Rafael, Maybe you can say a bit more about what you see as the connections.
>on August 18 Ia[i]n wrote about the question of filtering and heritage as well
>as on ethical responsibility for what we transmit to the future.
>This is a question posed today by for instance nuclear technology concerning
>the semantic (and mediatic) stability of our messages for future
>generations.
>I see this question connected to metaphysical thinking (knowledge should be
>stable: idea, or in forms of laws etc.) and to Michael' s quest for
>'enclitic' thinking.
>is the quest for stable knowledge a metaphysical illusion?
>can we talk more about this?
>rafael
Let me address this last question briefly. Is stable knowledge a
metaphysical illusion? Quite the contrary, I'd say it is a metaphysical
reality. (The phrase 'metaphysical reality' is redundant; metaphysics
constructs reality; there is no reality outside metaphysics). Is science
historically constructed? Does science presuppose metaphysical assertions
which it cannot accout for? Of course. Foundationally. But is the
knowledge produced by science therefore an illusion? Do the bridges we
drive over keep falling down? Perhaps it is not as stable as some of its
'naive realist' practictioners might like to think, but I'd say Heidegger's
point is that science presupposes an ontologically constructed
preconception of what is (e.g., biology presupposes what 'life' is). In
terms of knowledge, something counts as 'true'--according to our
metaphysical epoch--when it is formulated in assertions which adequately
correspond to that about which they are asserted. (Nietzsche's point about
ressentement was that historically-constituted knowledge only seems
unsatisfying given the expectation of a knowledge standing outside of
history; the latter is the 'illusion.')
Dreyfus's response to this question (in a great back-and-forth
between he, Rorty, and Charles Taylor a few years ago on the Q of the
'status' of science) was clear and succinct; our science may well--in
accordance with its ontological presuppositions--be 'getting it right'
about the way things work, but no science can ever get it right about what
truly is.
Iain
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>on August 18 Ia[i]n wrote about the question of filtering and heritage as well
>as on ethical responsibility for what we transmit to the future.
>This is a question posed today by for instance nuclear technology concerning
>the semantic (and mediatic) stability of our messages for future
>generations.
>I see this question connected to metaphysical thinking (knowledge should be
>stable: idea, or in forms of laws etc.) and to Michael' s quest for
>'enclitic' thinking.
>is the quest for stable knowledge a metaphysical illusion?
>can we talk more about this?
>rafael
Let me address this last question briefly. Is stable knowledge a
metaphysical illusion? Quite the contrary, I'd say it is a metaphysical
reality. (The phrase 'metaphysical reality' is redundant; metaphysics
constructs reality; there is no reality outside metaphysics). Is science
historically constructed? Does science presuppose metaphysical assertions
which it cannot accout for? Of course. Foundationally. But is the
knowledge produced by science therefore an illusion? Do the bridges we
drive over keep falling down? Perhaps it is not as stable as some of its
'naive realist' practictioners might like to think, but I'd say Heidegger's
point is that science presupposes an ontologically constructed
preconception of what is (e.g., biology presupposes what 'life' is). In
terms of knowledge, something counts as 'true'--according to our
metaphysical epoch--when it is formulated in assertions which adequately
correspond to that about which they are asserted. (Nietzsche's point about
ressentement was that historically-constituted knowledge only seems
unsatisfying given the expectation of a knowledge standing outside of
history; the latter is the 'illusion.')
Dreyfus's response to this question (in a great back-and-forth
between he, Rorty, and Charles Taylor a few years ago on the Q of the
'status' of science) was clear and succinct; our science may well--in
accordance with its ontological presuppositions--be 'getting it right'
about the way things work, but no science can ever get it right about what
truly is.
Iain
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---