> Dreyfus's response to this question (in a great back-and-forth
>between he, Rorty, and Charles Taylor a few years ago on the Q of the
>'status' of science) was clear and succinct; our science may well--in
>accordance with its ontological presuppositions--be 'getting it right'
>about the way things work, but no science can ever get it right about what
>truly is.
I think this conflates several issues Heidegger handles separately, indeed,
sometimes only in his early or sometimes in his later philosophy.
First: does science work on the basis of presuppositions? Yes, according
to the early Heidegger, who was attempting to criticize Husserl's task of
finding a presuppositionless philosophy that could ground science.
Second: what is the ground of science? Being. Put another way, how beings
are articulated in terms of what they are, i.e., our understanding of what
is real. This is common to all facets and "epochs" in Heidegger's oeuvre.
Third: Can there be a science of being? Unknown. It depends on when
Heidegger said it and what he meant by science (or metaphysics) when he
said it. It seems around 1928 he thought he was really close to a
completed fundamental ontology that could ground the other regional
sciences. However, even at this time he still thought of fundamental
ontology in terms of formal indications, which is to say, a science that
articulates the ways in which being can be articulated. This science does
not take the form of propositions about beings. Later, no science of being
possible other than metaphysics, science here meaning a system of
propositions. Is "thinking" nonetheless "scientific" in the earlier sense?
Four: Does modern science work (function)? Yes, and that is bad.
Metaphysics thinks reality as that which can be effected, thereby passing
over and forgetting being as originary presencing. This has nothing to do
with whether in an alternative reality things will work or not, viz.
whether bridges will collapse. It has to do with how we conceive of the
reality of things. The ontological presupposition of modern science is
that reality is conceived of as what functions, and what do you know, it
finds truths that function and discards what does not function as untrue.
Five: Can we get at the reality of things? Like all great matters, it
depends. Does modern science? Yes, because within its particular
articulation of being it understands the reality of things as their
functionality. In this sense, all articulations of being, of which modern
science is one, get at the reality of things because reality is nothing
other than what is articulated. Which leads us finally to...
Six: Are all articulations of being appropriate? Clearly not. The
authentic/inauthentic distinction meant whether the articulation of being
offered by either theory/modern science was appropriate to human being.
The answer, from 1918 onward, is a definite no. Is there an authentic way
of articulating being? Clearly, yes; either phronesis early on or
techne/poiesis later. Does that mean that Heidegger thought there was a
way of "correctly" articulating being or the ontological presuppositions of
experiencing beings? It seems so.
Chris
_______________________________________________________________________
I just can't stop
When my spark gets hot
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