Cologne, 10 September 1996
Allen Scult writes:
"Heidgegger does speak of mood as "already disclosed" as "equi-primordial with
being-in-the-world", but also as "making it possible first of all to direct
oneself towards something.""
Why do you write "but" here, as if there were some sort of opposition? Instead
of "but", I would write: "that is". Moodedness is a primordial mode in which the
world is opened up (disclosed), thus opening the Da of Dasein. Its
"equiprimordiality" with understanding must be taken seriously, i.e. moodedness'
disclosure cannot be brought back to any type of understanding. Rather, the
world as a whole in its wholeness opens for Dasein in moodedness. It is the
wholeness of this dimension that first allows Dasein to orient itself
understandingly toward specific beings.
Allen writes further:
"The description of mood as "making possible" conflicts ever so delicately with
its character as "already disclosed," which I would like to gloss as "already
interpreted."
Why do you want to gloss it this way? Interpretation (Auslegung), dealt with in
SZ #32 "Understanding and Interpretation", is the job of understanding.
Interpretation lays matters out discursively in language. This is quite another
level from the originary disclosure performed by mood, which takes Dasein up
into itself and colours its Da.
Any mood is open to interpretation, i.e. it can be taken up by understanding.
And any understanding is always mooded. But neither can be encapsulated within
the other. The chiasma between the two allows for their respective
primordiality.
Aristotle does indeed treat rhetoric in the context of a "predisposition to
action" (praxis), but Heidegger's situating of moodedness is prior to that: it
is on the level of Welterschlossenheit (world-disclosure) as such. How is Dasein
there at all in the world? This is the opening of the dimensionality of Dasein
in human being as such, before any distinction between activity or passivity can
be made. (The 'Letter on Humanism' must not be lost sight of here: the essential
action (Handlung) in history is thinking. But this is no longer Aristotle's
praxis.)
So, characterizing "Gestimmtheit as a predisposition to action" is a
non-originary (non-primordial) characterization. Heidegger's thinking steps back
>from the openness of beings in their being to the openness of being as such: the
worldliness of the world, the there (Da) of being-there (Dasein), the moodedness
of mood, the understandingness of understanding.
Allen, can you say more about Heidegger's epiphany "in an early lecture when he
said/saw that Verstehen was what Aristotle meant by Phronesis."?
Cheers and regards,
Michael
\\\ ° '~': '' /// ° artefact text and translation °~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ - °
.{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ °°° made by art °°° _ °/ ~ : ~:~ \./''/
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eldred
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---