Perhaps Heidegger would muse that the stick persists in the temporal lobe
of Beon. (Bishop Berkeley may have been crazy, but he wasn't stupid!)
On Fri, 19
Jul 1996, Eric E Thomson wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I am tinkering with a theory of consciousness, and am being dragged
> against my will (by reason) into areas which Heidegger may have
> interesting things to say about.
>
> Specifically, I am interested in the reality of that which is represented
> by our brains. For instance, I can be hallucinating a stick, and during
> that time the 'stick' representation is being activated. As a scientist,
> I can say "There is no stick there, but the brain is representing the
> world as such."
>
> What is the nature of the 'reality' of the hallucinated stick (and
> representations in general--even 'veridical' ones)? I do NOT want to
> say the stick does not exist PERIOD. I also do not want to say it merely
> exists 'in the consciousness of the subject', basically placing it in a
> mystical zone from which few will escape. I believe I am more talking
> about the causal efficacy of the 'stick' _to the subject_ than the
> 'experience' of it. I want the stick to exist in some 'substantive'
> sense, but not in the sense that will let it be observable directly by
> science (because it is patently NOT so observable).
>
> [I know this isn't all that clear, but I am in a zone where I have very
> little articulated linguisticially. I am feeling my way around conceptual
> space with what I've got, though....]
>
> Due to my experience with him, and certain cryptic comments my Prof made,
> I think Heideggar may have some interesting things to say about
> this, and so I should dig in. Does anyone have any idea what I could
> read of his (or any secondary sources) that would shed light on the
> question of the reality of that which is represented (I know he would
> eschew talk of representations, but perhaps there is some cognate
> concept which I could hook into).
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Eric Thomson
> eet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
>
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