beyond the charge of sophistic pretense. Of
course such moments in H. can still look like "rhetorical legerdemain" to
those unwilling to hear the words as reflecting and calling forth profound
thinking, and of course there is no way to ultimately convince them
otherwise. (One trying to make this case might also be accused of simply
joining in Heidegger's rhetorical legerdemain.) I guess I'm suggesting that
you can't put H.'s "hermeneutical brilliance aside" in assessing his
"rhetoric" because that brilliance is consituted by the very
rhetoric one is assessing, hearing, understanding ( or should that be
hearing, understanding, assessing?).
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---