Hi all,
I am tinkering with a theory of consciousness, and am being dragged
against my will (by reason) into areas which Heidegger may have
interesting things to say about.
Specifically, I am interested in the reality of that which is represented
by our brains. For instance, I can be hallucinating a stick, and during
that time the 'stick' representation is being activated. As a scientist,
I can say "There is no stick there, but the brain is representing the
world as such."
What is the nature of the 'reality' of the hallucinated stick (and
representations in general--even 'veridical' ones)? I do NOT want to
say the stick does not exist PERIOD. I also do not want to say it merely
exists 'in the consciousness of the subject', basically placing it in a
mystical zone from which few will escape. I believe I am more talking
about the causal efficacy of the 'stick' _to the subject_ than the
'experience' of it. I want the stick to exist in some 'substantive'
sense, but not in the sense that will let it be observable directly by
science (because it is patently NOT so observable).
[I know this isn't all that clear, but I am in a zone where I have very
little articulated linguisticially. I am feeling my way around conceptual
space with what I've got, though....]
Due to my experience with him, and certain cryptic comments my Prof made,
I think Heideggar may have some interesting things to say about
this, and so I should dig in. Does anyone have any idea what I could
read of his (or any secondary sources) that would shed light on the
question of the reality of that which is represented (I know he would
eschew talk of representations, but perhaps there is some cognate
concept which I could hook into).
Regards,
Eric Thomson
eet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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